U.S.A. ARMY STRENGTH

Greymouth Evening Star, 12 June 1943, Page 6

U.S.A. ARMY STRENGTH

11 MILLIONS INSUFFICIENT?

NEW YORK, March 25. I One. of the most actively debated (questions in the United States at the moment, whether a military establishment of 11,000,000 men by the end of 1944 is too big for this country, is taken up in forthright manner in a leading article in Life. “It is time that advocates of a (smaller army stopped kidding themselves,” says the magazine. It points out that about 2,900,000 must be deducted for the Navy, Naval Air Arm, <the Marine Corps, Coastguard and Mercantile Marine. Of the remaining 8.200,000, about 3,450,000 will be needed in the United States at the end of 1944 for the “indispensable services of a vast military base,” it is /stated. Of the ground troops left in the United States at least 1,000,000 will be in training. The rest will be required for the gigantic services of (the suppy H.Q., the work of manning bases and schools and the maintenance of a reserve. The result of all this is that only about 60 per cent, of |lhe proposed army, or about 4,750,000 /men, can be sent overseas by the end \of 1944. I “This,” says Life, “sounds an enormous force, but examination leads to no dreams of grandeur. If the overseas air force is estimated at 1,000,000 that would leave about 3,750,000 men jn the American Expeditionary Force ground forces. From that total by (War Department estimates, there could be created about 100 strictly .combat divisions—principally infantry and light artillery—consisting of about 1,600,000 men.” Estimating the number of Axis icombat divisions in Europe and Africa at 483, and the number of Allied combat divisions, including those Russia is known, to possess, at 321 the article points out that this means that the United Nations will have in action in the European and African theatres in 1944 62 fewer divisions itlian the Axis. “The fact in incontestable,” it says, “that Germany can fight a defensive war against Russia on the Dnieper or Dniester and still out-number on the Western Front the British and American Armies combined.” “Far from being an overwhelming horde,” Life says, “the proposed army will be a small striking force which can win in the end only through superb training, keen intelligence, unflinching courage and the mighty air arms that we are creating. From a military point of view, the figure is not only small, it is precarious. It will impose on our generals very severe strategical limitations.”