CAMPAIGN RE-FOUGHT

Greymouth Evening Star, 27 December 1944, Page 3

CAMPAIGN RE-FOUGHT

TALKS WITH GERMANS

N.Z. GENERAL'S MISSION

(N.Z.P.A. Special Correspondent)

■LONDON, December 25. Three generals sat down in a London room recently, and while they smoked they talked over their campaigns in North Africa. _ One was Major-General Id. K. Kippenberger, 2nd N.Z.E.F. The others, were Generals von Thoma and von Sponeck, of the Wehrmacht. They were captured in Egypt. Von Sponeck was commander of the 90th Light, and was directly opposed to Major-Gen-eral Kippenberger. The purpose of the meeting was to enable . MajorGeneral Kippenberger, who is partly devoting his time to the historical section of the War Office, to collect data on the Somme campaign of 1940 and the North Afrrican campaigns. The Germans, speaking in English with a strong accent, conversed quite freely and amicably on specific points raised.

Major-Gcnera 1 Kippenberger said later than von Thoma and von Sponeck had hardly a good word to say for the other senior commanders in the Wehrmacht, and they both hated Rommel. They declared that he was arbitrary and difficult to work with, for he 'did not observe the proper chain of communications. He would often go direct to a unit and give it orders without telling its formation commander, thus causing confusion and trouble. Both admitted, however. that he had splendid drive. The generals made the interesting revelation that when Rommel was away on leave in Berlin and the German forces were at El Alamein. von Thoma had prepared plans for the German army to retreat before the October moon to Halfaya Pass and Solium, the reason being that they were having difficulty in maintaining their I communications.

The Germans expected a British attack, and von Thoma -wanted to strengthen iris forces and give longer .lines of communications to the British while lighting several rearguard actions. If the Germans had retreated the British attack would have been delayed until at least mid-Novem-ber. But when Rommel returned from Berlin he would not hear of a retreat. The plan was sent to Hitler’s headquarters, which confirmed Rommel’s decision.

The generals expressed the opinion. however, that had Rommel been convinced that to retreat was the best plan he would not have hesitated to <,o against the orders of headquarters, which he had done before during May when, although Hitler had ordered him to take Tobruk and stay m Solium, he advanced to El Alamem. The generals said that Rommel was convinced that he would win the battle or at least have, a tan chance of making a draw ot it. There was, indeed, a good chance ol tiiis. since General (now Field-Mar-shal) Montgomery did not have an overwhelming force, but it was his good leadership; and that of the divisional commanders, w’hich weignted 1 lie balance. It is interesting to theorise on what would have been the position of Malta had the Germans retreated before the battle of El Alamein. A convoy from Alexandria had failed to reach the island because of the lack of air support, and until the Cyrenavian airfields could be recaptured there was little chance of this necessary support being provid-

ed. Perhaps Malta would have fallen. MONTGOMERY AND ROMMEL Montgomery certainly did not want Rommel'to retire and he deliberately did not hit the German forces too hard in the battle at the beginning ; of September. Montgomery wanted] to defeat the Germans at El Alamein, and fortunately Rommel’s and the i German Headquarters’ decision to remain there played into his hands, it is of course, theorising, but if Rommel had not been defeated and had kept his army intact, lighting might still be going on in Tunisia to-day. ] Major-General Kippenberger and von Sponeck had a long talk about I their many fights, particularly that at Nafilia at Christmas, 1942. In that battle there occurred an almost unprecedented event in modern war, when two opposing commanders saw each other in the held. Major-Gen-eral Kippenberger told von SponecK that as the New Zealanders approached to take the road he saw a group .of German staff officers standing on the prominent Hill 164. Major-Gen-eral Kinpenberger was in a staff car at the head of the brigade which was extended in desert formation. Von Sponeck said that he was one of the officers on the hill and that he had seen the Now Zealanders, movement in the (insert and then- turn to the right to attack the road, lie also said that he had seen MajorGeneral Kippenberger’s car at the head of the column. Von Sponeck had been too quick for the New zea-i landers on that occasion, getting his, mon off the trucks and into position. The New Zealanders were held up by bad going. They could not get over the road, and were checked. Von Sponeck said to Major-Gen-eral Kippenberger: “We . were old friends of yours,” and Major-General Kippenberger told him that the New Zealand officers had contemplated giving a dinner, when the Tunisian campaign was nearing the end, to the officers'of the 90th Light when they captured them. It never came to anything. , , . Von Sponeck, who was extremely amused, said: “It would have been a pleasure.” He' said he knew all die personalities of the New Zealand Division bv name and asked about them. Von Sponeck said that German specialists at headquarters even knew the New Zealanders’ voices on the air when radio messages were intercepted, and were not fooled by nicknames. He gave Major-General Kippenberger the German disposition at El Alamein, which agreed entirely with British information. Ho also confirmed the Wehmarcht’s low opinion- of the Italians, saying: “They let the Germans down on every possible occasion.” • .After the conversation von Thoma and von Sponeck were driven back to their camp. They were depressed, but Major-General Kippenberger observed that they were still 100 per cent. German in their outlook.