The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, AUGUST 9, 1941. THE RUSSIAN FRONT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20629, 9 August 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, AUGUST 9, 1941. THE RUSSIAN FRONT

According to German reports Hitler's forces have made further progress in the last few days at both ends of the vast Russian battle-front. Past experience shows that German claims have to be severely discounted, but since Russian communiques are now mentioning centres further to the east it can be assumed that the invaders have made some gains. The extent and probable effect of these are difficult to determine owing to the depth of the front, but there is certainly no reason to believe that they will be any way decisive. The inference to be drawn from the latest reports is that the Germans are now less concerned with the drive on Moscow and are concentrating more on the capture of Kiev in the south and Leningrad in the north. It is on these sectors that most progress has been made during the past week. The attempts to encircle Kiev continue and 'it seems not unlikely that r determined effort is to be made to isolate the Black Sea port of Odessa. In the north they seem to have advanced well east of Lake Peipus and. reading between the lines, it is not unlikely that some gains have been made on the Finnish front. The inference from these developments is that Leningrad. Kiev and Odessa are more seriously threatened than before but such a threat is anything but vital.

It is :rae that the Germans have advanced hundreds of miles over a 1500-mile front into Russian territory. Against any other country in the world such an advance would have spelt the end of the campaign, but in Russia, if the defence is properly handled—and all the evidence suggests' that this is the case—it can prove e definite handicap. Germany herself has emphasised that territorial gainr are not the primary objective, sincr they can avail nothing unless the Red Army and air force are annihilated. The task of maintaining order in the conquered territory is itself a difficult one and, in addition, there is the everincreasing problem of securing supplies and maintaining the ever-lengthening lines of communication. The Russians have none of these difficulties tc contend with since their lines arc being contracted and their forces consolidated, while ' supplies can be obtained from the rear and by importation through Vladivostock. If. therefore, they can keep their forces intact they can never be beaten, and whatever advances may be made by the Germans will avail them nothing of real value. It will only be a matter of time before their vast armies find themselves exhausted in hostile country from which they can obtain insufficient supplies for their maintenance. In the meantime, there is accumulating evidence of the enormous toll of this campaign. Except to the extent that they provide corroborate evidence of the grimness of the struggle, the German figures, obviously exaggerated as they are, can be ignored. Reports from Moscow admit that the Russian losses in the first six weeks of the campaign were 600,000 men, 5000 tanks, and 4000 aircraft. These figures will certainly not be ar. over-estimate but can be regarded as a minimum. It is reasonable to.assume that the German losses are a great deal heavier —even if they are not as high as the figures claimed by Moscow —since the attacking forces would, in the ordinary course of events, suffer most. How long can this terrific slaughter and destruction continue? Here, surely, is the key to the whole campaign. Russia is admittedly losing 100.000 men a week and Germany, at a conservative estimate, is losing twice that number. If the same rate of lo' r were to continue for another six weeks Russia would have sustained 1,200.000 casualties and Germany at least 2,500,000, iand altogether more the 20,000 planes and an equal number of tanks would have been destroyed. Obviously, with a continuation of warfare on the present scale one s:d‘ or the other must collapse before many weeks have passed. In Germany itself there appears to be a realisation of this fact. In other campaigns it has been possible for the Nazi High Command to issue plain reports of the progress of its forces and thus to satisfy 'the people that the losses were compensated for by tangible gains. Here, however, there have been appalling losses with no concrete results. On the contrary, it has been necessary to issue long explanations of the official reticence and to explain the unprecedented difficulties which have been encountered. These explanations are eloquent for they indicate that operations are not proceeding according to plan. The German problem is becoming increasingly one of maintaining its forces and their equipment, and the difficulties must be immeasurably increased by the incessant attacks by the Royal Air Force on their industrial centres. How long, then, can the struggle continue? Germany has no alternative other than to throw the full weight of her forces into the attack in order to' obtain a quick decision and this can only be secured in the event of a Russian collapse, of which there is not at present tha slightest indication. It is only necessary for the Russians to maintain their stubborn and gallant resistance for a comparatively short time to ensure the defeat of the Nazis’ rash adventure on the eastern front.