COMMONS & “CONFIDENCE”

Greymouth Evening Star, 2 July 1942, Page 5

COMMONS & “CONFIDENCE”

HISTORIC DEBATE OPENED

ALLEGATIONS OF INEFFICIENCY RUGBY, July 1. The House of Commons to-day opened the debate on the no-conn-dence motion of Sir John WardlawMilne (Conservative, Kidderminster;. Before the debate opened, Commander S. King-Hall (N. Lab., Ormskirk), asked whether Sir John Wardlaw-Milne would defer his motion until the battle in Egypt had reached a conclusive stage. At this stage, Mr. Churchill intervened, saying that he had carefully considered the matter, and he had no doubt that if a request had been made because of the urgency ot the present situation in Egypt it would have been possible to arrange a postponement. But as the fact that the motion was to be debated had been broadcast, and as this fact had been a matter of comment in all parts of the world, he thought a postponement would now be inadvisable. Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne moved: “That this House, while paying tribute to the heroism and endurance of the armed forces of the Crown, has no confidence in the central direction of the war?’ He first assured the House that he had tabled the motion for the sole purpose of assisting in winning the war in the shortest possible time. His attack was directed not against officers in the field, but against the central direction in London, where he felt lay the cause of the Libyan defeat. While paying the warmest tribute to the personal qualities and leadership of Mr. Churchill, Sir John suggested it had been a vital mistake to combine the duties of Prime Minister with those of Minister of Defence. What was needed was a strong fulltime leader and Chief of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee. His mption implied a demand _for enquiry as to what caused Britain to be behind the enemy, and what was wrong with our strategy and production. “We are turning out vast quantities of munitions and aircraft guns. What prevented getting these things to the right place at the right time?” Sir John said he had not. forgotten our assistance to Russia, and entirely agreed as to its necessity. As regards production, British tanks, though many of them were very good, they were not good enough to compete with the Germans, yet we knew all along about the German Mark Four tank, which had dominated the Libyan fighting, befpre Dunkirk. Since most of the British tanks were made after Dunkirk, they should, at least, have been equal to the German. The new Churchill tank was probably the most formidable weapon ever built, but where was it, and how many of these were in Libya? Concluding, Sir John said he had no confidence in the central direction of the war for the reasons stated, but if they were to make the necessary changes, the country’s stability was unimpaired. Its will and determination for victory was supreme. Dark as the present situation might be, we could, if necessary, have changes made and win through to victory, freedom and peace. Sir John said: A strong independent man must be given charge of the three services. No Defence Minister, in full knowledge of the facts as known to-day, could have made Mr Churchill’s statement that we were on equal terms with the enemy in Libya. That statement was untrue. What is the Government’s excuse for asking work people to strive to the utmost to produce weapons which are '‘already out-dated? What is the Government’s excuse for sending men into battle with the scales constantly against them? The “surprise weapon” which knocked out the Allied tanks a few days ago, was used against Bilbao in 1937. Whatever the Commons decides, the country will not be satisfied with the present state of affairs. I have no confidence in the general direction of the war, but n the necessary changes are made Britain’s stability will be unimpaired. Sir R. Keyes, seconding the motion, said: If we had used amphibious power in the winter of 1940-41, we could have knocked Italy out of Africa before Germany came to the rescue. Mr Churchill at Gallipoli, in Norway, and the Mediterranean thwarted the carrying out of strokes which might have altered the course of two wars, because his constitutional naval' adviser declined to share the responsibilty. The Admiralty’s failure to provide the Mediterranean Fleet with a -naval air force, after nearly three years of war, was inexcusable. It was intolerable to watch the war machine lumbering from one disaster to another, when thousands of fighting men were killed and taken prisoner because they were using interior equipment.

MR. LYTTELTON’S REPLY.

