ALARM OVER “KEMALISM”

Greymouth Evening Star, 16 April 1937, Page 3

ALARM OVER “KEMALISM”

RECENT SYRIA SETTLEMENT. Ernest Main, “Daily Telegraph” special correspondent in Syria, writes: — Since the Alexandretta affair the Arabs have been asking in their newspapers whether “Kemalism is not a bigger danger than Zionism.” That tension between Turkey and France over the status of the Sanjak, which had to be submitted to Geneva for treatment, devedoped in a way which disquieted them. It was the Syrian Arabs who suffered the shock. They had just concluded their treaty of alliance with France, and, as one of their leaders put it to me, were “naive enough to think that a bargain was a bargain." What they found, they say, is that in spite of the treaty guaranteeing Syria’s integrity, France, backed by Britain, has in effect given their principal seaport to Turkey. This, of course, is not strictly correct : what happened was that the sanjak, or district, of Alexandretta was given local autonomy. Nevertheless, the Syrians feel a sense of grievance and they are convinced that Turkish pressure forced France to betray them.

France at the moment is nominally Syria’s Public Enemy No. I.' Mr Eden is No. 2. Syrians toll me they cannot understand why Mr Eden persuaded France to give way to Turkish pressure except on the asumplion that Britain wants to placate Turkey. Nor can they understand why France did not call Turkey’s war-bluff, in view of France’s alianco with Russia, the country of which Turkey is most afraid.

Tho truth is that a new factor is coming into Middle-East politics What the Arabs mean by “Kemalism” is the new resurgence of the Anatolian Turks under the electric energy of Kemal Ataturk. Tho policy adopted in recent years by Mussolini and Hitler has made a profound impression on the East, where it. is again being openly said that force pays. Kemal Ataturk is cast in the same mould. He has consistently refused to allow himself to he called the Dictator of Turkey, preferring to be known as the head of a unanimous nation. But in any case his single-mindedness is as complete, as thorough-going, as I hat of the acknowledged Dictators, and the demand for Alexandretta was made in the real heroic style. Turkey naturally could not. face with equanimity the possibility that Syria—once France gave up the Mandate —-might not be strong enough to keep <m aggressor out. of Alexandretta. An impecunious Syria might, for example, be tempted, for a consideration. to lease the harbour Io an Italian company, in which case the port Io all intents and purposes would have become Italian.

TURKEY AXI) ITALY. Italy is trying ver.v hard to extend her influence in Hie Levant, ami a foothold on the Syrian coast, would' place her in a. new and secure position on (lie (lank of (he British line of communication wil h I lail'a and t he Suez ('anal. Haifa is a rising part : it is a terminus of the Irak pipe-line and may soon be on the air-route to India, ami Australia Turkey herself does not need

Alexandretta as a port, hut she evidently wants to satisfy herself that no other strong Power should threaten it. There is only one Mediterranean Power of which Turkey is nervous, and the new Franco-Turkish agreement over “Skanderouna,” as the Arabs call Alexandretta, should, in the opinion of Turkey (and possibly others) keep that Power out of •the port. But the Arabs fear that the Turks will not stop at this. They fully realise that the Turks have never forgiven them for their rebellion during the war. What Arabs called a. light for freedom the Turks called treachery, and Turkey is now beginning to bo able to indulge in the luxury of remembering a grievance in the full knowledge that she is in a position to do something about it. Since Alexandretta and Antioch have been “lost” Syria is wondering whether Aleppo will be the next objective of the Turks. If bluff worked once, the Arabs say, it will work again. The northern fringes of Syria, as of Irak, are not pure Arab. Turkish and Turcoman types are frequent and the Turkish language is in common use, although all the non-Arabs speak Arabic. So far as Irak is concerned, many Arabs in Damascus tell me that before long Turkey will begin to lake an interest in Mosul, which she lost in 1925.

It is pointed out that the north of Irak is very largely Kurdish and that the Kurds might prefer to be Turkish rather than Irak subjects. They would ask for autonomy, but—so runs the argument—the Turks might be willing to pay this price, while the Kurds remember that in the years preceding the termination of the Irak Mandate, two separate Home Rule movements in the Kurdish mountains were put down relentlessly- by the Irak army, aided by the British R.A.F.

