The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES” GISBORNE, FRIDAY, APRIL 9, 1043. THE WAR IN RUSSIA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21065, 9 April 1943, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES” GISBORNE, FRIDAY, APRIL 9, 1043. THE WAR IN RUSSIA

Actual fighting in Russia during the past few weeks Has been on a relatively moderate scale. That does not, mean, however, that there'has been any diminution of activity on either side. On the contrary, the lull in battle suggests even more intensive preparations for future operations. It Was reported the other day that a vast movement of men and materials was proceeding along the 1200 miles of front as the Russian and German forces prepared for the next stage of the conflict. What do these preparations imply?, That is a question which no one cap answer with any degree of certainty, for even the commanders on tlie spot must, to a large degree, be uncertain and apprehensive as to the trend of coming events. Until this year the German High Command was largely able to prepare and pursue its own plans while the Russians wore in the unenviable position, from a short-range point of view at least, of having to improvise their plans according’ to t]ie .movements of the enemy.' To-day, however, the Germans cannot scheme with the same measure of confidence; their plans must be defensive as well as offensive and even offensive operations must, to some, exte.pt' be governed by defensive considerations. ' The Russians are in a similar position, l'or they cannot yet concentrate o’p the offensive. At the beginning of the week, the Soviet Information Bureau, for the first time since" the war began, gave a detailed description of the front from Leningrad to tke. Caucasus. This fact is itself' 'significant,,' for it indicates sufficient confidence in the position to be prepared to disclose it to the world, whereas hitherto it had 'been deemed wise to preserve a considerable degree of secrecy. A study of the position reveals that the present front differs remarkably little from that of June, 1942, when the Germans launched their last offensive. In the Donetz Basin, between Izyupi and Taganrog, the Germans pje a little further advapce.d than they' wpre a year ago and they now have a bridgehead in the Caucasus. Op the other hand, they are ' not' >so far advanced between Izyum and Kharkov and the Russians are in possession of- Kursk, which last year was in-German hands. Between Orel and Smolensk the Germans hold sonic additional ground, but this is more than' offset by the loss of the Viasma-Rjev-Velikie Luki pocket. From Velikie Luki to Leningrad the line is little changed. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the position of thd front as a whole is very pinch the same as it was before last year’s German offensive. In other words the Germans are back where they were a year ago. The situation raises the question of whether or not the Germans can achieve this year what they failed to accomplish in 1942. On the face of it, the answer is definitely in the negative. In the, first place, the Gerpians planned for a, sbqr.t war in Russia and had hoped to break Russian military poiyer bv, 19,42 at the latest; in fact. I-litlcr declared ' that the campaign v/.quld bp ended in 1941. On the ptliep hand, the whole Russian strategy had been directed ioivards pr.epnrutipns for a holding war until the Allies gained strength. On tiiese grounds alone it would be reasonable to assume that the Germans have already passed the peak of their power,' whereas that of the Allies, if not that of Russia alone, is still growing. Last year, Germany still had superiority in the air and.was able to concentrate the greater part of her forces against Russia. To-day, she is definitely inferior in the air and has, also, to contend with a very serious second front in North Africa, with the possibility of it extending across the Mediterranean in the not-far-distant future. It is a reasonable inference, therefore, that Germany cannot possibly mount against Russia the weight of men and metal which she was able lo use last year. Whether Russia ys stronger or weaker than a year ago is an unknown factor, but she has given impressive evidence of the extent of her reserves. All the indications are that this year’s operations will largely be a battle of resources— not those of Germany and Russia alone, but those of Germany against the combined strength of the United Nations. If. as there, is reason to assume, Russia is relatively better situated than she was a year ago, then there is no ground ip fear that Germany will be able to seize the objectives which last year proved to be beyond her reach. At the other end of FAirope, there can be, no question that Britain and the United-States possess a’striking force beyond comparison with that of a year ago. The successes in Tunisia are only one indication of this strength. The b.ombing of Germany is another —a weapon that is taking steady and heavy toll of the resources which will be such a vital factor this year. Apart front tlie U-boat campaign—the’roost serious aspppt of the 'war from the Allied point of v.igw—Allied production has b.een little disrupted by enp.piy activity.; but the blockade of Europe, which is more effective than ever, continues to deny to the enemy supplies of which he is ip vital need. In the battle of resources, therefore, the; Allies' have an immense advantage and behind the resources of material are vast armies trained and ready to lake the field when opportunity offers. These factors, as much as the situation in Russia itself, justify the belief t,hat Germany will be no nearer success in Russia in 1943 than in 1942.