CONDUCT OF WAR

Greymouth Evening Star, 21 May 1942, Page 5

CONDUCT OF WAR

SIR S. CRIPPS’ REVIEW I ATTACK ON CONTINENT RUGBY, May 20, Speaking of closer co-operation among the three Services, Mr. Attlee said: “The failures we have had up to now have not necessarily meant failure in planning. Plans which looked ail right have failed from some unexpected cause, and others that looked risky have succeeded. The enemy has had similar experiences.” Captain A. U. M. Hudson (Conservative) said that the system of joint planning was as nearly good as it could be made.

Sir Frederick Sykes said that an organisation was needed which would enable the three Services to be looked upon as one concentrated service. A Labour member, Mr. John H. Martin, suggested that Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and M. Stalin should meet somewhere, say, in Ireland, this Summer, to build up closer unity. Colonel Oliver Stanley made a long speech on the subject of joint planning. He was opposed to a single Service head. He said there was no one fit to occupy the position of permanent head, except a civilian. That would make him a dictator, and no one wanted that.

Sir John Wardlaw-Milne (Conservative) said that one man could not carry the responsibility for government in such times as Britain was passing through at the moment, and he accused the Government of never having shown the least intention' of tackling the formidable problem of production. ■ At the start of the second day of the Commons debate on the war situation, Sir S. Cripps, as Leader of the House, explained that Mr. Churchill was not present, in accordance with an arrangement made last March, when Sir S. Cripps was appointed leader, to enable Mr. Churchill to absent himself to attend more-pressing affairs. , , Mr. A. P. Herbert said the people had faith in the leader, and they should resist the democratic tendency to try to knock down heads which came above the crowd. Mr. Beverley Baxter said that despite a long list of disasters, Mr. Churchill’s name still stood high. He believed that Mr. Churchill would lead the country to victory. If the Japanese landed in Australia, the people of Britain would feel it as deeply as if the fighting took place on their own beaches. The Prime Minister, who had done so much to keep the English people together, should give more faith and more voice to “our own kith and kin in the Empire.” Mr. W. J. Brown, paying a tribute to Mr. Churchill’s unique contribution to the war effort, emphasised Mr. Churchill’s handling of the Russian entry into the war with “a speech, which constituted a great act of statesmanship.” “GREATEST COMPLEXITY.” Sir S. Cripps; winding up the debate, said that co-ordination of military, naval, and air activities in the war waged from the Arctic Ocean to Australia, and throughout the Atlantic and Pacific areas, was a task of the greatest complexity. Sir S. Cripps stressed the extreme difficulty of moving troops over immense distances under rapidly changing circumstances. Whereas the Germans and Italians had rapid interior lines of communication, we had to move round the perimeter. Similarly, the Japanese, while they retained temporary control of the Pacific, enjoyed interior lines of sea communication throughout the Pacific area, enabling them rapidly to concentrate their forces wherever they wished to strike.

Sir S. Cripps said he agreed with the view that, in these circumstances, it was indeed surprising that worse results had not ensued. He did not think either the House or the country realised the enormous degree of attack from which Malta had suffered, and the enormous amount of aircraft Britain had to get to Malta to counter it. During April, the Germans made 5000 sorties, and more bombs were dropped on the island during that period than on Britain during any month during the worst period of the blitz? Regarding Britain’s attitude towards Australia, he said that, from the operational point of view, Australia had fallen into the sphere of American help, but that did not mean, from the supply point of view, that Australia was left to the mercies —no doubt tender mercies—of America. It was quite certain that we shall do our utmost in balancing their needs against the urgent needs of other theatres of war. Sir S. Cripps said that Australia would have every sympathy and help Britain could possibly give her in these difficult times.

Regarding suggestions for an inquiry into the Singapore disaster, Sir S. Cripps said the Government had decided that such an investigation would not be in the best interests of the effective prosecution of the war. Firstly, no inquiry could be conducted among those who had fallen into Japanese hands. Secondly, at a moment so critical for the existence of India, it would be madness to plunge General Wavell, formerly Comman-der-in-Chief at Singapore, into the details of an inquiry which might be particularly concerned with his competence as Commandcr-in-Chief. Sir S. Cripps also reiterated that the policy of assisting Russia continues, and, dealing with the bombing of Germany, he said this was, in the British Government’s view, of material assistance to Russian resistance, and the best way we could give that assistance until such time as we were able to make a carefully-plan-ned attack on the Continent of Europe, which we intend to do. “The House can be satisfied that this bombing of Germany is not a question of first principle, but is part of our strategy, interlinked with the whole strategy in all theatres of war.”

EX-MINISTER’S CENSURE

(Rec. 1 p.m.) LONDON, May 20. Mr. Hore-Belisha (ex-Minister for War) in the debate in the Commons, said: The first requirement is to realise we are not fighting the Germans alone, but a formidable Axis combination. We must meet its unified strategy with a unified strategy of our own. There should be a Ministry of Defence. We have reached the stage where Chiefs of Staff are guided and directed by a political Minister. This change was made before the disaster in Norway, and you cannot divorce the almost unbroken sequence of strategical disasters from this mixture of political strategical military elements in the war-directing machine. Who told General Wavell to stop at Benghazi? Who decided to send an army to Greece without adequate air support? We are told it had the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff, but concurrence is very different from advice. We have reached an extraordinary pass, when in a war debate, we have neither the benefit of the Service Ministers, nor the presence of the Minister of Defence. While Stormoviks are shattering German defences, and two thousand Stukas are roaring over the Russian position at Kerch there is no such weapon as a dive-bomber in the British Army. The Japanese passed swiftly through Malava with a dive-bomber designed specially for army use. Java was taken by modern tactics, not superiority of arms. General Alexander, in

Burma, conducted a retreat without cover. .Is this to be tolerated after nearlv thr°e years of war? It must be stopped.