LOST ON FIRST DAY

Greymouth Evening Star, 15 August 1942, Page 7

LOST ON FIRST DAY

PHILIPPINES’ AIR FORCE.

On the first day of war—7th December at Honolulu, Bth December at Manila—the United States took two terrific blows, comments “The Christian Science Monitor” editorially. The American people preoccupied with Pearl Harbour, heard little _ about what happened in the Philippines. But disclosures made in connection with the fall of Batan now indicate that the main hope of defending the Islands —an American air force comprising hundreds of planes—was largely lost that first day. On 10th April, Charles Hurd, reporting in the “New York Times” an interview with Secretary Stimson bearing on Batan, revealed that among the forces there were “some 5,000 men originally attached to the obliterated air force.” On 11th April, Clark Lee, in an Associated Press dispatch from Melbourne told of 54 Japanese bombers and 88 fighters catching American bombers on Clark Field and American fighters parked at Ida Field about noon, Sth December. He declared that this raid “largely destroyed” the American air force in the Philippines. Now Walter Robb, formerly this newspaper’s correspondent in the Philippines, corroborates the Clark story and tells of 150 planes destroyed on the ground in one attack—which helps explain the presence of 5,000 air force men on Batan. This all adds up to the fact that a powerful American air force—which might well have prevented Japanese landings on Luzon —was surprised and virtually destroyed hours after the Philippines had heard about Pearl Harbour. It means that something approaching a Pearl Harbour, something relatively more crippling to American air power and seriously altering the whole war picture, occurred forty miles north of Manila on Bth December. This may be news to the American people, shocking news, but it is hardly information of aid to the enemy. For the Japanese knew that they had removed the Philippines’ air protection; after Bth December they bombed almost without hindrance, and quite possibly they knew the number of planes destroyed. But the American people did not know; they heard only of the few planes which escaped and carried on a brief-desperate defence. There was less excuse for surprise than at Pearl Harbour, for commanders in the Philippines knew war had begun. Mr. Robb believes American flyers were hoping to attack Formosa, but had to wait for orders from Washington. That may be so, but still appears to leave General MacArthur and his aides responsible for the failure to avoid surprise and the loss of their air force. Accounts would indicate that American officers failed to heed British lessons in dispersing and hiding planes from air attack and were mentally unprepared. Probably the whole Nation must share the blame. Indeed, the main constructive purpose of going into the Philippines Pearl Harbour is to ask whether the lesson has been learned even now and to emphasise the necessity for 'more alertness. We are informed that one American air field intended for the protection of a vital naval installation has no anti-aircraft guns—because it does not expect to be attacked until after another area has been bombed. There is still too much close parking of planes—bunched for destruction —and too much general carelessness about the protection of airports. The last time we examined the situation it was still possible for anybody to get into army fields by putting on a uniform —which anybody could buy without credentials. If the shocking news that there was something like a Pearl Harbour behind Batan will arouse public insistence on more alertness, that news does not come too late to serve a good purpose.