The Minister of Production (Mr Lyttelton), making his first speech on behalf of the Government in a Commons debate, pointed out the. inconsistency of the previous two speeches against the Government. Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne had maintained that Mr. Churchill interfered too much with the direction of the war, while Admiral Keyes thought he had not been given sufficient powers over his professional advisers. Mr. Lyttelton discussed firstly equipment, especially tanks, guns, and anti-tank guns., and secondly, battle tactics. He said in October, 1939, we had one so-called armoured division, with 200 light tanks. We had in Britain at the time of Dunkirk only 200 such light tanks and 50 infantry tanks. Clearly, therefore, it was necessary to concentrate on producing weapons against invasion, without waiting for testing new types, though everyone knew we had to develop for the future a tank more heavily gunned and armoured, otherwise we should have gone under. However, a start was made with the development of the new manufacturing capacity to produce new types, although they had no background of proved mechanical experience. Mr. Lyttelton said that in September, 1940, the War Office placed the first order for the six-pounder gun.

The development and production of the six-pounder had been an outstanding industrial achievement, and appreciable deliveries were made between the 13 and 14 months after the first order. Production had risen continuously, and now was running at several hundred monthly. “On June 1, 850 of these guns, with field mountings, had been allocated to the Middle East, and large numbers had arrived, but only a small proportion were in Libya at the outset of the present campaign.” Mr. Lyttelton pointed out the time taken in development by the trickle of production, by the quantity of production, then by the delivery to troops over a 12,000 miles waterway. Neither the Government,

the General Staff, nor the Ministry of Supply had been content to develop merely the six-pounder. “I think it would be true to say the six-pounder would give equality with equivalent weapons of the enemy, but we must surpass them. As an anti-tank gun, it is inferior to the 88 millimetre used by the enemy, although the 88 millimetre is less mobile. The idea that except for a small number of sixpounders, we had no similar weapons to the 88 millimetre, which has been so skilfully employed in the present battle, would be wholly wrong. We actually have in the Middle East enough guns for three of 4.5’5, and these have a great range, and are capable of tak-£

ing on the 88 millimetre, but cannot be considered anti-tank weapons in the normal case. The twenty-five-pounders, although not designed as anti-tank guns, proved particularly effective against tanks. The same applies to the 88 millimetre originally put into the field as an anti-aircraft weapon. Apart altogether from the two-pounder, six-pounder and 25pounder, we are developing specialised anti-tank weapons far more powerful than the six-pounder. The main production is expected to start very shortly.” , „ J , Mr. Lyttelton then spoke of tank production in the period following the collapse of the French Government, bearing in mind the need for serviceable tanks. “The Churchill tank, which was put into, production from the drawing board, is an excellent fighting vehicle, but will not have the reliability which could be obtained, if further time had been possible in its development.” . Mr. Lyttelton, continuing, said that numerous defects in the first production which once threatened that tailure might have to be faced, had now been largely eliminated. The present tank was of the very greatest possible value, although no doubt a higher rate of replacement and reserves would have to be provided. These tanks were now being armed with a six-pounder, and production was growing. The “General Grants,” or “Mark Three,” with a seventy-five millimetre gun, matched the best tanks Rommel employed, while the Mark Four, now in large scale production in United States, was a still more effective weapon. In spite of the losses in the recent battle in which they proved their worth, General Auchinleck still had substantial numbers of “Grants” in service. CAUSES OF SETBACK Examining the causes of the Libyan setback, Mr. Lyttelton said the most important were the tactical mistakes.. The operations south of Benghazi proved to be over-enterprising m the then situation. Secondly, there was the unsuitability of our Crusader tanks under desert conditions. Tnirdly, the superior armament in range and weapons of the German tank. This factor, he placed third, because it must he remembered the Germans wer reduced to small numbers and it must be remembered the two-pound-ers had a much higher rate of fire than the heavier German tank gun. The present compaign had been fought with a considerable, but insufficient, number of “Grants,” with cruiser tanks mounting a two-pounder, and at the beginning with a small number of sixpounder anti-tank guns on field mountings. There were many more later. The twenty-five pounder had proved a deadly anti-tank gun. There had not been any general criticism of our air machine nor was il alleged that our equipment was inferior to the enemy’s, except in lack of dive-bombers. It would be a mistake to suppose the Air Staff had ever discarded dive-bombers. In 1940, we were desperately short of aircraft, and needed the less specialised types even more than we needed divebombers. Now the situation had changed. With efficient fighters and bombers we had air supremacy in more than one theatre, and with this ascendancy expected to turn, the dive-bombers to good account, and were sure we could employ them effectively at sea. Dive-bombers had already reached one theatre, and others were on the way, and still more would be delivered from the United States in the next few weeks. Lack of priorities had not led to slowness of deliveries. The Minister continued: It has been suggested that General Ritchie had been dealt with by the enemy in detail. If our. armoured forces prove insufficient to keep the enemy’s armour away from our strong points, as happened at Bir Hacheim, the enemy will deal with isolated strong, points by weight of superior armour. From such accounts as the Government has, there is no reason to suppose that General Ritchie did not manoeuvre his armoured divisions, or maintained a passive attitude after the fall of Bir Hacheim, Gazala and Tobruk, not because the armour was immobile, but because our tank forces were either too exhausted or depleted to continue the fight against the enemy armour. It is not yet clear whether the infantry should have played a more mobile role but I suppose this criticism might be justified.

