FUEL CRISIS

Greymouth Evening Star, 11 February 1947, Page 7

FUEL CRISIS

GOVERNMENT’S DEFENCE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT IN COMMONS ' ■" SHINWELL AND HIS CRITICS (Rec. 11.0 a.m.) LONDON, Feb. 10. England had faced a critical coal position each winter for the last five years. This year, however, the coal stocks had been only 11,000,000 tons, compared with 14,000,000 last year. The Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, made this statement in the House of Commons this afternoon. He added that despite the steady increase in coal production during the past few months the demand for coal and electricity had increased beyond all expectations. The available generating plant in the country was rapidly approaching the point where it would be overloaded. The country should have been able to get through the winter if the weather had been normal. The Government, he said, was well aware of the serious loss the electricity cuts had inflicted and of the hardship many were forced to suffer, but this action had to be taken. Frozen railway points, tunnels and lines blocked by snow and the accumulation of laden wagons had disorganised railway traffic, and the arrival of further supplies of coal depended on the weather. If the consumers co-operated, stocks would be sufficient to overcome the emergency. Public Response Good. The public, Mr. Attlee said, seemed so far to be responding excellently, but it was still too early to forecast how soon power could be restored to industry. “If we are to maintain essential services, there must be drastic restrictions on electricity for the general public,” Mr. Attlee said. The six main London power stations had only six days’ stocks. The coal supplies on the way should be enough to prevent further loss of stock before February 12 or 13, but if the stocks did not arrive, other and more drastic steps must be taken. The position was much the same in other areas. Mr. Attlee was replying to Mr. Churchill, who had asked whether the Government had any further statement to make on the cuts, and he interposed after Mr. Attlee’s statement: “It is everyone’s duty to comply with the Government’s directions and do their utmost to help, but why was not a warning given before the cuts were announced?”

Mr. Attlee replied that reports on the position were still arriving when the House of Commons met on February 7, and Mr. Shinwell’s statement was made as soon as possible. Mr. R. A. Eden said that Mr. Shinwell had not spoken until the end of a long speech, the greater part of which was spent in abusing the Opposition for having dared to suggest that there might be an industrial crisis. Debate in House. Mr. Attlee: He was replying to at-' tacks made upon him. I Mr. Arthur Greenwood, who is acting Leader of the House, suggested that a debate on the situation should be held to-morrow after the members had had time to consider the Prime Minister’s statement, but he yielded to pressure from the Opposition and agreed to move the adjournment of the House to enable the subject to be debated this evening. Mr. R. A. Hudson then opened the debate for the Opposition. He said the main criticism against Mr. Shinwell was that he was warned repeatedly about the inevitable results of allowing the coal stock position in the summer to be so bad. Mr. Shinwell had refused to admit the situation was serious—or rather one moment he admitted it was serious, then became optimistic and contradicted the warning he had previously given. Also despite knowing, as .he must have known, that the stocks were perilously low, he made no adequate plans to meet the emergency that was' almost bound to arise. Mr. Hudson said that Britain started the winter with only three and a half weeks’ supply of coal. Therefore it was perfectly clear that the Minister’s excuse that the crisis had arisen as the result of the unexpected demand since October would not bear examination. Mr. Shinwell, replying, said the last thing he sought to do was to minimise the gravity of the situation. The disturbance, however brief as it might be, was bound to impair industrial production which Britain was so j anxious to avoid. Stock Position. Referring to Mr. Hudson’s allegations of an inadequate stock position, Mr. Shinwell .said that was funda-' mental. It was the pivot on which the whole of Britain’s economic system must turn. The inadequate stock position was not new. It began to[ emerge after the French disaster in 1940.

• Mr. Shinwell added that from the I time of the fall of France, the British | pits were denuded of lusty, vigorous labour, because men were allowed to drift into the forces and the munition factories. Inadequate stocks, combined with dwindling mines manpower, was already the situation emerging towards the end of the war, when the Labow Government was returned to grapple with the situation. Nevertheless during 1946, 76,000 men and boys were attracted to the mines? because they were assured of the reforms for which they had long asked. He pointed out that the Labour Government had built the coal stocks to almost 11,000,000 tons last October, compared with 6,806,000 in May, 1946 —because the miners put their backs into it and produced more. “I was not satisfied. I repeated the warnings in practically every speech I made,” he added. If the Government early in the winter had adopted a rationing scheme it would have Jed to short-time in industry and unemployment and would have impeded Britain’s industrial effort. Increased Consumption. Dealing with increased consumption, Mr. Shinwell said the highest point reached was for the week ended January 31, when consumption totalled 727,000 tons, compared with 576,000 tons in the same week of 1946. Mr. Shinwell said that if it was possible to hold’down consumption for four or five days, or a week, at the most, and build up stocks in addition to the stocks at present available, Britain could get through. When the weather on the night of February 6 allowed only 20 out of 50 relief coal ships to get out of port, the Government finally decided on February 7, tha(; the cuts scheme should be put into operation. “It would be a dereliction of duty if the Government had not responded to the emergency and acted thus,” Mr. Shinwell said. He pointed out that the majority of the electricity and gas undertakings depended on seaborne coal from the Tyne, which on the night of February 6 was invisible for miles, so that the skippers of vessels refused to take them out. Mr. Shinwell concluded: “Although our industrial economy is imperilled, this crisis may prove a blessing in disguise, because it will focus the attention of all the people in this country on Britain’s vulnerability, unless we can promote an atmosphere in the mining industry that will bring men into it willing to produce coal. That is what we are endeavouring to do—through nationalisation.”