The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, TUESDAY, NOV. 25, 1941. THE WAR IN RUSSIA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20622, 25 November 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, TUESDAY, NOV. 25, 1941. THE WAR IN RUSSIA

Although at the moment, primary interest in the war so far as New Zealand is concerned is centred in the Western Desert, the situation in Russia lias again reached a critical stage and developments there demand notice. In any case, the two widely-separated fronts are closely related. They comprise, as has been pointed out, the two claws of a huge pincers. To function perfectly there must be equal pressure on both claws. To the extent that one weakens, the responsibility of the other increases. In other words, the new' pressure in Libya is designed to relieve the burden being carried by the Russians by drawing off some of the German forces from that front. Conversely, if the Russian resistance weakens or the Germans are able to consolidate their position on the eastern front, the Axis Powers will be better able to reinforce their troops in the desert. These considerations no doubt explain the desperate efforts w'hich are being made by the Germans to secure some decisive advance in Russia. It is clear that they have thrown an enormous weight of men and metal into the drive against Moscow and Rostov. It is clear, too, that they have made some gains, but there is nothing to suggest that the Russian resistance is weakening or that the advances that have been made are sufficient materially to alter the position.

On the contrary, there are some encouraging features about the Russian situation as a whole. For the past week the Germans have been making stronger efforts than ever before to penetrate the defences outside Moscow'. Since they are now confronted with winter conditions and with a serious threat on a second front it is reasonable to assume that their attack has reached its peak. Unless, therefore, there is an unexpected collapse of the Russian defences there seems to be every chance of Moscow continuing to hold. It is not without significance that the Germans, who have been accustomed to the most spectacular advances, in a week of the most intensive effort have been able to make only insignificant gains. On the southern front there is very much the same story. There seems now to be little doubt that the Germans have succeeded in capturing Rostov, the important city on th’e Don and the gateway to the Caucasus. , This is unquestionably a serious blow to the Russians, but even for this heavy loss there are some compensating factors. In the first place, it is certain that the southern advance is not according to plan, since it should have been preceded by the capture of Moscow, and, secondly, it is a clear indication that the pressing need for oil is overriding all other considerations. Other operations on the Rostov sector lend point to the suggestion that the Germans have been forced to take serious risks. It is reported to-day that west of Rostov the Russians have advanced nearly 40 miles, which suggests that there is a chance, at least, of the German wing being cut off. This was a danger that was inherent in the German change of plans. Had Moscow been taken first, as was intended, the Russian threat to the German spearhead in the south would have been removed, but so long as Moscow holds this threat will remain. A somewhat similar situation exists to the north. The capture of Leningrad was intended to precede the fall of Moscow. Since Leningrad has not fallen, the German troops attacking Moscow from the north are vulnerable to attack by the Russian forces based on Leningrad. To-day these forces are reported to have recaptured territory 90 miles south of Leningrad, so that this movement, too, will require to be watched by the Germans. Further north still, it is reported that winter conditions have halted all operations in the Murmansk area. This may release some Russian forces for service further south, and with the steady approach of winter this factor may develop a snowball effect and enable stronger concentrations of Russians in the southern areas where the German pressure is strongest.

Optimism in regard to the war in Russia is certainly not warranted, but these favourable factors are entitled to consideration. There is no doubt that the German advance, compared with what it was earlier, is almost pitifully slow, and it is to be assumed that the Russian defence is proportionately stronger. It is certain, too, that winter conditions will impose a further brake on operations and that the opening up of a second front in Libya lwill present new problems for the Germans. Whether or not these things combined will suffice to bring the German advance to a complete standstill remains to be seen. In the meantime, they are slowly pushing

ahead and the danger to the Caucasus is undoubtedly serious. The capture of Rostov, however, is only the first step—or if the advance into the Crimea is counted, the second — towards this vital objective. The Germans now have two alternatives. The first is to strike directly into the Caucasus in order to secure oil supplies which are probably necessary to maintain the campaigns further north, and the second to continue the eastward drive to Astrakhan with the object of cutting the northern Russian armies off from the Caucasus. In the first event, however, they would have Allied forces from Iran to deal with, and in the second they would impose their advanced wing to danger of attack from the north.