FAR EAST SITUATION

Greymouth Evening Star, 17 September 1940, Page 9

FAR EAST SITUATION

VIEWPOINT AT SINGAPORE The Singapore correspondent of “The Times” (London) points out that the Japanese have their own definition' of the phrase “South Seas,” or Nanyo. A booklet published a few months ago by the Japanese South Sea Association and purporting to discuss economic and cultural problems included within its orbit the following countries: The Philippines, French IndoChina, Thailand, British Malaya, British North Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei, the Netherland Indies, Portuguese Timor, Hainan Island, and the Japanese mandated islands, which are more legitimately described as in the South Sea zone. A wider definition of the area was given by Mr. Masanori Ito, the Japanese publicist, in an article two or three years ago in the “Japan Times.” He said: The region cannot be clearly defined as are America and Asia. There are varying terms for the zone, such as the Front and Back South Seas, the Outer and Inner. South Seas, etc. The South Seas as interpreted'in connection with (Japanese) economic statistics mean the so-called Front South Seas, which cover a sphere including Thailand, the Netherland Indies, French Indo-China, the Straits Settlements, and the Philippines. This area embraces 110,000,000 square miles, or five times that of Japan. In a sense it may be proper that these regions should include New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. . . . Taken in a wider sense the South Seas include India, Australia, and even Africa.

THE NAVAL SPHERE. It will be seen that the orbit of the Japanese, South Seas policy can be made to expand or contract at will. In the minds of Japanese in the countries affected it embraces all that region whose trade routes the Japanese Navyj claims the ability to police should) Japanese economic interests be threat- 1 ened. The Japanese in Singapore will! explain that, whereas their army I has a responsibility toward Continent j tai East Asia, meaning China, their j navy is concerned with “Advance to . the South’’ aspirations. Though in- | creased attention has been given the 1 problem in recent years, Mr. Ito con- j tends that Great Britain, France, and; the Netherlands entertained suspic-1 ions about Japanese intentions in the] East Indies even before 1914. To-day i with a formidable task on her hanas’ in China it is' reasonable to suppose ’ that Japan will be satisfied if her, economic interests in the South Seas can be secured. Provided there is no deliberate effort to pick a quarrel there need be no inconsistency between the clearly understood desire of Japan to consolidate her economic position in the South Seas and her frequent affirmation that she has no territorial ambitions in this region.; Any determined attempt to secure “economic mastery” of the region, such as some Tokio extremists have urged would provoke serious re-; actions; but, since the South Seas . is; pre-eminently an area from which all. the industrial countries of the world,; the United States no less than Euro-. pean nations, must buy raw materials, j it ought not to be beyond the capacity i of statesmen to find a solution calculated to meet the legitimate requirements of all concerned. I Various arguments have been put forward in support of Japan’s intense interest in the South Sea countries, but the real justification for the Japanese interest is that the region is the. natural source of raw materials which Japan requires. Some Japanese feel

that, while they can secure all or almost all they require in this region, at some future time restrictions might be imposed which would have a serious effect on their national economy. There has never been any serious likelihood of this, and Japan’s purchases in Netherland Indies and Malaya, for example, have been restricted only by the countries’ ability to meet Japanese orders. Moreover, few obstacles have been put in the way of Japanese companies sharing in the development of these areas. All the iron mines in Malaya are owned and operated by Japanese and last year produced some 2,000,000 tons of highgrade iron-ore, which was exported to Japan, equal to nearly 50 per cent, of her total iron-ore imports. Also there are many Japanese-owned rubber estates in Malaya, and the Japanese fishing industry operates from many Malayan ports. Figures published by the South Sea Association put Japanese investments there at about £20,000,000, most of which is invested in agricultural enterprises and the rest in forestry, fisheries, min|ing, commerce, and industry. The ’Japanese say, however, that this figure represents less than 3 per cent, iof the total foreign capital invested i in the South Sea countries. A LIFE LINE. Japan claims that the South Seas constitute one of her vital “life lines,” a phrase which might in certain circumstances be used to justify strong action. For the present she need have no fear of interference with this “life line,” and the recent declarations on the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherland Indies and French Indo-China, together with the treaties signed by Great Britain, France, and Japan with Thailand, which guarantee the integrity and future independence of that important buffer State in East Asia, are hopeful signs for the future. The special correspondent of a Japanese newspaper who arrived i in Singapore recently after an extended stay in Java implied that Japan is ! satisfied that her legitimate aspira- ' tions in the Dutch colony will be met and that there is no justification for [ any fears. A further indication of the I common desire of the Japanese and i Dutch authorities to agree on ’ outstanding points may be seen in a | statement made a few days ago. According'to the spokesman of the Japj anese Foreign Office, the Netherland Indies Government will, not take any i measures which would prevent those I commodities of the Netherland In- • dies essential to Japan from being i exported to Japan. This is taken in Ba- ' tavia to mean that agreement has been I reached in principle between the two Governments.' The Netherland Indies authorities are anxious to sell as much as they can of their surplus ex<port products, but, since the Netherlands and ; her colonies are at war, it is not unnatural that the . Dutch should put first the economic requirements .of the fight against Germany.

The Far East should.he tbe seriously affected by any econotnic changes brought about by the war, unless Russia plays a bigger part as. a supplier of- essential commodities to Germany. Some months ago it was admitted that there had been leakages in the blockade owing to the Soviet Government allowing the transit of tin, rubber, and other war materials to Germany from the Far East. -Fortunately there is no reason to'believe, for the present at any rate, that Japan intends ,to sell war materials to Germany in this way. Her policy appears to .be prompted more by her own requirements. Analysed in relation to the immediate situation, this policy may be seen as a desire to lessen Japanese ence upon supplies from the United

States, particularly of petroleum.Japan’s shortage of oil resources is a fundamental weakness- in her economy. At present she can buy in the Netherland Indies, and any precipi-- ' tate action in the Far East likely to 1 extend the scope of hostilities would probably result in cutting off her supplies of oil from the United States as I well as from the Indies.