VOTE OF CONFIDENCE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20826, 3 July 1942, Page 3

VOTE OF CONFIDENCE

CHURCHILL ANSWERS CRITICS SEVERE BLOW IN LIBYA ADMITTED * DEFEATED DESPITE SUPERIOR FORCES WAR IN OTHER THEATRES REVIEWED (By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copyright.) (British Official Wireless.) (Noon.) RUGBY, July 2. . At the end of the two-day House of Commons debate on the war situation, the vote of no-confidence was rejected by 475 votes to 25, the result being received with prolonged cheering. The Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, was loudly cheered when he rose to reply to the debate. In the course ' of a speech that lasted for an hour and a half, he broadly reviewed the whole war situation, dealing not only with the position in Libya and Egypt, but also touching on the shipping problems and the supply of equipment to the various theatres of war. While regretting that at such a critical juncture it should be necessary for the Government to face such an attack, the ! Prime Minister said he would not. have it otherwise and he welcomed the opportunity for testing the confidence of the House.

“All over the. world—throughout the United States, as I can testify, in Russia, in China, and throughout every subjugated country—all our friends are waiting now to know whether there is a strong solid Government in Britain and whether the national leadership is challenged or not,” he said. “Every vote counts. If a vote of censure on the National Government is converted into a vote of censure on its authors, a cheer will go up from every friend of Britain and a groan of disappointment will ring in the ears of .the tv rant we strive to overthrow.”

Mr. Churchill, replying to the debate, - said that though everything had been done by members to weaken the confidence of the people and the army in the leaders, he was in favour of this freedom, which no other country would dare to use at a time of such mortal peril. At any moment they might receive news of grave importance. The misfortunes in CyrenMca and Egypt had \ completely transformed the situation throughout the Mediterranean. We had lost upwards of 50,000 men, by far the larger proportion prisoners, and a great mass of material and stores. We were now in the presence of a recession of our hopes and prospects in the Middle East and the Mediterranean unequalled since the fall of France. The fall of Tobruk, with about 25,000 men, in a. single day was utterly unexpected by the War Cabinet, the General Staff, of the Middle East Command. • The decision to hold it was taken by General Auchinleck, but the War Cabinet and its professional advisers thoroughly agreed with him beforehand. The Prime Minister was ready, on behalf of the Government, to take a full share of the responsibility. The decision to surrender Tobruk was taken, to the best of his knowledge, by the commander of the fortress.. Mr. Churchill said that when he left for the United States on June 17 they had no reason to be discontented with the situation, which seemed to have entered upon a wearing-down phase. It was only, .gradually .that the very grievous and disproportionate losses which our armour' sustained round and south of Knight’s Bridge became apparent. When he heard of the fall of Tobruk he found it very difficult to believe. Distorted Accounts It was an aggravation in the days which followed to read the distorted accounts of the feeling in Britain. That these rumours from Home did not pre- ' judice the work he had to do was due solely to the fact that the Americans . were not fair-weather friends. They never expected the war to be short or easy, or that its course would not be chequered by lamentable misfortunes. In this case the bond of comradeship between all the men at the ton was actually strengthened. Only his unshakeable confidence in the ties which bound him to the mass of the British people upheld him through those days Of trial. The Washington conversations were concerned with nothing but the movements of troops, ships, guns and aircraft, and the measures to combat the Josses at sea and more than replace the sunken tonnage. Shipping losses had been very heavy lately, and the bulk had been on the eastern shores of America. The most strenuous measures were being taken to curtail this Joss. These, combined with the great American and British shipbuilding effort, should result in a substantial gam in tonnage at the end of 1943 over and above that we now possessed. One of the most painful parts of the Battle of Libya, continued Mr. Churchill, had been that in the opening stages we were defeated in conditions which gave good expectation of success. Malta was now stronger in aircraft than ever before, but during the incessant Axis attacks on the island it was impossible for the fighters to do much to impede the German supplies to North Africa. Turning Point in Battle The enemy, by the tactical use they made of the 88 m.m. gun, gained • a decided advantage, but this became apparent only as the battle proceeded. We were so mauled in the struggle that no effective counter-stroke could be delivered. The withdrawal from Bir Akheim was the turning point in the battle. On June 13 we had about 300 tanks in action. By nightfall not more than 70 remained. This happened without any corresponding loss being inflicted on the enemy. It was - for the House to decide whether those facts resulted from a faulty central direction of the war or from the terrible hazards and unfori seeablef accidents of battle. Most authorities expected that 10 days or a fortnight would be gained by the withdrawal to- Mersa Matruh. However, although we inflicted very heavy damage, the advance of the German light divisions and 100 or 150 heavilyarmed tanks led to our further retirement owing to the destruction of our armour. Mr. Churchill said he could not tell the House about the reinforcements which had reached the army or were approaching it, except that they were very considerable. They did not regard the struggle as in any way decided. 2000 Tanks for Russia Extreme exertions had been made in the last two years to strengthen the armies in the Middle East. There had gone from Britain nearly 5000 pieces of artillery, 50,000 machineguns, and over 100,000 mechanical vehicles. The Government had sent over 2000 tanks to the Russians, who were using them with vigour and effect. Mr. Churchill said he considered that he had discharged his responsibility for everything that happened by not interfering with the tactical handling of the armies. Before the battle, he urged General Auchinleck to take command himself, as he i thought he was the man to handle the

business, but General Auchinleck gave good reasons for not doing so. The Prime Minister added that he could not pretend to form a judgment on what had happened. He liked all the commanders to feel that between them and public criticism the Government stood like a strong bulkhead, otherwise, they would not run risks nor would the Government run risks unless it had behind it a loyal and solid majority. “In wartime, if you desire service you must give loyalty,” said Mr. Churchill. The battle now raging was of a most intense and serious character. The Government had assured General Auchinleck of its confidence and believed that it would be found that this confidence had not been misplaced. He would say nothing about the future, except to invite the House and the nation to face with courage whatever it might unfold. Short War Never Expected He had never shared the view that this would be a short war or would end in 1942. It was far more likely to be a long war. Now more than half-way through the summer, no major offensive had been taken by Hitler against Russia, unless he called the attacks on Kharkov and Kerch an offensive. The Russians had surprised Hitler and would surprise mm again. Hitler made a contract with the demon of the air, but the contract ran out before the job was done. For the last six months, our convoys to the East had grown, said Mr. Churchill, and he was confident that a mass invasion of Australia would be most hazardous. India had now been strongly reinforced. Ceylon, which at one time appeared to be in great jeopardy, was now strongly defended’ by naval, • military, and air forces. The struggle in Egypt was approaching its full intensity and was an action of the highest consequence. The House must be a steady and stabilising factor in the State, and not an instrument by which' disaffected sections of the press could attempt to provoke one crisis after another.