AUSTRALIA’S DANGER

Greymouth Evening Star, 20 May 1942, Page 5

AUSTRALIA’S DANGER

U.S.A. ALLEGED COMPLACENCY

DEMAND FOR MORE AID WASHINGTON, May 18. Fears expressed by Sir Keith Murdoch, -of the “Melbourne Herald,” and by the “Sydney Morning Herald.” that Washington is viewing Australia’s position over-complacently are widely publicised here. There .is no official reaction to the Australian complaints since they were uttered unofficially. There is a disposition in some circles here to regard the complaints as an unjustified “newspaper campaign.” However, the reaction in other high quarters was that the Australians’ supplies are inadequate as the enemy approaches. Therefore they want to do their utmost to obtain more support. These authorities said that the United States was doing her umost for the Australians in view of its responsibilities to them. Authorities say that if there was ever a lack of awareness of Australia’s danger, that has been dissipated by Dr. H. V. Evatt’s mission and General MacArthur’s assignment to the Southwest Pacific Command. At the Pacific War Council, Dr. Evatt repeatedly emphasised the importance of the Australian front and he also reiterated this message to the highest military and naval officials in a series of conferences.

One source said that Australians should not be misled by Mr. Roosevelt’s use of the word “check” in the statement in which he declared that the Japanese southward advance had been checked. This does not mean defeated or thwarted, but merely halted temporarily. A high source here has been emphasising lately that the Battle of the Coral Sea was in no way conclusive or final, since it is expected that the Japanese will strike again with far heavier forces. This view coincides with Australia’s and shows no complacency, although only the future can prove whether United States leaders have correctly judged the amourii of material and reinforcements which should have been sent to Australia. To-night’s revelation that large American reinforcements have been sent to the British Isles is a reminder that the United States must divide its support among many fronts in spite of the fact that many Australians undoubtedly feel that the share of the material they have obtained should have been larger. BRITISH PRESS COMMENTS LONDON, May 19. In a leading article on Doctor Evatt’s ministerial talks and broadcasts, the “Manchester Guardian” says: “It was good that the British people should be told so frankly and almost brutally, what the Australians are feeling, and what they expect from us. The theory of a slowly-mounting Allied production, which, in time, would crush the enemy, has to be tempered by the need for exerting all of their strength in critical months of 1942. This is the response to Hitler’s immense concentration, and also to the time schedule which Japan’s progress will impose. It also is the answer to Dr. Evatt s demand that Britain and the United shall give to Australia greater and more prompt aid. Whether Australia is not just a little importunate is a matter for argument. Australia is near the Japanese. We are not. None of us can dictate to our Government how it should apportion our growing strength. We only hope, with Dr. Evatt, that it will not be dissipated and spent prematurely.” The “Daily Express,” in a leader, says we cannot write off Australia as America’s business, any more than we can write off the defeat of Hitler as Stalin’s business. The urge to attack Hitler is burning in the people of Britain. We are not demanding a second front in Europe, as a reprisal front. We ask it deliberately as it means beating the Axis. The Japanese invasion of Australia would be the bitterest blow the Empire has yet had to take. The invasion of Australia is no longer a choice for the Japanese. It is a necessity. They must smash the Allied hammer in Australia before it is big enough to reach out, and use the East Indies as its anvil. The Japanese war machine must be stopped and broken by the Allied forces in Australia before it has a chance to land.

MR. ATLEE’S REVIEW

BRITAIN’S DESIRE TO HELP

RUGBY. May 19.

After it was stated in the Commons, that Mr. Churchill was unlikely to take part in the debate on the war situation, unless some point arose with which he thought he ought to deal, Mr Attlee opened by referring to the setbacks in the Pacific area, and said “the Japanese as a result of our losses, are in a position to strike out in various directions. Not having command of the sea we are inevitably in a weak strategic position at present. With islands scattered around the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it was obviously impossible to provide adequate forces at every point. It would be equally unsound to concentrate on one area before Japan revealed her main objective. However, we must strengthen vital points and hold positions from which later to launch an offensive.” Mr. Attlee said it was not clear which way the main Japanese .thrust would strike. It might be China. India, Ceylon, Australia, or New Zealand. The battle of the Coral Sea had inflicted a severe check, as had the defeated raid on Celon, but the threat to Australia remained. He said the British should have the utmost sympathy with the people of Australia, who were facing the possibility of invasion. They were with and kin and the natural impulse was to send every possible help, as Australia and NewZealand were lavish in their help to Britain. . , , , The Allies must consider the best way to reinforce Australia. It is far easier to send American forces than British, and this was recognised in the discussions between the United States and Britain. The United States had sent large forces to Australia, but American acceptance of that responsibility did not mean any indifference on the part of Britain, or any shirking of responsibilities. Britain was ready when the need arose, to run any risk lor the defence of Australia. Common sense and sound strategy must apply, and support sent from where it was most readily available. Strength was steadily piling up under the leadership of General MacArthur, and if Japan attacked Australia she would get a warm reception. Mr. Attlee said that whenever the main engagement opened in Russia, he was certain the Germans would be met with the resolution, fortitude, and skill the Russians had already displayed. Not only was Britain continuing to send supplies to Russia but large enemy forces were also held in the" Libyan campaign. Malta also engaged the attention of a large proportion of the Luftwaffe. The possibility of an offensive from Britain meant the Germans had to dispose troops in order to meet the eventuality. Every move was conditioned by transport, and the matter of shipping was a constant anxiety. Although immense distances made one combined General Staff impossible, the Chiefs of Staff at Washington actually combined with the General Staff in dealing m particular with the major problems of Pacific Allied nations. They also exchanged staff representatives, and were endeavouring to get the greatest possible coordination in strategy and allocation of supplies. He explained the structure of the joint planning staff, the

working of the Defence Committee, and the Chief of Staffs Committee. Existing machinery was working smoothly and there was not the constant clash, which seemed to occur in the last war between Service representatives and Ministers. Mr. Attlee informed a questioner that the campaign in Burma was directed by General Wavell, who was responsible to the British Government.

Asked whether an official statement would be issued giving the reasons for defending Burma with a small ground force and aircraft, together with the salient features of the campaign, he said that dispatches no doubt would be written, but it would have to be decided if ft were in the public interest to publish them. Mr. Greenwood, said that while it was vital for the United States to give assistance to Australia, it would be a great gesture, if Britain could give more direct aid, which would inspire the Australians and be a small measure in return for what the Australian forces had done for Britain. Mr. Churchill’s speech at Leeds indicated that an offensive on a second front was contemplated, but the Government must be certain before the signal was given, that there was an ample and overpowering flow of war materials to sustain troops, make good the losses, and build reserves. PORT MORESBY RAID.

LONDON, May 19. A communique from Allied Headquarters in Australia says that 34 Japanese heavy bombers escorted by 15 fighters, raided the aerodrome at Port Moresby again to-day. The raid had practically no effect, and only minor damage to runways was caused. One enemy bomber was shot down and three others were probably destroyed. Three fighters were damaged, and one Allied fighter is missing. The Japanese raid was the heaviest on any Allied base since February 19. While the enemy was raiding Port Moresby, Allied aircraft attacked the island of Timor. They scored direct hits on two enemy transports in Koepang Bay. probably sinking both. It is estimated that the Royal Australian Air Force has now destroyed 180 enemy aircraft, and probably damaged another 100.