“BOMBER” HARRIS

Greymouth Evening Star, 16 January 1947, Page 8

“BOMBER” HARRIS

/irnw and Nttny Chiefs A Hacked

“MOVES TO DESTROY R.AF.”

[From A W MITCHELL, N.Z.P.A. London Correspondent. I (Recd. 9.30 a.m.) LONDON, January 15 “For nearly 20 years I watched the Army and Navy, both singly and in concert, engineer one deliberate attempt after another to destroy the Royal Air Force. Time after time they were within a hair’s breadth of success. Time after time Lord Trenchard, and Lord Trencliard alone, saved us. “If they had succeeded they would have abolished our air power ns they succeeded in abolishing our tank power, while retaining the Camberley drag hunt ami, as pinnacle of our sea power, those scarcely more useful battleships whose bones now lie where airpower so easily consigned them, littering ae floors of the ocean or obstructing the harbours of the world. And had they succeeded in suppressing the Air Force we shou d have entered the war with , one fighter as we entered it wi a one tank, we would have lost the Battle of Britain and the Nazis would have ruled Europe-if not the world—for centuries.

This is one of the many downright statements made by Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Arthur Harris, former Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, in his book, “Bomber Offensive,” just published. In it Sir Arthur, round, whom a controversy centred during the war and still continues now that he is in South Africa without having received an honour in recognition of his services, recounts the various stages and many difficulties experienced in the bombing of Germany. It is a book, which while it may cause many m Whitehall occasionally to lift their eyebrows in pained surprise, will be read with interest, especially by the crews of Bomber Command, who were deeper in Sir Arthur’s heart than many of them may have supposed.

Tribute to Airmen’s Courage.

“There is,” he says of them, “no parallel in warfare to such courage and determination in the face of danger over so prolonged a period, danger which at times was so great that scarcely one man in three could expect to survive his tour of 30 operations.” He regrets they were refused a bomber campaign medal, although every clerk, butcher or baker in. the rear' of the armies overseas had a campaign medal.” . . In recounting the various stages oi. Bomber Command’s work, Sir Arthur also mentions that the. Germans abandoned the London blitz after they lost 260 bombers in one month from crashes on the return to their own airfields. By 1942 Bomber Command was “still too small to achieve anything lasting and it was also poorly equipped.” At night the bomber crews were hardly ever able to find their targets.”

Long and Difficult Task.

It was a long an d-difficuH task to increase efficiency.. The navigational guides were slow in production and development. The weather was always one of the greatest factors to overcome. At one Pe™d as fast as squadrons were raised Ynt® u c °d, not against Germany, but tiansferred Io the Middle East or other commands. But a definite advance was made with the fust 1000 bom er raid on Cologne, which had an immediate effect on the whole, of German air strategy, resulting in drastic modification of her ai fcraft production plan, “which eventually .stripped, the German army of all an cover and of all close support from Later came the successful strategic bombing, the battles of the Ruhr and Berlin, until Bomber Command was switched to the pre-invasion campaign and the offensive against oil.

Now History. All this is now history and absorbingly interesting history- What is equally interesting are Sir Arthur s comments on the lack of appreciation of the Navy and Army chiefs ol the correct use of air power until the closing stages of the war, his. forthright views thereon, his criticisms oi the Ministry of Economic Warfare and his despair of the civil service and of “getting anything, done through the proper channels is reasonable time.”

The book is peppered with such phrases as “Sailors being complete amateurs in air matters,” and he makes a striking claim: “The fact that tjhe Air Force was sinking more submarines than the Navy never seemed to get published at all, just as the fact that Bomber Command sank more German naval ships has never got out.”

He refers to battleships as the most expensive and most .utterly useless weapons employed in. the whole of the last war.” He criticises the “cavalry” mind of the Army, its love of horses, and he declares: “Unfortunately they too are apt to develop the mentality of the animals they are so enthusiastic about.” He makes an exception where Field Marshal Lord Montgomery is concerned and quotes fully the message of congratulation he received from the field marshal after the attack on Caen. Principle of Co-operation. Looking ahead, he agrees with the principle of co-operation, “but only on the lines of abolishing all three services and having one defence force,” and he adds: “The whole key to our defence is the encouragement of science and scientists. Whoever gets far enough ahead in science will prevail—for the time being.”

Sir Arthur sees in atomic energy the end of air warfare, not because it is too terrible to use but because it can be used with infinitely greater effect without aircraft at all. He believes the rocket in all its forms is already an out-of-date weapon. Sir Arthur is a frank and openhearted admirer of Churchill and men like Smuts and he has a special word of praise for Air Marshal R. A. Cochrane, former Chief of Staff, R..N.Z.A.F., “a most brilliant, enthusiastic and hard-working leader of men.” . , - “Bomber Offensive” is. stijnulaung and forceful It is described as in some respects the most controversial war book since the. Hiroshima atom bomb story, which will “make a lot of people angry and provoke them into writing solemn letters to The Times.”