ALLIED FORCES

Greymouth Evening Star, 23 September 1943, Page 5

ALLIED FORCES

GEN. MARSHALL’S COMMAND

‘TOUGHEST SOLDIER WE HAVE’

WASHINGTON, September 21. The nomination of General George Marshall (United States Army Chief of Staff) as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied global forces was perhaps a major decision reached at Quebec,” says the Associated Press of America. “If it meets with final approval General Marshall will be head of the whole global field command, with authority to co-ordinate aggressive action on all fronts under the Quebec directives. Such a step will recognise also the* fact that in the successive inter-Allied military conferences, from Washington to Casablanca and Quebec, the American Chief of Staff was an outstanding contributor to the fashioning of strategic plans for victory. Rumours that General Marshall is to be released from his present Chief of Staff assignment, due to the pressure of interests opposed to him presumably British—are in direct conflict with the facts. General Marshall has won the admiration and respect of all British officials with whom he has been in contact, including Mr Churchill. “The unprecedented scope ol General Marshall’s contemplated ultimate command, giving him presumptive authority even over General Eisenhower in the Mediterranean, General MacArthur in the South-west Pacific, and Lord Louis Mountbattenin South-east Asia, might stir debate in Britain, but it is understood to be wholly acceptable to Canada and to the French forces in the Mediterranean. One thing is absolutely certain—that General Marshall stands so high in Mr Roosevelt’s estimation, both personally and professionally, that any change not wanted by General Marshall would be vetoed by the White House. The primary and dominating element of the Allied war plans still is to smash Germany first and then to turn the full weight of the ever-increasing British and American power against Japan. For that reason General Marshall is expected to assume command of a direct attack across the English Channel against the Germans in France and the Low Countries. “A highly placed Government official said to-day: ‘Our toughest job is to reach Berlin, and General Marshall is the toughest soldier we have to do it.’ This official also indicated that the British and American joint chiefs of staff saw General Marshall as the only officer of either nation whose supreme command both could trust in the tremendous task of completing victory, involving not only the placing of Britain’s main Army, Home Fleet, and Home Air Forces under other than British command for the far-reaching offensive actions across the Channel which are contemplated, but even the linking of operations in the Pacific, Asia, India, and China with a unified central field command in due course.” MACARTHUR 'S~STATEMENT. NEW YORK, September 21. American correspondents interpret General MacArthur’s statement as a virtual admission that he has been shelved and that his command has been subordinated to Lord Louis Mountbatten’s South-East Asia Command. A correspondent of the New York “Daily News” writes: “General MacArthur has been side-tracked here since the Bataan campaign. He has tactily admitted that his plans for a Pacific victory have been rejected, and he is apparently commanding a third-rate unimportant drive against the Japanese.” The “New York Times's” correspondent. Frank Kluckhorn, comments: “Despite his guarded tone, General MacArthur went about as ■far as a commander on active service could in expressing disapproval of the course of events. The statement is considered the strongest he has yet made.” Kluckhorn adds: “The declaration has been made at a time when reports that Lord Louis Mountbatten will be supreme Allied commander in the Western _ Pacific have not been officially denied, and when Colonel Knox has publicly hinted that the United States Navy, under Admiral King, will run its own show in the Pacific. One fact stands out —that the United States’ senior experienced combat general, who has not been called home for consultation since the war began, is seriously concerned about what he hears indirectly of Allied strategy in the Pacific and its cost in men and material. Thus, it is widely felt here that the statement is more than just one of the repeated appeals to Washington lor a few added sinews of warfare, it involves the issue of Pacific strategy.” . A correspondent of the United Press of America (Byrdon Taves) says: “The statement apparently has two purposes: first to obtain clarification of General MacArthur’s position vis-a-vis Lord Louis Mountbatten, and second, to defend the strategic theories on which General MacArthur has based his conduct of the war, and which have apparently been rejected by London and Washington. General MacArthur is arguing that Australia is the logical base for an offensive against Japan, since this theatre is the only area where need for island-hopping hi the widest sense can be avoided.” Official quarters in Washington refused to comment pending further information. Senator Ewin Johnston, a member of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, said: “General MacArthur feels pretty deeply about the appointment of Lord Louis Mountbatten to a job which rightfully should be his. I am glad he is speaking up.” SYDNEY PRESS COMMENT.

(Recd. 12.30 p.m.) SYDNEY, Sept. 23

“It seems a pity General MacArthur has seen fit to comment publicly on rumours recently circulated in the United States regarding future strategy in the Pacific,” says the Sydney “Herald” editorially. “However near to or far from the mark these rumours may ultimately prove to be, it cannot be overlooked they emanate, almost wholly from sources which have been consistently hostile to the present American Administration, critical in their attitude towards Mr Churchill, and assiduous in the efforts to use General MacArthur as a political weapon against both Mr. Roosevelt and those directing the higher strategy of war. Knowledge of this should surely have dictated greater caution on General MacArthur’s part than to issue a statement which, however well intended, gives countenance to rumours which are politically suspect, and cannot fail to give the impression ho believes himself to be at odds with those whose duty it is to determine the broad strategy of the Pacific war. To say this is not to challenge in any way the correctness of the viewpoint which General MacArthur expresses, but to proclaim it, so bluntly and in such circumstances, can hardly make for smooth co-operation with either Governments or combined Chiefs of Staff in whose hands lie the ultimate decisions on such questions. So far there has been no indication, unless General MacArthur is speaking from special knowledge denied to the public, that his command will not enjoy the opportunities which he seeks for

it. Certainly there is no inherent reason why Lord Mountbatten’s appointment should be deemed a prelude to such opportunities. As Mi. Roosevelt said in his broadcast on February 14, there are many roads leading to Tokio, none of which, he promised, would be neglected.” MOUNTBATTEN’S COMMAND (Rec. 1.30 p.m.) LONDON, Sept. 22. Lord Mountbatten’s South-east Asia Command, says Reuter’s, in the first disclosure of its boundaries, extends over French Indo-China, Siam, Malaya, Sumatra, and Burma, excludes the Indo-Persia Sea regions, and extends to the south-eastern coast of Sumatra, excluding Sunda Straits, south along a line entirely excluding Australia, to take in the Bay of' Bengal, Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea to the western boundary, cutting the Persian coast 140 miles east of Jask. The line then just misses the tip of Arabia, runs south in Albatross Island, thence southeastwards, avoiding Rodriguez Island, thus excluding Madagascar, Reunion and the Mauritious Group. The eastern boundary goes due south from Singapore to the north coast of Sumatra, thence round the east coast of Sumatra to a point 104 degrees east on the coast of Sumatra, then south to latitude 08 degrees south, thence south-eastern towards Onslow, and then longtitude 110 is reached, due south along that meridian. NAVAL CO-OPERATION. RUGBY, September 22. Colonel Knox, on returning to London from a four-day tour of inspection of the American and British Naval Commands, said he had never witnessed a finer and more constructive degree of co-operation between the two navies than he had seen evidenced on every hand in Britain between the British and American sailors.