THREAT TO EGYPT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVII, Issue 20379, 16 October 1940, Page 9

THREAT TO EGYPT

INVASION FROM LIBYA ITALIAN ARMY’S TASK NATURE OF THE TERRAIN The threatened invasion of Egypt from the west is no new conception, wrote Major C. S. Jarvis in the Observer, London, recently. The Italians have been preparing for it since the days of sanctions in the autumn of 1935, and for this purpose have been massing troops in Libya and the adjoining province, Cyrenaica. The 350 miles of desert that lies between the Anglo-Egyptian frontier at Solium and Alexandria may be divided into three parts. Firstly, the coastal belt some 10 miles wide which for the most part is hard clay or gravel with infrequent saline wells; secondly, a stretch some 20 to 30 miles wide with myriads of small scrub bushes growing out of hard clay hummocks which is not negotiable by cars for any considerable distance; and, thirdly, south of this the desert proper, with its limestone scarps, its lines of sand dunes, and its depressions of marsh or soft sand, which is entirely waterless except for the oases. Alternative Routes There are two possible lines of advance; one along the sea coast, where the going is suitable for a mechanised force of all arms, and the other by way of the high desert and the oases. There is no definite caravan route across the central desert. Light vehicles and light tanks—but neither laden lorries nor heavy artillery—could cross it either going due east, or south-east, or north-east, but an intimate knowledge of this sandy wilderness and its various traps, both natural and otherwise, would be essential for a successful crossing. There are in some parts marshy depressions with narrow causeways, there are others filled with quicksands, there are sudden abrupt lines of sand dunes that cannot be traversed, and steep escarpments that cannot be climbed, and the watering places, as represented by the oases, would be held by Anglo-Egyptian troops. Difficulty of Water In addition to this there would be bombing from the air—and a big column in the open desert is a conspicuous mark —ambushes and raids by our own and the Sudanese light car patrols, and any protracted delay would mean water difficulties of the first magnitude. In high summer in the Libyan desert the mid-day heat is not far short of 112 degrees, which means that if a force failed to connect with its water supplies at the time arranged half the motor transport would be out of action from dry radiators a few hours later, and two-thirds of the force crazy from thirst.

The coastal route looks the more attractive of the two, but here the few wells would be denied to the enemy, and at Mersa Matruh—for, of course, there is no intention of holding the small outposts of Solium and Sidi Barrani—the invader would run up against the Anglo-Egyptian defences which were started in 1935 and have been added to and strengthened ever since. British Navy’s Part This line of attack, too, would be subjected to shelling from our naval forces the whole of its 350 miles length, and run the risk of having its communications cut by surprise raids from the sea. The front on which an invasion across the central desert could move would be limited to the country between Siwa and the coast: South of Siwa there is an impassable sand sea some hundred of miles wide that runs along the Italian frontier toward the little water hole of Owenat on the Sudan border. Where these serried dunes die away a hundred miles north of Owenat they are replaced by a broken scarp rising 2000 ft. from the low desert, which is equally impassable. A light car raid from Owenat as a diversion to interfere with the water supply at the Assuan dam might be regarded as a possibility, but it is safe to assume that if such a force reached the Nile Valley it would never return. Since the article was written Italian forces, opposed only by harassing measures, have advanced along the coastal road. For the past two weeks they have been endeavouring to con,solidate at Sidi Barrani.