The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES" GISBORNE, THURSDAY, AUG. 14, 1941. INSIDE EUROPE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20634, 14 August 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES" GISBORNE, THURSDAY, AUG. 14, 1941. INSIDE EUROPE

There has been a good deal of publicity recently for reports about distress, discontent and disruption in Germany and some of the occupied countries. This sort of thing, of course, makes pleasant reading, but there is always the taint of propaganda about it and a feeling that the wish might be father to the thought. So far as Germany is concerned, it must be realised that there is great difficulty in the way of securing accurate information regarding internal conditions, and the same thing applies, although to a lesser extent, to the occupied countries. Having discounted these reports in this way. however, the fact still remains that even if they have been grossly exaggerated, the developments which they indicate may have an important bearing on the progress of the war. From the commencement of hostilities with Germany the importance of the blockade weapon has been emphasised, but it has tended to be obscured by more sensational events. The effectiveness of the weapon, however, deserves to be recalled, and with particular reason at the present time when Germany is approaching her third winter under war-time conditions. Whatever else may be in doubt, it is certain that the supply position in Germany cannot improve with the passage of time, and this raises the question of whether she can survive another winter.

It has been made abundantly clear, even in Berlin itself, that Germany gambled on a short war. However complete her military preparations might have been, it is apparent that her economic plans could not have envisaged the extension of the war over a period of years. It is conceivable that, despite the disruption of her programme, it would still be possible to maintain military production, but it is beyond belief that she could concentrate on her military needs and at the same time make good the deficiencies in civil supply. In other words the people of Germany have had to go short in order to keep the army in the field —guns have had to come before butter and, perhaps, a good many other things. A people geared up to war pitch can undoubtedly endure a great deal so long as they feel that their sacrifices will not be in vain. They are buoyed up by hopes of victory and can be fed for a time on stories of successes, but when successes are few and far between and ever more costly, when victory seems far off, then hope is apt to give way to despair. It is not necessary to know anything of actual conditions in Germany to know that this must be the position in Germany to-day. The lavish promises of the Fuehrer have not been fulfilled and- it is inevitable that his people are asking why. It has always been admitted that the Battle of the Atlantic is vital to Britain, but it must be conceded, also, that the battle of communications generally presents Germany with a problem of even greater magnitude. For nearly two years she has been cut off from the outside world. She has been able for a time to make good some of her deficiencies by plundering the territories she has occupied. Since they, too, were largely dependent upon imports, however, it is apparent that there is a limit to the extent to which they can meet Germany’s needs. More than that, their own requirements have to be met and their people, since they have nothing to gain, will not willingly go without the necessities of life. Germany at the present time has to supply the requirements of the largest army the world has ever known, and it is spread from the Arctic to North Africa. In addition, she has largely to maintain her ally, Italy, and to give the people of occupied countries at least sufficient to check the revolt which would follow utter desperation. All these things simply cannot be done for an indefinite period. To paraphrase a well-worn truism, she might meet all of the needs for some of the time, or

some of the needs for all of the time, but she cannot possibly meet all the needs all the time. Sooner or later the break must come in Europe. If there is not to be an uprising of the people, the requirements of the army will have to be sacrificed to the demands of the civil population. The more the army is neglected the sooner will it be defeated. II is more than probable that much of the German aggression has been dictated largely by the need to secure fresh sources of supply. As one source has been depleted another has been sought. The latest venture is into Russia which, although she had been supplying Germany for nearly two years, had not given her enough. She now wants first claim on' all Russian resources, but instead she is finding that the Russians, pursuing the scorched earth policy, are leaving her even less than she had before. From the poiiß of view of supply alone, there must be a limit to this procedure, but supply is only one aspect. Equally important is that of communications. These were never good and to-day, faced with a greater demand than ever before and constantly damaged by the Royal Air Force, they must be strained to the very limit. It requires no intimate knowledge of conditions, therefore, to be able to say that Germany is facing a grave economic problem, and 'this position, coupled with the death and destruction that are being meted out to her civil population as well as to her armies, is a good augury for a speedy end to the war.