CHOICE FOR NAZIS

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20067, 13 October 1939, Page 2

CHOICE FOR NAZIS

COURSE OF WAR FUTURE STRATEGY POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES LONDON, Oct, 3. The Nazi leaders, when they are convinced that their pence overtures will be rejected," Will have to choose between four courses of action. The first would be to continue to remain strictly on the defensive in the West, but for a full-scale naval war to continue on orthodox lines. This would mean that Germany would refrain, from bombing any objectives except troops ana naval vessels, and would also refrain from a large-scale military offensive on. the Western Front between Luxembourg and Switzerland. It would implv also that the Nazis believe that 'they stand a good chance of winning a war in which the principal weapon is blockade. It was the sustained blockade that defeated Germany in the last war, but the German outlook to-day is ineviably influenced by, the fact that, whereas in IJ>lB she had access only to a few European countries, to day she has access overland to every neutral European country, except Spain and Portugal, and every neutral Asiatic country, except Siam, the Arabian Kingdoms, and , the Netherlands East Indies. Bombing Ships jn Harbours The second choice would be to remain on the defensive on the Western Front, to "reinforce the submarine blockade by bombing ships in Allied harbours, as was done in Spain. This, or, indeed, any extension ot the present carefully-limited aerial warfare, must inevitably lead to a gradual Increase in bombing objectives until a widespread bombing campaign resulted with each country’s economic system as the target. It wauld lead, indeed, to a bombing offensive similar to that to which Poland was subjected,: in which every road, railway, factory, aerodrome, and military encampment was an objective. The third choice would be to , decide—either with or without an 1 enlarged bombing campaign—to attack on the narrow Western Front. There are two main reasons why orthodox soldiers consider that this choice is unlikely. First, although Germany could undoubtedly now mass more divisions in the West than Britain and France can put against them, unless the Germans are very trustful of their Russian neighbours they could not assemble the three-to-one superiority which is accepted as being necessary' where one modernlyequipped army plans an offensive against another army just as well equipped and trained. The German generals are not dreamers, and are well aware that their army—division for division—is less well officered and trained, and no better equipped, than the French and British formations which are now assembled on, or near, the Western Front. Outflanking the Maginot Line They are aware also that the overrunning of France is a vastly different problem from the overruning of Poland, where the highly-mechan-ised Reichswehr, with an overwhelming air force, thrust against the army of a peasant nation which possessed, all told, fewer motor vehicles than would be found in a fair-sized Western European provincial city, and whose principal attacking forces were a cavalry corps, which was thrown into confusion by ceaseless bombing and machine-gunning by low-flying aircraft. There remains a fourth choice for Herr Hitler —namely, to attempt to outflank the Maginot Line by a march through Holland and Belgium. It is a desperate alternative, not only because Belgium and Holland have long been ready to oppose such a move, but also because winter is approaching. Europe has enjoyed an Indian summer. Night after night, the London sca/chlights have been fingering cloudless, starry skies, but this cannot last much longer, and to launch an offensive through a half-flooded Holland, or through Belgium in October, on lines which worked well in Poland’s dry September, would almost be a reckless gamble. Room For Open Warfare The British and French High Commands might even welcome a German attempt to break through to Paris and the English Channel. The German advance would probably be halted long before it reached either objective, and the German line would then be stretched over a long front, which, would give the British and French more room to develop a "cunter-offensive than they now have in the restricted fortified irea where the French Army is nibbling its way systematically into the German defence system. If Belgium and Holland became the battlefield, there would be an opportunity for open warfare, with a largescale use of mechanised divisions, as in Poland. At the same time, German aggression against Belgium and Holland would leave no doubt in neutral minds of the limitlessness of Nazi ambition, and the ruthlessness of their methods of attaining it.