The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, TUESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1911. THE EASTERN FRONT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20638, 19 August 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, TUESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1911. THE EASTERN FRONT

The situation on the eastern front remains uncertain and confused. It is reasonably clear, however, and the fact should be faced calmly, that the Germans are making substantial advances in the south and some gains in the north. In the central sector operations appear to be more or less at a standstill. The Russian retreat, or the German advance, whichever it may be called, is not, however, the deciding factor in this campaign. German territorial successes are real gains only to the extent that they the ultimate end, which is the complete overthrow and defeat of the Russian armies, and if they do not contribute to this objective they may well be the forerunner of serious reverses. The German advances, particularly in the Ukraine, cannot be viewed with equanimity, but, at the same time, they certainly should not be regarded as disastrous. Everything will depend upon the manner in which the Russian withdrawal is carried out, the extent to which their forces are kept intact, and their ability to hold the new lines which are being established. It is well to recall that the first serious Russian withdrawal was on the central sector, the road to Moscow, for it is significant that following their early retreat the Russians now appear to be holding the enemy. This experience may be repeated in the south. The objective of the Germans in the south seems to be to drive the Russians back on the River Dnieper. If they succeed it will be an important gain, at least temporarily. From Kiev, the Dnieper flows first south-west and then turns south-east and flows into the Rlack Sea, forming what is known as the great bend and embracing one of the most valuable areas in Russia. It contains valuable deposits of iron ore, which Germany no doubt desires, and is also a large industrial centre, while on the Dnieper itself is one of the great .Russian hydro-electric undertakings. In addition, there are, of course, large areas of agricultural land from which all of the season’s harvest has not yet been gathered. Whether or not the Germans have taken Odessa, it certainly would seem as if they had driven past it to the River Bug in one of their favourite encircling movements. Towards Kiev they are driving on to the Dnieper itself and may plan to move down the river towards the Black Sea. The question is whether Marshal Budenny will endeavour to hold the enemy in this area or will continue the policy of strategic withdrawal. The essential thing is that he should keep his forces as intact as possible, for if he does this anything the Germans now gain will ultimately avail them little or nothing. The Ukraine has, of course, always been the objective of Germany. Ostensibly it offers a rich prize, but it may be doubted whether, under existing conditions, it will be a prize worth taking. The “scorched earth"

policy of the Russians will denude the area of any immediate fruits. The same policy will, moreover, increase the problem of meeting the needs of the Soviet population, which will fall upon the Germans instead of the Russians. With a further lowering of the already low standard of living a vast army of occupation would be required to prevent revolt among people who do not take readily to oppression by invaders. This was the experience of the Germans who occupied the Ukraine in 1918, and everything suggests that history will repeal itself. Taking a longer view of the situation, if the Ukraine is to be of value to Germany it will have problems of transport to contend with and the exploitation of the territory will probably require the introduction of non-Soviet labour. It is premature to assume that the Germans will gain nominal control of the Ukraine, but it is as well that it should be understood at this stage that even if they do succeed they will still be a long way from securing effective and profitable control. It is possible that they will merely be storing up trouble for themselves.

The factors which have already been mentioned still overlook the primary consideration in the Russian campaign and that is the complete dislocation of Hitler’s time-table. To the Germans this is particularly important and possibly even disastrous. It is a wellrecognised fact that the Germans are adept and unequalled in planning and organisation. The effectiveness of the organisation, however, depends upon everything proceeding according to plan. If they are thwarted and their plans disorganised, they lack the capacity for improvisation and making effective changes. That is the position in which the invaders are to-day. They may still be proceeding according to plan, but the time-table is upset and the result is that they are faced with a winter campaign which could never have been envisaged and could hardly be provided for even if it was. In the meantime they have suffered heavy losses, and even if the Russians have suffered equally, which is unlikely, the Soviet armies are still intact and continue their resistance. And while the German armies and air force are being severely battered on the eastern front, their towns and cities and the people at home are being relentlessly attacked by the Royal Air Force. So it is that the Germans may be securing successes on the eastern front, but there is as yet nothing to suggest that they are any nearer to winning the war.