Greymouth Evening Star. AND BRUNNERTON ADVOCATE. MONDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1939. B.E.F. IN FRANCE.

Greymouth Evening Star, 16 October 1939, Page 6

Greymouth Evening Star. AND BRUNNERTON ADVOCATE. MONDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1939. B.E.F. IN FRANCE.

stories disseminated by Nazi propagandists invariably draw prompt and convincing replies. One of the most effective of these has been given by Britain, this being the despatch of the first contingents of the British Expeditionary Force to France, to the impressive total of 158,000 men. The Nazis have endeavoured to cause ill-feel-ing between France and Britain, by suggesting that the latter wanted to wage Avar with French manpoAver, but M. Daladier aptly replied that the Nazi voice Avas “droAvncd by the rumble of convoys' taking British soldiers and cannon to the French front.” Moreover, the British Minister for War (Mr. Hove Belisha) has declared that England has at present the best part of one million men Avho can be called upon for service. Presumably, this does not take any account of the large contingents which Avill be available from the various parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations, if the Mother Country should find it necessary to issue a call. Meantime, the British authorities have wisely adopted the policy of not sending more troops to the front than can be kept fully equipped and maintained at. their maximum effectiveness. It is evident that every precaution is being taken in order to prevent a repetition of mistakes made in the Great War, and that, on this occasion, there is to be an avoidance, to the greatest possible extent, of the useless sacrifice of man-poAver which Avas too-frequently seen in the past. “One of the greatest military feats,” is the description applied

to the transport without casualty, across the English Channel, 01. over 150,000 British troops. This tribute from a French military expert was accompanied by an expression of opinion that the transportation represented the first victory for the Allies in the war. Tn any case, it gives a practical demonstration of the Allied mastery of sea and air, in an all-impor-tant area. Had the Germans been able to do so, there is no doubt that they would haye taken energetic measures with the object of preventing the crossing of the British forces. The achievement of such an objective would have been a brilliant feather in the Nazi cap, besides having a valuable moral effect upon their own forces. The knowledge that over 150,000 splendidly trained and equipped British troops arc already prepared for action against them, and that there is no obstacle to the transport of further thousands, is not calculated to encourage the Germans in the West, particularly in view of the reports That the men occupying the Siegfried Line have already made complaints regarding the conditions under which they are expected to carry on the campaign. The fighting qualities of the “contemptible little army” of 1914 have not been forgotten, and there is not the slightest doubt that the “Contemptibles” of 1939, in much-greater numbers, immeasurably better-equipped, will, as Mr. Ilore Belisha expressed it, “acquit themselves with the same tenacity, courage, and endurance.” Added merit is given to the successful transportation of the Expeditionary Force by the fact that the troops were shipped in small groups, and disembarked at scattered ports in France, thus increasing the task of the naval units engaged as guards. Some idea of the amount of equipment simultaneously taken across the Channel is given by the official statement that it comprised no fewer than 25,000 vehicles, including tanks weighing up to fifteen tons each. The great advance in the mechanisation of the British Army ,is indicated by the information that, in 1914, infantry constituted 60 per cent, of the British forces, these relying on rifles, bayonets, and two machine-guns to each battalion. To-day, only 20 per cent, of the entire force consists of infantry, while there are fifty Bren guns, twenty-two antitank guns, and other weapons per battalion. One factor essential to the successful prosecution of mechanised warfare is an adequate supply of fuel. In this respect. the longer the war continued the greater would be the advantage to the Allies. Their command of the seas would ensure fuel supplies, whereas the lapse of time would increase the difficulties of Germany, the blockade already having cut her off from important sources of supply. The same argument applies to many other essential Avar requirements, the stocks of which now held would rapidly be exhausted by the demands of a major campaign. The prospects of German victory to-day are much worse than they were in 1914, one of the main reasons being the great increase in the strength of Britain.