Greymouth Evening Star. THURSDAY, JUNE 15. 1944. ALLIES AND DE GAULLE.

Greymouth Evening Star, 15 June 1944, Page 4

Greymouth Evening Star. THURSDAY, JUNE 15. 1944. ALLIES AND DE GAULLE.

yiIROUGHOUT his career. General do Gaulle has been admitted, even by liis admirers, to be difficult to work with. Britain and U.S.A, are finding it difficult to ■ work for him, also. Britain has alwaysbeen more pro-de Gaulle tb.au has the j U.S.A., who before her entry into tlipj war was almost pro-Vichy. Britain re-1 menibers llial in the dark' days following the collapse of France, de Gaulle was the loader of the further resistance movement, and he proclaimed defiance to the Germans when most of his countrymen were i willing to accept defeat and submission. De Gaulle was naturally featured as a hero by the British Press, and not without justification, -lust what would have happened had de Gaulle not directed a Fighting French movement cannot be stated, but his activities did provide some base on which to construct a revival of French courage and independence. Before the Avar, de Gaulle Avas little knoAvn outside French military circles. He was unpopular Avith tb.e General Staff because of his insistence on Ihe importance of tanks and armoured cars in military strategy and equipment. In this attitude, de Gaulle Avas proved correct, but this did not help him Avith his military chiefs. It is new knoAvn that the French Army had degenerated from being the strongest in Europe after the 1914-18 campaign, into one not respected by the Germans. The French military leaders were incompetent and the men became apathetic. There Avas little desire to fight on Poland’s behalf despite the alliance between the lavo countries. Political corruption and treacherous dealings with the Nazis were Avidespread, and the Avhole French structure collapsed after receiving a feAV blows from the Germans. Britain was kt doAvn very badly, and but for her oavu endurance and resolution, might have been conquered through her misplaced reliance on French co-operation. It was found necessary later for British ships to attack French naval vessels, and to overcome French hostility in various areas. Those unpleasant chapters in history are uoav closed, but it may be, justly claimed that. Britain has displayed avouderful patience and forbearance to France, whose recovery of prestige and strength she is uoav fighting for. Hitherto, the French appear to have done little to help in this crusade. De Gaulle’ forces in Africa Avere re-equipped by Britain and U.S.A, and by this time should have been of more use. Apart from operations in Italy, they have scarcely been mentioned. MeauAvhile, Hie French Committee of Liberation. or French Provincial Government, its latest title, has acted at Algiers as if it had already by itself freed France from the Germans. The latest announcement that it has appointed administrators in Normandy, within a week of the Allies’ invasion, is typical of the arrogance displayed. The Anglo-U.S.A. policy is that the civil control of liberated France should be retained by General EisenhoAver until the military situation in any area is such as to Avarrant the transfer of control from the military to the civil authorities. This attitude is reasonable, as little imagination is required, to see the difficulties that might be created Avere a premature transfer" made. The U.S.A. Administration thinks that; de Gaulle is too hasty, and that he should not be alloAved to dictate either to the Allies, or to the French people themselves, from whom he has received no mandate. The situation is delicate and it is understandable Avhy Mr. Churchill requested that the Commons .should not debate it, meaiiAvhile. At present, it looks as if the de Gaulle tail is trying to wag the Allied dog, where France is concerned.