The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, MARCH 1, 1941. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20493, 1 March 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, MARCH 1, 1941. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

There has recently been an accumulation of reports bearing testimony to the economic difficulties which are being faced by enemy and occupied countries. This position once again directs attention to the importance which the war of blockade is destined to play in the present struggle, and /it is on this front, more than on any other, that the Allies have such outstanding advantages. There is naturally a tendency to exaggerate the problems and hardships of the other side, but a dispassionate analysis of the situation will show that the current reports ’are based on something more substantial than mere propaganda. It is an inescapable concomitant of war that there should be shortages of some commodities which are in general use by the civil populations. This does not necessarily mean, however, that they are not obtainable but, rather, that they have been diverted to more essential military needs. On the other hand, there is a long list of goods and materials which can only be obtained by importation from overseas, and it follows that those countries which have control of the seas start off with an immense advantage. This is the fortunate position which Britain and her allies occupy to-day and it gives them a long start over the enemy on the economic front.

The long'German preparations for war enabled them to build up large stocks of essential requirements, while the imposition of rationing long before the war started served' to accustom the people to the more stringent restrictions which had subsequently to be enforced. These same factors, however, placed a limit on the further adjustments which could be made under war-time conditions. The fact that stocks could not be replaced owing to the blockade made further restrictions imperative, but the scope for a curtailment of the supplies available was limited, in turn, by the drastic restrictions already imposed. For a time it was found possible to relieve the situation by drawing on the supplies and reserves of the occupied territories, but it is a matter of reasoning rather than speculation to assume that these sources must now be seriously depleted. All of the occupied territories are themselves dependent upon imported supplies and it is certain that after nine months of virtual isolation from the outside world they have ceased to be an asset to Germany and have become a heavy and increasing liability. The stringency in Germany itself may have been temporarily relieved by the occupation, but it has now spread to the occupied countries and there is no prospect of relief.

It is this situation, based on known facts rather than wishful thinking, that explains and makes credible the ever-increasing reports of unrest in occupied countries. None of the countries from Norway to France is anything like self-supporting. None of them, however, is able to obtain more than a trickle of imports, but, on the contrary, each is required to contribute from its own diminished production to the ever-growing needs of Germany itself. In such circumstances increasing distress and intensified antagonism to Germany, the cause of it, are to be expected. Reports of disorders are filtering through to the outside world 'in spite of the most rigid censorship and it is fair to assume that the position is a good deal worse than has been disclosed. Nor is it only the occupied territories that are affected. Germany has been able to batten to some extent on her victims, but for Italy there is no such relief, and the plight of the Italian people even before the war was worse than that of the Germans. Even Japan, the inactive partner of the Axis, is feeling the economic strain, though for different reasons, and her position is far from satisfactory. The question then presents itself as to how long the people of enerhy and occupied countries are likely to tolerate conditions which are becoming progressively worse.

It is a significant point that supplies for the enemy are almost entirely restricted to countries under their direct control and in the actual war zone. This means that supplies are not only by the blockade but also by the effect of hostilities on their own industries.' There are no outside sources upon which they can draw. It is here more than anywhere else that the Allies possess such a striking advantage. Supplies are available to them from every part of the world outside the war zone—from North and South America and from all parts of

the British Empire. The only limitation imposed is that of the availability of shipping, a point which explains the emphasis laid by Germany on the war at sea and the exaggerated reports she has circulated of Allied shipping losses. Shipping is admittedly a problem, but only because there are so many demands upon it. It is not the case, and is never likely to be, that there will not be sufficient ships to provide ail the essential needs of the Allied countries and supplies have never been restricted to the point where hardship is inflicted. The allimportant factor is that the effects of the blockade will be intensified with the passage of time. So long as the Allies retain command of the seas the position of the enemy will steadily deteriorate while that of the Allies, if necessary, can be improved.