MARINE INQUIRY

Greymouth Evening Star, 8 August 1936, Page 14

MARINE INQUIRY

WRECK OF ABEL TASMAN.

OFFICERS GIVE EVIDENCE. After yesterday’s sitting, good progress had been made at Greymouth •with the marine inquiry concerning the wreck of the s.s. Abel Tasman, which broke away from her moorings at the wharf, and stranded on the North Tip, on July 18. The evidence of the members of the ship’s complement had been completed, and the Harbourmaster (Captain F. W. Cox)

was in the witness-box when the Court adjourned'. Mr H. Morgan, S.M., presided, with Captain J. Mawson and Captain F. W. Baron, both of Wellington, as nautical assessors. Mr N. A. Foden, of Wellington, represented the Minister of Marine and the Collector of Customs; Mr E. K. Kirkcaldie, of Wellington, appeared for Captain W. D. Archibald, of the Abel Tasman, and the former owners of the vessel, the H. C. Sleigh Coasters Proprietary, Ltd., of Melbourne; and Mr F. A. Kitchingham for the Greymouth Harbour Board Captain H. A. Dillner acted as advisor, on behalf of the Marine Department. Mr D. C. Milne (Harbour Engineer.) and Mr J. S. Robertson, local representative of .the former owners of the ship, were in attendance. On resuming after the luncheon adjournment, Peter Dalziel, first mate of the Abel Tasman, was called. He stated that he was on the wharf with Captain Archibald, and heard him say that the ship was breaking away. They started to run, but witness tripped and fell, and was too late to get on board. He ran to the Kaimai, with the object of boarding the Abel Tasman, but was too late. He got a taxi, and went across to Cobden with two sailors, Anderson and Gear. They went to the North Tip, where witness took charge of the rescue opera-

tions after the Abel Tasman struck. Witness corroborated the captain’s evidence as to the ship’s moorings at the wharf, and said they seemed all right prior to the breakaway. He considered the ship was moored thoroughly. One of the Harbour Board officials instructed witness to put out a second cable, about noon. It was the practice to wait for such instructions. To Mr Kitchingham: His instructions would come through the captain, who would receive them, from the Harbour officials. To Mr Kirkcaldie: He had been visiting the port for seven years. In his opinion, the ship had a wide margin of safety. William Murray, chief engineer of the Abel Tasman, stated that he was at the engine-room door about 5 p.m. on July 18. He was looking over the side, when he saw the aft lines slackening, and thought something had carried away forward. He did not actually see what happened. The engines at that time were practically ready for use. The steam had only to be turned on and the valves opened. That would take about two and

a-half minutes, or three and a-half minutes before they could be started in response to an order. The captain’s orders were promptly executed. Under the circumstances, witness realised that time was important. If the propellor had been turning over, the time would have been reduced by the two and a-half minutes. It had never occurred: to him that it was desirable to have the propellor turning over in flood-time. It had not been done on previous occasions when the ship visited Greymouth, when the river was flooded. He could not see whether, if the two and a-half minutes had been saved, that would have been of assistance to the captain in handling the ship after she broke away. Witness had experience of river ports in the Belgian Congo, but they were not bar harbours. At one place the current was running at 10 knots, but ships could go beyond it into slack water. He thought that rivers such as the Grey were a “damned nuisance.” He agreed that it would be possible to keep the pro-

pellor turning over. To Mr Kirkcaldie: On the afternoon of July IS, the captain told him to keep steam handy, and this was done. The engines were ready for instant use, except for turning on the steam. When witness saw the ship moving, he immediately went to the engine-room. The steam was first turned on to the steering apparatus, by opening a valve. Steam for the winches was next turned on, by another valve, and the same procedure was followed for the main, engines. Witness just guessed the time required, but his estimate would be pretty accurate. The reply to the order from the bridge was almost instantaneous. Witness could not say whether the running of the engines would cause the ship to lie unsteadily at the wharf. The turning of the propellor would have a bad effect on a vessel lying further down the 'wharf. The latter vessel would have to be warned.

