DOUBTS IN GERMANY

Greymouth Evening Star, 19 February 1937, Page 3

DOUBTS IN GERMANY

RESULTS OF FOREIGN POLICY. Many in Germany are carrying with them grave preoccupations about the future of German foreign policy; and they are deprived for the moment of the relief of public expression, said the Berlin correspondent of “The Times” recently. What would be Great Britain’s attitude toward the German colonial claims? Does she stand in the Spanish clash on the side of what are in Berlin described as the “forces of order?” And what is her attitude toward Communism in Europe, generally, and Soviet Russia, in particular? are questions asked. German policy seems to have reached a deadlock. For it is becoming clear that Great Britain and France, which have recently drawn closer together. are prepared to support a settlement which might meet the chief of German’s demands only in exchange

for a complete return to economic ami political collaboration and the abandonment of adventures. The terms seem to mean the giving up of the policy of self-sufficiency, of indepen'dence of international finance, and of the systematic finance for the mobilisation of the entire nation for war conditions. Not only would such terms be bitterly hard for a regime like that of the new Germany to swallow, but it almost looks as though some parts of the policies in question have been prosecuted beyond the point at which a withdrawal seems practicable. On the other hand, without relief of some sort, no one can see how Germany is to get through another winter. if she gets through this one. Desperate measures may enable the critical spring months, during which the grain shortage will make itself felt, to be surmounted, but only at the cost, indirectly, of next winter’s supplies of various vital foods. The policy of “Gun rather than butter,” deliberately chosen in Germany's present circumstances. has brought this about.

It. is not astonishing, therefore, that in those influential quarters which set much store by a pursuit of the independent. policies at all costs, the idea of the “explosion” threatened by Dr. Schacht as a psychological and material outlet should have gained ground. In speculations of this sort the strategical value of a success in Spain is urged, on Ihe giound that it would keep part of the French Army immobilised and altogether embarrass France and Great Britain. Against this argument *is the fact that the support of General Franco to victory has met with serious delays, and the view is understood to have been conveyed through General Fanpel, the German Charge d’Affaires with the insurgents, that very considerable addi-i tioiial support will he necessary lor success. That this requirement coin-i cides with signs of an improvement in | Anglo-Italian relations and with al le.ling that Italy's interest, in Spain is. perhaps, slackening a little adds to the gloom of the outlook. ' There is little doubt that military advice would go against further commitments. But it cannot be taken for granted that the army's advice would necessarily coincide with that of General Goering’s air force and associated

i •. i< • , a..-.; taken the kcenci interest in the Spanish affair. t The advice of both, its merits duly weighed.

would have to he conveyed finally through the War Minister, whose deep attachment to the Fultrer and sympathy with other party leaders is well known. Mean while the “moderates.” among whom may be included not only the Foreign Office and Dr. Schacht ayd ihe industrialists, but also responsible military chiefs, are clearly playing for al least a "little” concession in the colonial field for the sake of prestige and as a dt t-c; . .c itaau.-; m uit.iig over the food crisis psychologically and of reinforcing their own waning

power and appeasing the hothead: Even a “little colony.” it is pleadej would soon be expanded into a bi one in the popular mind by ski'Jtu propaganda, and would make a big in' pression. The difficulty about this solution 1 that it could only be a makeshiftperhaps a very brief one—and woub offer Europe little, if any, prospect o relief from anxiety, for it would ac mittcdly have slight chance of leadin. to (Im abandonment of intensive re i m. mmu, Um F.nu Tear Plan, and th policy of self-sufficiency for militar purposes.