As a. coincidence it is noted that tho present Prime Minister of Irak is of Turkish origin, and the generalissimo who put him in power is a Kurd. Neither appears to show any strong interest in the pan-Arab cause. The Arabs of Syria, in the present difficulty, are bound to‘continue to rely on French arms, however much they may dislike French policy. There are over 10,600 French troops in Syria, every arm being represented, including the Foreign Legion, stationed in tho north. For some time to come the Arabs feel that they must depend on the bayonets of France.

PEACE IN EUROPE. Tho French fear that in the present tension the Syrians of the towns may have the hacking of the Druse, who gave the Mandatory Power so much trouble in 1925. If the Jebel Druse “goes up.” France will have her hands full. To-day in Damascus all is quiet, but there is still lension. and tho situation is potentially difficult.

If France had called Tn rkey’s “bluff'' and found that after all Turkey was not bluffing, then Syria could not. have kept. Alexandretta without, French help. Rather than lose the| port—whether to become Turkish or | merely “autonomous”—the Syrian' nationalists, so they tell me. would I have cheerfullj r seen France and I Turkey at loggerheads, whatever the. risk to European peace. They tell| me tha-L in their opinion Turkey traded on (lie desire of Britain and France for peace,, hut they object to

paying in Syria the price of peace in Europe. It is for these reasons that .Temil Mardam Bey, the Prime Minister, and his Foreign Minister went to Geneva to press for the abrogation of the recent arrangement. Nationalist feeling in Damascus and other Syrian towns is kept at white heat by the nationalist leader, Fakhri Baroudi, a thin, eager, almost wild-eyed young man, with an uncanny power of swaying a crowd. Fakhri Baroudi rushes about in a state of perpetual exaltation, consumed by zeal —capable, I should say, of great things in due time. As always in the Middle East, the students are playing a lively part in tho Alexandretta demonstrations, but, in spite of the fact that schoolboys of 8 and 10 take part in the processions, there is discernible a very strong national feeling underlying tbe more frothy excitement of the law and medical schools.

At. the moment, the Syrians are not disposed to heed any reminder that France has not yet ratified the Syrian treaty and that. Syria is not yet a member of the League. They will not take the warning that a. show of violence on their part may lead to los of confidence in Syria’s capacity and to a postponement of her entry into the League. These warnings and reminders have been given by responsible personages in Damascus but all that the Syrians can see is the loss of Alexandretta and the apparent climb-down of Britain and France before Turkey. The Arabs ask why the Allied Powers continue to serve the interests of peace by sacrificing their weaker brethren, such as Abyssinia. And they ask how many more times the process will have to be repeated before the Anglo-French worm will turn.

Britain’s name in Hie Middle East is not what it was. In the Persian Gulf after tbe war Britain was felt to have "let down” the then Sheikh of Mohammerah and the then Sheikh of Kuwait, both of whom lent vital assistance al the landing of the British troops in Mesopotamia, in 1911. The story is a. complicated one, bill tl ,is well known and understood in Arabia. We lost further prestige by our “betrayal” (as it has been called) of Hie Assyrians in 1932-33. The Abyssinian affair shook even further the confidence of the East in Britain. The East did not appreciate the retinemcuis of the legal position. It did not understood that Britain was acting lor ihe League in its Sanctions policy. All that the East saw was that Britain and Italy were confronting each other and in the circumstances came to the conclusion that Britain was too weak to tight.

Then came the Olympic Games. Tbe Arabian world saw Britain well down the course. There is nothing that the Arab admires so much as physical strength and prowess: in 1936 he saw Britain beaten in the Held of sport, in whjcl) she had always been thought I re-emiuent. The. Arab asked himself: What has come over Britain? In Palest itie al the same time Hie

Arabs were persuaded that somehow or other (hey were in a position to prevent Britain keeping order in the country. To-day the Syrian leaders 101 l urn (hat. Britain has given way again. It is a point of view of which th" British public should he made aware.