Leslie Arnold Baillie, third officer on the Abel Tasman; said that he was on the wharf with the captain and the chief officer, inspecting the moorings. Witness did not notice any strain on them. Ke heard a report, as if something had carried away, and looked between two trucks. The ship must have moved instantaneously. Witness jumped aboard at the same time as the captain, and ran aft, on his own initiative. He saw what was left of the aft lines, but could not do anything, and went to the bridge. The lifeboats were got ready, at the captain’s order. Witness agreed with the captain’s evidence regarding the way the ship went down the river. The first rocket was a failure, because the seas were coming over the bridge, and wet the fuse. That was liable to happen to all rockets. Thre rockets failed, but the fourth reached the Tiphead. Witness had been visiting Greymouth, off and on, since 1921, but had no experience of other river ports. , Magnus Warwick, wireless operator on the Abel Tasman, stated that when he was on the bridge at 5 p.m., he saw the aft lines part, but did not see the forward lines break. He took the wheel, at the captain’s instructions, and obeyed his directions. When the ship bumped, 'witness was still at the wheel.. He was ordered to send a distress mnspavo to :• vessel in the; vicinity, but did not get any acknowledgment of the signal from that vne.-‘ scl, although lie Imd responses from Auckland and 'Wellington. , No assistance was sujTplied by the vessel in the vicinity. ,

Charles Paulsen, bosun on the Abel Tasman, stated that he was on deck, and saw the ship moving. He went aft, saw the lines break, and then ran forward. He met the captain, and was told to get the starboard anchor ready, by connecting the chain. He was then told to leave the anchor, and heave in the port chain. The ship hit an obstruction, but witness did not. know whether it was the wreck of the Kaponga. There were thirty wrecks over there. (Laughter).

“You don’t suggest that the port is as bad as that!” said Mr Foden. Witness said that the Abel Tasman was bumping heavily on the bar. He assisted to prepare the rocket gear. Witness had visited the port eight or ten times, and had seen the river in flood twice previously.

RIVER CURRENTS.

Captain F. Venn, signalman employed by the Harbour Board, said he arrived at the station at 5.15 p.m. He previously saw the ship drifting down the river, and she appeared to him to touch on the Kaponga wreckage. Witness signalled the Titoki, in the roadstead, to keep handy. The current in the river was eight or nine knots at 5 p.m. Witness had eight years’ experience at Greymouth. He was not due on duty on July IS until 6 p.m., but went down to see if he could give any assistance. He saw the ship bumping on the bar. To Mr Kitchingham: The Kaponga wreckage was well outside the navigation limits of the port. There was a heavy sea on the bar, and the waves would be 10ft to 12ft high. To Mr Kirkcaldie: Floats were used to measure the river current, in ordinary circumstances, and the float was run over a measured distance. The estimate of eight or nine knots given by him was guesswork. To Mr Kitchingham: Floats were not used in flood-time. To the S.M.: The bar was not navigable on July 18, and the signals were against it.

Albert Edward Cornell stated that he was on duty at the signal station. He first save the Abel Tasman when she was near the south of the lagoon. She passed the signal station at 5.15 p.m. Witness saw' her strike the Kaponga wreckage, swing broadside on to the bar, and finally strand on the North Tip. There would be 20 feet of water on the bar when Lite Abel Tasman reached it, but the depth was not steady, there being a nine-foot sea on the bar. Witness estimated the river current at eight or nine knots. He had experience of the river since 1907, and it was part of his duty to watch the current. He did not see that the captain of the Abel Tasman could have done any more than he did, to try and save his vessel.

To Mr Kirkcaldie: There w'as no means of measuring the current when the river was in flood, and the estimates at such times were guesswork. The tug was used about once a week, to sound the bar. He could not say, offhand, when it was last done before the wreck of the Abel Tasman. Witness described the method of taking soundings by leadlines, to ascertain the depth on the bar. A gauge board located at the lower end of the wharf, was used to show the rise and fall of the tide every hour, and the readings on the board were used in conjunction with the soundings on the bar. If there was 15 feet on the bar, for instance, and 5 feet on the gauge, the depth recorded was 10 feet. The tide -was rising at 5 p.m., on July 18. He could not say whether there had been any “scour” between the time of the last sounding on the bar and the wreck.

