The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES” GISBORNE, FRIDAY, NOV. 28, 1941. A CO-OPERATIVE EFFORT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20625, 28 November 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES” GISBORNE, FRIDAY, NOV. 28, 1941. A CO-OPERATIVE EFFORT

To-day’s news from the Western Desert is a little more precise and definite and a good deal more encouraging. Generally speaking, it would seem that the great tank battle which held the centre of the stage for the first day or two has lost much of its initial intensity and that an increasingly prominent and important part is being played by the infantry. The New Zealanders, in particular, have achieved some notable tasks and have been in the forefront of the advance. Apparently they have earned the distinction of being the first to link up with the forces which essayed out from Tobruk and to them has fallen the honour of occupying—or recapturing in the official phraseology—Sidi Rezegh. They have been active, too, at the other end of the coastal sector, where the Maoris are reported to be investing the enemy in the BardiaSollum area. These reports suggest that the Imperial forces hold the coast from Bardia to Tobruk, a distance of 70 miles, and that the Germans and Italians are being contained in everdiminishing isolated areas. It is likely however, that pockets of resistance will remain to be mopped up for some time to come. In the meantime, the tank brigades of both sides are probably licking their wounds preparatory to further engagements which are inevitable before a decision is reached.

The outstanding features of the campaign so far are the brilliant conception of the Allied attack and the degree of co-operation between the various units engaged. This co-operation takes on many sides. Outstanding, perhaps, is the unison with which land, sea and air forces have moved into action. To some extent, of course, their respective operations have been independent of one another but every move bf each seems to have dovetailed in with the plans of the others. The same remarks apply to the various divisions of, the land forces. The tank attacks have been closely linked to the plans of the infantry and artillery, either paving the way for an advance or protecting' it after it had been maae. The infaptry, in turn, has been on hand, i as at Sidi Rezegh, to consolidate the-gains of the tanks. The navy, like

the air force, has been attacking the enemy’s supply lines, covering a land advance, or bringing up supplies to wherever they might be required. In these widespread operations military strategy is seen at its best, and there is evidence on all sides of careful and elaborate preparation. It is these factors, more, perhaps, than the actual gains so far made, that provide encouragement as to the progress of the campaign and justify confidence as to its ultimate outcome. The war in the Western Desert, because of these opportunities for co-operation, has given the Allies their first real opportunity of meeting the enemy on equal terms. Everywhere else it was they who had to contend with difficulties of supply, support and reinforcement; it was they who had the long lines of communication, who were deficient in tank strength, and whose air bases were remote from the scene of operations. It would not be correct to say that the positions have been reversed, for the Germans in Libya are not nearly so handicapped as were the Allies in Greece or Crete. They had had ample time and opportunity for preparation—and were, indeed, well prepared—they were not short of equipment, and even now they have ample air bases. Where they are at a disadvantage is in their long supply lines, and it is here that the Allies have struck first and hardest. It is worth remembering, however, that this handicap would not by any means be fatal unless they were outmanoeuvred and out-fought in the various land engagements. They knew in advance precisely what difficulties they had to contend with. It must be 'presumed that they prepared for them and counted on their ability to overcome them. If they are beaten, therefore, it will not be due to natural handicaps but to the superiority of the opposing forces. There are three basic factors of co-operation in this campaign. In the first place, the land forces, aided by the best ol equipment from all parts of the Empire and the United States, have been preparing for months to play their part. At the same time the navy, in its constant watch over the Mediterranean, has interrupted supplies destined for the enemy and ensured the delivery of supplies for the Allies. The air forces of the Empire have carried out almost daily incursions into enemy territory. They have bombed the sources of supply in Italy itself, enemy ships attempting to cross the Mediterranean, and bases and lines of communication all the way from Tripoli to Solium. This is the background to the campaign, the long and careful preparation which has made it possible. Now that the campaign has been launched the co-operation takes on a new turn but is of at least equal value. The Imperial troops, tank forces and infantry have gone into action under the protective wings of the air force and, on the coastal sector, with the support of the guns of the Royal Navy. Simultaneously, the air force is harassing every move of the enemy, and the navy continues its task of cutting off enemy supplies and bringing up supplies for its own land forces. This co-operation is the keynote of the whole Libyan campaign and the best possible augury for its success.