TANKS AND TACTICS Mr. Lyttelton explained details of tank tactics, and said that tanks armed with heavier guns were at a disadvantage, but used as a defensive weapon, they were very mobile and when endeavouring to defend the flanks of infantry in strong points, could manoeuvre to the flank to get into hull-down positions in the desert, where they presented an extremely small mark to artillery, and by letting enemy tanks into close range, played a defensive role with some effect.

Mr. Lyttelton added: At present there is no evidence that General Ritchie on January 13, ran into an ambush. Undoubtedly, the enemy destroyed a large number of tanks when Ritchie was attacking, but the attack was made after careful reconnaissance, and from what we now know, the repulse of this attack was due more to German anti-tank defences than ambush. All the experience had shown that co-operation between the Army and the Air Force reached a high level of efficiency, but time and again it was impossible for the Army Commander to put down local bombing support, because of the difficulty of identification. Heavy bombing on the battlefield might well do more damage to our own tanks than the enemy’s. It is the opinion of the commanders that dive-bombers could not affect the course of the battle, and that the enemy dive-bombers was largely ineffective, owing to special local conditions. Utility bombing in Libya and Egypt lies now in bombing the mechanical transport, feeding the tanks and back areas. We have applied this form of attack with great effect. One disadvantage to the air arm is there are very few defiles in the whole of Libya to compel concentration of enemy transport, thus there was a lack of large targets to bombing aircraft. The bombing of Tripoli, Benghazi and Tobruk, of course, is oi prime importance in stopping, or impeding enemy reinforcements, and we always had a force of heavy bombers —now reinforced—to do this job.

AMAZING PROPOSAL. (Rec. 1.45 p.m.) LONDON, July 1. Sir John Wardlaw-Milne, in the Commons, when asking for co-ordin-ation of the three Services under a single commander, added: I think it would be a most desirable move, if the King and His Royal Highness agree, that the Duke of Gloucester be appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. This raised an gnormous outburst of laughter, amid which an Opposition member shouted: That’s put the .fid on it! Sir John tried to continue, but was not heard amid the continued laughter and jeering. The Speaker finally

restored order. Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne added: It is clear that the serious disasters in the last few months, and the last f°’” year, were due to the fundamental difficulty in the central administration of the war. A man claiming credit for successes, if any, must bear responsibility for defeats. What is wrong with our plane strategy and production, which places us in this inferior position? Two years ago, it could rightly be said we had no equipment because the nation had not prepared, but that excuse did not hold water to-day, because the country was turning out great quantities of munitions and aeroplanes, and a great range of guns.