The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES" GISBORNE, MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1943. ROMMEL SPEEDED UP

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21067, 12 April 1943, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES" GISBORNE, MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1943. ROMMEL SPEEDED UP

11. is now' clear that the bulk of General Rommel’s forces have either

withdrawn or are rapidly withdrawing into the northern tip of Tunisia.

The retreat along the coast under pressure from the Eighth Army and with the fiank threatened by the Americans and the French has developed even more rapidly than there was reason to expect, a fac: which indicates the extent to whicl the Axis forces have been outmatehee. The latest reports place the Eighth Army well north of Sl'ax, probably half-way to Sousse, while the First Army, by breaking through in the region of Fondouk, has completed the Junction of the Allied northern and southern armies. It is to be expected that the withdrawal of the enemy will continue without .interruption at least until the kills north of Sousse arc reached, so that, to all intents and purposes, the Axis is now contained within an area less than 100 miles long and 50 miles wide. - In this confined space the enemy’s.forces will make their final stand for their last base in the African continent With severely depleted forces and with their backs to the sea, they Will face an overwhelmingly superior opponent whose previously scattered forces will now be able to concentrate all their strength against the last remaining objectives of the African campaign.

The speed of Rommel’s retreat should not be construed as indicating that the enemy has been routed. On the contrary, Rommel seems again to have disengaged himself with characteristic ingenuity. He fought delaying actions in the south, first at IViareih and then at Akarit, and, at the same time was able to protect his long and seemingly vulnerable flank while his main forces withdrew to the north. It seems possible that the speed of the Allied successes against his fortified positions took him by surorise, but there is nothing to suggest that even this prevented the bulk of his armies escaping. The withdrawal, however, and particularly the speed of it, must have been extremely costly, hi three weeks he has lost, at least, more than 20.000 prisoners and his casualties in killed and wounded cannot have been light. Even more important. perhaps, is the loss of equipment. Well equipped, a comparatively small force might have made a pro-p-acted stand in the mountains in the north of Tunisia, but with the severe losses that have been sustained, with only the scantiest prospect of fresh supplies, and against the preponderant strength of the Allied armies, it seems unlikely that Rommel can hold out for my length of time. Certainly, the present situation encourages the greatest optimism.

The present situation is now relalivelv clear. The Allies hold a line running from east of Cap Serrat in Hie north, down through Medjel el Dab to the vicinity of Kairouan and across to the coast. What has happened in ihe meantime has yet to hr(old. It is known, however, that some of Rommel’s best troops were holding positions between Kairouan and the iVlaknassi road. Their function was to hold back the American and French while the main armies made their - -eat along the coast. The Allied successes at Pichon, Fondouk, and Fa id Pass, however, suggest the possibility of substantial enemy forces having been left behind in the retreat and it may be that substantial numbers of prisoners will be taken in these areas. In the meantime, possession of the port of Sfax gives the Allies a considerable advantage, since once it has been rendered usable, the Eighth Army will be able to he supplied from here instead of from Tripoli. Another important gain in the intest advance is the important airfield at La Fauconniere, about 15 miles north of Sfax and within easy reach of Tunis and Bizerta. With good port and air facilities at both ends of the line and with the British, American, and French forces now concentrated along a relatively short front, the Allied task does not seem to be a difficult one.

In these circumstances, it is inevitable that conjecture should look further afield than Tunisia itself. Certain it is that the Axis leaders will have written Tunisia off as all but lost and will be planning, with a good deal of anixety. to counter the next move of the Allies: which probably explains i.l,c conference that is reported to have taken place between the German •md Italian commanders. Rommel has gained some time for them to make preparations for the defence of Europe, but their obvious difficulty is to know what region to defend. The problem is complicated by the halfheartedness of Italy, the stubborn resistance of the Yugoslav patriots, the unrest in Rumania and Bulgaria, and Hie pro-AUied attitude of Turkey. Each'of these spots is vulnerable to Allied attack once command of the Mediterranean has been secured and Germany will be mindful, too, of the possibility of another attack from the north. The Axis has .made a desperate bid to handicap Allied plans by Ihe war on shipping, but it has yet to he seen how far this will restrict future trooo movements. On the other hand, the Allies have given clear evidence of their supremacy in the air and this should largely offset any weakness at sea. A broad view of’the position suggests that, at. the [east the Allies are better placed for the offensive than at any previous stage of the war.