LIBEL BY MAYOR

Greymouth Evening Star, 19 May 1943, Page 2

LIBEL BY MAYOR

£lOO DAMAGES AWARDED

WELLINGTON, May 18. A verdict awarding £lOO damages to the plaintiff Myra Cohen, a former supervisor of the Combined Women s Services’ Club, in her action lor libel against Thomas Charles Atkinson Hislop, solicitor and chairman or the Wellington Patriotic Committee was returned by the jury in the Supreme Court to-day. The jury’s decision was reached by a three-fourths majority, the foreman having informed the Chief Justice (Sir Michael Myers) that a full agreement was impossible. The jury was out for three hours and a-quarter. . „ , . On the application or plaintiff s counsel (Mr Leicester) His Honor formally entered judgment for the plaintiff, with costs, according to scale. Mr Watson, senior counsel for the defendant, applied for an extension to 14 days of the. time of application for a new trial. His Honor: On what grounds? Mr Watson: I prefer not to state the grounds on the spur of the moment, Your Honor.

His Honor: Very well. Addressing the jury Mr Watson said the defendant’s letter to Miss Cohen had been published to one man only, Vincent Ward. The plaintiff had suffered no damage from the publication of the words to a man who already knew the circumstances, and the defendant had done everything a reasonable and honourable man could do to meet the plaintiff’s demand for redress. He hoped to convince the jury that the words ware in fact substantially true, and in any case there was not a tittle of evidence to show that the defendant had acted maliciously. On the question of malice, counsel for the plaintiff said he would- say, in a general way, that if the case were a living thing, it would be one that oozed malice from every pore. He asked the jury to consider whether there could ever be a case in which malice on the defendant s part was more evident. JUDGE’S SUMMING UP “You will probably one and all regret that it has been necessary, for a period of five days, to convert this Court into a laundry for the washing of linen which, you may think, should never have been allowed to be soiled,” said His Honor, beginning his summing up. One indisputable fact was that the passage in the letter was unnecessary and offensive. “You may probably deplore that any employer, least of all the Mayor of your city who has, admittedly worthily, for a number of years carried out his duties as first citizen vtth great ability and great dignity, and with credit to himself and city, should condescend to write such a passage as that complained of to an employee who had resigned, especially when, that employee _ was a woman, who was, after all, in receipt of a nominal wage,” said His Honor. “You may deplore that in his capacity as chairman of various committees he may or may not have used the baser language alleged by the plaintiff and Mrs Kidd. You may deplore that he should go down personally to the room of the employee, and bang at her door, and threaten her that the door would be opened or bashed in, and that she would be ejected if she did not leave at a certain time. You may think that was all very undignified for the first man of the city. You may think the plaintiff should have been given the opportunity of being heard, and that it was hardly the right thing to do to condemn her unheard, imd pass, a resolution on Hislop’s own motion, on wlAch he and Mrs Hislop voted. You may deplore what he did at a meeting of the Metropolitan Committee on February .15, in addressing the meeting for possibly an hour, giving Ils own ex parte version, and thereby securing the rejection of a motion that a committee of three should be set up to investigate, which motion he voted upon himself, acting as judge in his own cause, and would do so contrary to natural justice. “You may deplore the contemptuous letter sent in reply to plaintiff’s letter of February 10. All these matters may be of importance on one aspect of the case, but if you do hold all of them it does not mean that the plaintiff does succeed in the case. On the other hand, you may consider the behaviour of the plaintiff was wrong, and may have justified dismissal, but whether it justifies the use of the words ‘gross misconduct’ is one of the principal matters you will have to consider.”

His Honor ruled that the passage complained of was capable of a defamatory meaning, but it was for the jury to decide if the words were dcfamatory in their present use. You may say,” continued His Honor, ’’that the plaintiff’s actons were, as I think they were, reprehensible. You may or may not think they were so reprehensible as to justify being termed gross misconduct. A good deal has been said about Mrs Hislop. 1 am not sure that too much has not been said about her. She .may be, as Ward is reported to have said, very cf.fficult. At times she may be, but are not we all? Certainly th£ plaintiff was. It was probably wrong for Mrs Mislop to act as hurriedly as she did, and without reference to Mrs Gffidhill. The position Mrs Hfslop holds is a difficult one, but it may be that she enters into the case in one matter. It may be that the defendant may have been actuated by feelings about his wife.”