WAR CABINET

Greymouth Evening Star, 7 November 1939, Page 11

WAR CABINET

MR. CHAMBERLAIN’S METHODS. Differences between the War Cabinet of 1916-18 and the present War Cabinet formed by Mr. Chamberlain on the first day of the outbreak of war are referred to by “The New Statesman and Nation.” “Mr. Lloyd George had a War Cabinet of Five, only one member of which. Mr. Bonar Laxv, was as: Chancellor of the Exchequer, charged xvith administrative function,” it is recalled. “The other members xvere set free 1 from all departmental duties in order to give their xvhole mind to the higher principles of strategy, international and domestic. They decided all vital questions, and transmitted their decisions, after consultation to the departments concerned.

“The theory of the structure was that a Minister who is charged with the innumerable problems of a great department becomes so immersed in them that he has- rarely the time and seldom the energy, either, for the problems of co-ordination which constantly arise, or for that fuller perspective which enables him to see things beyond and above the miasma of departmental tradition and routine.. “Mr. Chamberlain has only partially accepted the Lloyd George plan. His War Cabinet is almost twice as big: it consists of nine members, not counting Mr. Eden, who, as Secretary for the Dominions, has the right to attend its meetings. But of these nine, two only (he. Prime Minister himself and Lord Hankey, are completely free of departmental duties; Sir Samuel Hoare, as Lord Privy Seal, is still responsible for civil defence (apart from A.R.P.) —a somewhat undefined field. “All the services are represented together with Lord Chatfield as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. Two Ministers, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary represent the more civilian side of the administration. Below them, there appear to be two grades of Minister — one with Cabinet rank, like the Home Secretary, and one without Cabinet rank, like the Minister of Transport. No doubt they will be consulted from time to time; but they will take no

part in the making of decisions by the War Cabinet, xvhich remains, subject to Parliament, the paramonnt authority responsible for the conduct of the war.”

The article goes on to say that it is too early yet to decide whether Mr. Chamberlain's method is' better, or worse than Mr. Lloyd George; it is recalled that Lord Curzon said that the Lloyd George system involved a large expenditure of time in composing differences between the War Cabinet and departmental Ministers.' It is assumed that Mr. Chamberlain has had the benefit of Lord Hankey’s advice, since his experience is unique At the same time, “The New Statesman and Nation” adds: “Tlie scheme is an experiment still to be proved, that the size, of the War Cabinet is abnormally large for the coherency and rapidity of decision that war involves, and that Ministers, if they are to make it work, will have, to an unprecedented degree, to delegate routine functions to their subordinates both parliamentary and permanent. “We hope Mr. Chamberlain has urged the importance of this upon his colleagues. It would he fatal if any but the major decisions in a department go* up to the Minister for decision. If he once gets immersed in the paperasserie of his department, th' system will, however groat his appetite- for -work, break down.' 1