The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, MONDAY. DECEMBER 1, 1941. GERMAN RETREAT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20627, 1 December 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, MONDAY. DECEMBER 1, 1941. GERMAN RETREAT

The Germans are in full retreat from Rostov-on-Don, the most easterly point to which they had penetrated in their invasion of Russia. Common sense dictates that this reverse on one sector of the vast battlefront should not be magnified out of its true proportion, for the Germans, as well as the Allies, are entitled to point out that the war should be judged by its progress as a whole. With this reservation, however, it is still permissible to describe the withdrawal, or flight, from Rostov as an event of considerable significance. After all, it is the first time in morO than two years of war that the German army has been compelled to make a withdrawal of any importance. Up till now they have always held the upper hand. It may well be that the experience at Rostov is indicative of the turn of the tide and that German miscalculations, combined with evergrowing Allied strength, are beginning to tell. The situation was not unexpected. For some weeks past it has been pointed out that it could never have been according to plan that the drive to the Caucasus should be made in advance of the capture of Moscow, and that the forces involved were in serious danger of being cut off from the north. This prediction has been fulfilled and, more important, the Germans have tacitly admitted the disruption of their plans. The immediate effect of the German retreat is some relief from the -threat to the Caucasus, but it may result in increasing the pressure in other directions. That depends on the motive for the withdrawal. It may be that the Germans have revised their plans in the light of experience and decided to abandon the drive to the Caucasus and. falling back on the original programme, concentrate on attacking Moscow. Alternatively, it may be intended to strengthen the forces in the Crimea and to attack the Caucasus from that point. In other words, the possibility cannot be overlooked that a retirement on one sector is a prelude to a more spirited attack elsewhere. This, however, presupposes that the withdrawal was voluntary. On the other hand, if it is the case that the I Germans were compelled to retire in I order to prevent the forces at Rostov being cut off, which seems a more | likely explanation, then they have suffered their most serious reverse of the war. It means that they are on the run—and having commenced to retreat they might find it difficult to stop. In the meantime, Russian propaganda will make the most of this reversal of fortune while Dr. Goebbels. having been forced to admit the withdrawal, will have some difficulty in explaining that the Russian campaign is proceeding according to plan. This is not the only reverse that the Germans have sustained. In the battle of Libya, too, they are obviously encountering difficulties and if they are not on the run there it is primarily because there is nowhere for them to run. The news from this theatre has been confused by what one commentator to-day describes as the broadcast “ballyhoo” with which the commencement of operations was announced. There is not the slightest reason to assume that this campaign has not nrogressed as well and as speedily as the army authorities anticipated. If it has not so far come up to the expectations of the public it is because the public was misled. What is certain is that the area between Solium and Tobruk has been wrested from the enemy, that Tobruk, after a siege lasting for seven months, has been relieved, and that such enemy units as remain are largely surrounded by Allied forces. In view of the fact that the territory had been held by p.cked German troops equipped with the most modern equipment, what more could reasonably have been expected in so short a time? It was never the intention merely to drive the Axis forces out of Libya, but, as Mr. Churchill pointed out when the attack was launched, the whole object was to annihilate the enemy, and this seems to be well on the way towards accomplishment. Libya is a long way from Rostov and Tokio is still further removed from either. Events in Tokio during the week-end, however, are doubtless closely linked with the developments in the other spheres. It was reported on Saturday that the negotiations between the United States and Japan had all but collapsed and President Roosevelt was quoted as saying that a crisis might be reached before to-morrow. Now the President has returned hurriedly to Washington, presumably on account of the bellicose statements of the Japanese Prime Minister. The German reverses in Libya and Russia might influence the Japanese in two entirely opposite directions. If they have been waiting for definite evidence of German supremacy before finally challenging Britain and the United States, they might be further restrained by the latest news. If, on the other hand, Japan is really susceptible to German pressure the difficulties which are being encountered by the Axis would provide a good reason for Japan to create a diversion in the Far East. The question is whether Japan is going to study her own interests or her obligations as a partner of Germany and Italy. If the former is the case, then war in the Pacific would seem to be less likely, but if Tokio is subordinate to Beiffin then a further extension of hostilities is almost inevitable,