The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, THURSDAY, SEPT. 5, 1940. AERIAL WARFARE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVII, Issue 20344, 5 September 1940, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, THURSDAY, SEPT. 5, 1940. AERIAL WARFARE

The experience of Great Britain during the past few weeks serves to confirm the view expressed some time ago that although the present war might be fought in the air it could never be won or lost in the air alone. Of the importance of the air weapon and of its inhuman and devastating effects there can be no question but by itself it can never finally decide the issue between two great Powers. Of the war in Spain it was said at the time that, to some extent, it was a rehearsal for the major war which was expected to follow. The same thing was true, also, of the conflict in China, while every campaign in the present struggle has provided experiences and lessons of one sort or another. It was shown in Spain, and again in China, that the mere possession of a superior air force would not ensure victory, however important an adjunct bombing planes might be to other forces. The same fact was even more strongly demonstrated in Finland where even the enormous strength of the great Soviet air force could not compel the Finns to submit. In each of these campaigns the air arm no doubt played its part, particularly in undermining the morale of the civilian populations, but in no case was it sufficient to prove the vital factor in determining the war and it is significant that in China the war has continued for years.

During the first year of the present war the German air force was used in every possible way but, although it is claimed to be the most powerful in the world, it was singularly ineffective ns a deciding factor. Unquestionably it played an important contributory part in the German invasions, but where can it be said that it succeeded on its own? Poland had been literally blasted to pieces by aerial bombardment, but still the Poles could have fought on had it not been for the vast mechanised land forces that were launched against them. In Norway and the Lowlands, the air force again assisted, but it is doubtful whether it was as potent a weapon as the “fifth column” and each campaign was really won by the German army. In France, the air force was of great value used in conjunction with mechanised armies but no one could suggest that it was the air force that subjugated France. These experiences should be borne in mind and it is important to remember, also, that in none of these campaigns has the invading force been confronted with an air force in any way comparable to its own. Modern history shows that, at best, vastly superior aerial armament is only an auxiliary weapon and that without the assistance of other forces cannot bring any campaign to a successful end.

In the light of these conclusions, the position of Great Britain in the present air war can be examined with calm confidence. If air power alone could not defeat Spain, China, Poland, Norway, the Lowlands, or France, then nothing is more certain in this world than that it cannot overcome Great Britain, and Great Britain, on present indications, is the one country involved in tire war that can only be attacked from the air. The British people are the last people in the world who are likely to suffer a collapse of their morale and they are the least susceptible of all to the activities of the “fifth column.” Germany has no navy of any consequence which it can bring to bear against the British Isles or which could be used to blockade them effectively, and without naval protection a successful land invasion is virtually impossible. Against Britain, therefore, the German air force cannot fulfil its only really valuable role, that of an adjunct to other forces, but it must fight alone and Raided. In the light of experience,.

and experience is the only guide, what, then, can it hope to achieve? It is true that it still possesses a nuisance value, that it can kill a certain number of civilians —although not as many as are normally killed in road accidents—and that it can inflict some minor damage, but, generally speaking, it is only carrying out sniping on a modern scale. In this campaign, however, Germany has not a monopoly of the air weapon. She may still have numerical superiority. but in every other respect she is demonstrably inferior. In the air battles over Britain itself, the Royal Air Force has achieved a wonderful record and although the German attacks may continue indefinitely there is not the slightest reason to assume that they will be on any larger scale or that they will be any more effective than in the past. In the meantime, the use of the air weapon is not conlined to Germany. The Royal Air Force is continually on the offensive and all the information that is available suggests that its striking power is far more effective than that of the enemy. Again, however, it should be emphasised that aerial bombardment is .only a form of sniping and that it is not a decisive factor. Assuming that equal damage is caused by the respective air forces, the results are of infinitely greater value to Britain than to Germany, because any losses sustained by Britain can be replaced from overseas whereas those of Germany, in many cases, arc irreparable. If every factory in Britain were wiped out and every railway disrupted she could still carry on because of hexcontrol of the seas, but where would Germany be under similar circumstances? The war in the air may be spectacular, it may even be devastating, but it is well to remember that it can never be decisive.