BALEARIC ISLES

Greymouth Evening Star, 17 January 1939, Page 4

BALEARIC ISLES

IMPOiri’ANCE TO THE FRENCH. 'Die Ralearic. archipelago, consisting of four large and eleven small islands off Hie east coast of Spain, has been sought far more eagerly than any other of that size and of so small an internal value. writes Professor .1. Holland Rose in the “Manchester “Guardian.” For it includes the key to naval control of the West Mediterranean in the finest natural harbour of that sea-—namely. Port Maboon of Minorca. This name is derived from the great. Roman seaman Mayo, a reminder of the influence of the Roman Empire, which, after capturing Cartilage, soon seized that archipelago and thence gained power for acquiring and holding most of Spain.

In an article published in this journal on March 19 last I showed that Mussolini’s final aim was the revival of the old Roman Empire. Naturally, then, he sought to further the efforts of that ijuasi-Fascist General Franco to crush the Spanish Government. The Italian occupation of Majorca, and thereafter of other islets, enabled Mussolini’s expeditions both to help on Franco's forces in Eastern Spain and to protect at sea their connections with Morocco, threatened at times by the French Mediterranean squadrons. For France desired Franco’s defeat. Let us note briefly the chief incidents which have proved the nautical value of the Balearic Isles. Leaving on one side the events of old Roman and medieval times, we will come to the period of Franco-Spanish supremacy in the Mediterranean. Ambi tious Louis XIV had in 1700 gained virtual control over Spain and thereby made that great sea a Franco-Span-ish lake, thus assuring control over Italy and also cutting off the trade of British, Dutch, and Germans from that vast expanse. Thus Admiral de 13i-eze brought out at Toulon a proud medal bearing the motto “Presage de I’Empire de la Mor.” Also our Parliament declared world peace to be at an end. Forthwith the Dutch and Germans

joined us in abolishing that new Mediterranean monopoly. So too did the

Portuguese in 1703, and in the nex year Gibraltar fell before our joint ai tack. Consequently this capture set ered the French-Spanish Meditcrrai can Fleet, from their oceanic forces ' yet it led on to no decisive succes within that sea until in 1708 our join 1 allied fleets seized Fort Mahon in Mil orca. This admirable naval base Ci cilitated several attacks on Souther ' France which greatly weakened he both there and in her efforts nortl wards against Marlborough’s arnij Hence the collapse of France an Spain in 1713, when the Peace c Utrecht assigned to us both Gibralta and Minorca and sonic French air Spanish colonies. BRITAIN’S LOSS OF MINORCA. This attainment of balance of powe in the Mediterranean assured it als , over the civilised world. Furthermore when the Seven Years’ War began i 1756 with Admiral Byng’s blunderin loss of Minorca, we attacked and cat tured Belle Isle in order to compe : France' to urge on Spain the restor; lion to us of that valuable base r the Mediterranean. We held it anti the disastrous American War of Ii dependence (1776-83) ensured its lost This event helped on the ambition young Napoleon Bonaparte in hi grand design of monopolising the Mr diterranean (1797-98) in order to seiz Egypt and thenceforth India. Seem ing the lonian Isles and Malta, he car tured Egypt, until Pitt’s resolve to rc occupy the Mediterranean led to Ne son's advance into it and his rout o Bonaparte’s fleet off the Nile (Aug ust I, 1798). This brilliant succes led to our recovery of Minorca, on J final capture of Malta, and the expul sion of Ihe French from Egypt, Other naval successes brought abou the Peace of Amiens (March 25, 1802) Though we were as supreme at se; as Napoleon (now First Consul o France) was on land, yet our weal Addington Cabinet gave up virtual!? all our maritime gains and left Franca and her ally, Spain, stronger than ever GIVEN BACK TO SPAIN. We surrendered Minorca back t( Spain, though we retained from hei Trinidad, also Ceylon from the Dutch Malta was handed over to the weal Order of the Knights of St. John. Oui Mediterranean blunders encouraget Napoleon to resume his great Orien tal design, the secret of which lu finally disclosed to General Gourgauc —“He who masters Egypt, masters In dia.” Hence the Peace, of Amiens pro mised to place France in the van ol the oceanic and colonising peoples This chance Napoleon lost at Trafalgar, which also ruined his hope, with the aid of Spain, of dominating the Mediterranean. Now from Malta as base, not from Minorca, we crushed his designs on Italy and Egypt. When, in .1808, his tyranny of Spain drove her over to our side we used the Balearic Isles to press on the Peninsular War. but claimed no territorial reward j at the peace of .181-1. Friendly relations now prevailed in the Mediterranean. But when after 1830 France conquered Algeria, and Spain spread over into Morocco, friction began between them. Then the Spanish fortifications in Majorca and Minorca rendered French expeditions risky. Still as of yore Franco-Span-to and from North Africa somewhat good. Indeed not until the dictators ish relations on the whole remained Hitler and Mussolini formed The Ber-lin-Rome “axis” did the recent Spanish civil war lead to landings in the Balearic Isles and certain “dictatorial” acts and plans in Spain. Let us hope that these will end as did those of Louis XIV and Napoleon J. for egotistic and forceful ambition leads to distlitCJ <