The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1941. THE LOSS OF CRETE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20570, 2 June 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1941. THE LOSS OF CRETE

By the capture of Crete the Germans have secured another victory, a major one if measured by the intensity and ferocity of the conflict, but one of almost trifling importance if regarded in its correct perspective as an incident in the larger struggle for control of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The victory goes to the invaders but the honours rest with the gallant defenders, and it is not by any means certain that Germany has not lost far more than she has gained by the Battle of Crete. That is not mere optimism, but is based on a dispassionate study of the situation as a whole. When the attack was launched, Germany boasted that Crete would be captured within a few hours or at most inside of two days. Instead, it has taken nearly a fortnight and it has undoubtedly proved one of the most costly campaigns upon which she has embarked. To this extent, Crete has served the Allied purpose. Germany had expected to march right down through the Balkans unopposed. Instead, she had to fight her way through Yugoslavia, through Greece, and now through Crete. Just how far these brilliant delaying actions have upset Hitler’s schedule must remain a matter for conjecture, but it is certain that while he has been held up the Allies have been preparing for more decisive actions elsewhere.

The Battle of Crete itself is an epitome of military experience and lessons. It is the first time in history that an essentially air-borne invasion has succeeded and it demonstrated the strength which Germany could devote to such an attack. In ibis respect it seems likely that the capacity of the enemy was grossly under-rated, but it seems equally likely that Germany over-rated the ability of her parachutists and under-estimated the courage and the determination of the comparatively small force defending the island. Germany had expected to succeed with her Initial surprise attack from the air and the Allies, rightly as it proved, had counted on their ability to repulse it. Tire Allies, however, had not reckoned on the capacity of the Germans to maintain an almost continuous stream of airborne troops, any more than the Germans had counted on the necessity for using such a force. It is a fair assumption that Germany, in order to capture Crete, has ,had to inrow tens of thousands of her most skilled and highly-trained troops into the assault. In doing so, she has suffered enormous losses of men and aircraft, and it is not at all impossible that she has expended on Crete a very considerable portion of the force she had specially trained for the invasion of Britain. If the stubborn defence of Crete has saved Britain from a similar invasion then it will have been more than justified and _even if it has not succeeded to this extent it will still have been justified by the heavy toll taken of the enemy and by the invaluable experience that has been gained of German strength and German methods. Again the one lesson that stands out above everything else is the impossibility of countering air attack without air defences. In Poland, in Norway, in France, in Greece, and now in Crete it has been tiie same story—the superiority of the Germans in the air. In Crete it was not so much the actual strength of the German air force as the absence of Allied air bases that told. The geographical situation of the island gave the invaders an immense advantage, and they certainly made the most of it. Just why, in view of the time that was available, more effective steps had not been taken to protect the aerodromes in Crete is a matter which is likely to call for some investigation, but little can be gained by holding inquests now. The one point that does stand out, however, is that in future where ever Germany attempts to strike it is she who will be most handicapped by the absence of air bases. The further afield she moves the greater will her difficulties become and the more effective will be the opposition. The essential point to be borne in mind at the moment, is that Crete, however important it may have been, was, in fact, only a small part of the whole campaign in the Middle East. The island was not vital to Britain, but it was to Germany, and for this reason she was prepared to pay an enormous price to obtain it. At the best it brings her about 100 miles nearer her next objective, but, unless Turkey surrenders to the Axis, the Allied bases will be nearer still. In point of fact, the British victory in fraq, which is now complete, is of far greater importance to the general scheme of things than is the German capture of Crete, and this is another respect in which the German programme and German plans have been seriously upset. More than that, the time that has been spent in holding the Germans in Greece and Crete has enabled the Abyssinian campaign to be virtually completed, It has handicapped the Germans in reinforcing their troops in Libya, and it has enabled the strength of the Allies generally to be materially increased. Over and above everything else aid from the United States on an everincreasing scale is coming nearer with every passing day. Britain continues to play, or rather to fight, for time and, despite her apparent setbacks she is succeeding probably far better than she had reason to expect.