MILITARY STRATEGY

Greymouth Evening Star, 18 April 1939, Page 10

MILITARY STRATEGY

NEW FACTORS IN EUROPE. Until a few months ago there seemed no doubt about the answer to the question whether Britain would need to raise a large army for use in a general war on .the Continent. In the 20 years which followed demobilisation, the idea of ever repeating the effort of 1914-18 appeared to be definitely ruled out. After rearmament started there was no serious attempt to prepare for the eventuality of having to raise an expeditionary force on the scale which' we saw in the last war (writes George Martelli in the ‘Sydney Morning Herald”). As regards the army, the authorities concentrated on supplying the

deficiencies in personnel and material caused by the ravages of peace. Recruiting and re-equipment were steadily pursued, but not at the speed or in the way , which would presumably have been adopted had an unlimited intervention on land been envisaged such as we undertook in the years 191-1-1918. In the popular mind, the weakness of our potential enemies compared with the strength of our potential allies seemed to preclude the necessity of going to the help of the latter. On the other band, the invention of new arms, and especially the development of the aeroplane, encouraged people to believe that the next war would be something very different from the last. There was a. widespread belief that it would be decided less by land than in the air and on the sea. This belief was nourished by postwar revelations of military errors and by writings of experts, such as Captain Liddell Hart, the famous military correspondent of ‘The Times,’ who consistently attacked the doctrine of unlimited intervention. According to this school, it had been a fatal mistake to put millions of men in France. Instead of exhausting herself trying to break the deadlock on the western front England should have exploited her sea power and financial strength (which in the end proved the decisive weapons) and reserved her army for a surprise attack on some unexpected point where a. relatively small force could be effective. That was the traditional strategy of England, these writers urged, which had always been successful in the past, and it should be the one adopted in any future conflict. The fact that our ally, France, seemed well able to defend her own frontiers lent additional weight to the argument. As far as anything could be known of their melitary conceptions, the British Government, seemed to hold the same view. When explaining the estimates for defence last year, Mr. Cham-

berlain laid down the duties of outfighting services in the following order:—To protect, the British Isles against, air attack and invasion; to defend sea routes and communications with the British Empire; to go to the help of our allies (which include France, Belgium. Portugal, Egypt, and Iraq 1. Although the carrying out of any of these duties might necessitate the sending of an expeditionary force, in the mind of the Prime Minister that was clearly the least urgent of the considerations which have determined the nature of the British rearmament pro-

gra mnte. If there was any doubt, on rite question the very fact not only that cous I'iption was rejected, but also that no preparations were made lor training another citizens’ army, seemed to preclude the despatch of a large force abroad. It may safely be stiid, indeed, that, until a short time ago no such force was contemplated. Quite lately, however, there appears ru have been a reversal of policy; the first official inkling of it was given by Im War Office on October 10, when it announced the formation of a Ter-

ritorial field army of 3 3 divisions. Such a force, which will include nine infantry divisions, and one. mechanised mobile division, is clearly intended for use on i lie Continent. Its creation suggests that the authorities now contemplate a. military effort on a considerable scale in co-operation with France.