HARBOURMASTER’S EVIDENCE

Captain F. W. Cox, Harbourmaster at Greymouth, for 21 years, stated that he was Harbourmaster and pilot at Nelson for ten years, and prior to that had seagoing experience. On July 18, he recorded the state of the river at various times. At 9 a.m., the river was normal and the bar rough with considerable sea; noon, river about four knots, bar rough; 3 p.m., river about seven knots, bar rough. The normal rate was one to two and a-half knots; up to a little over four knots was a slight run. Ten knots was described as a very strong fresh. The fastest current he had known in the river was about 14 knots. Tenknot currents were not common. When on watch, witness interviewed the captains of vessels, if any change in the river was expected, through heavy rain, and discussed the moorings. On July 18, the mate of the Abel Tasman was instructed to put out a second cable, about noon. Witness was then quite satisfied with the moorings. It was considered that two

cables should cope with anything experienced in the river. In exceptional cases, extra wires were added from the ships. Witness directed the placing of the moorings on ships in port, on the inside and outside posts. None of the captains had ever worked in opposition to witness, nor he to them. The by-laws gave witness control of the moorings, but he adopted the policy of amicable arrangement with the captains. Morally, witness was responsible for the safety of ships, but not legally. The by-laws absolved the Harbour Board from re-

sponsibility. Witness was off duty on the afternoon of July 18. About 4.55 p.m. he received a telephone message, and arrived at the wharf when the ship was half-way to the signal station. He made arrangements for rescue W'ork. If the propellor of the Abel Tasman had been revolving it would have eased the strain on the moorings. When it was thought that the moorings required assistance, instructions were given for the engines to be started; this -was usually done when the current reached between nine and 10 knots, but it depended upon circumstances, and each case was considered on its merits. He was convinced that the ship was safe, because she had chains out to take a breaking strain of about 150 tons. The port cable should take over 70 tons strain, and the starboard cable the same. Tho general condition of the cables, so far as witness could see, was up to the requirements. He gave a critical glance at the cables, and decided from his experience whether they were satisfactory. He knew what each size should stand, and what the resistance of the ship was. He could only judge by what he could see, and he relied upon his visual impression, based on his experience. He was not responsible for any defects in the cables; that was not in his province at all. ‘The system under which he worked did r.-'t provide for the possibility of -n ir.herert defect in a cable. The breaking strain of cables was fixed under Lloyds’ test conditions. It did not matter where the cables were used, if they.did not stand a test on

that basis, thpy were deficient. All the- cables used at Greymouth were anchor chains. They were tested by Lloyds for use with anchors and he considered that anchor work was a more drastic test than mooring work, because, in the latter case, the ship was lying “as quiet as a mouse.” Sudden strains were placed on the cables, when they were used for anchor purposes, as the ship was moving about. It was quite proper to use the chains for mooring purposes. The metal sometimes became “fatigued,” and developed defects. He did not hesitate to use the chains, as he knew that they were supposed to bo inspected annually by a qualified man. Witness assumed they were inspected, but he could not be responsible for everything in the universe. The chains should stand the strain imposed upon them by the Grey River. If not, they had no right to be there. The mishap to the Omana was due to the breaking of a crystallised mooring shackle, and was on all fours with the accident to the Abel Tasman. When one cable broke, the other could not stand the extra strain. After the mishap to the Omana, witness warned the shipping people, personally, that they were being “penny wise and pound foolish” in regal’d to defective cables. The harbour authorities took the cables of every ship in port at their face value. Witness considered that the system was quite satisfactory, so long as the material carried out its duty. If there were to be a repetition of the Omana and Abel Tasman incidents, some provision should be made to try and meet it. Some other provision was required for holding the cables aboard the ship, as the present system of a bandbrake was not sufficient. It would not be sufficient even if the windlass were in gear. Th© dredge had big windlasses, but Captain Connor had a Sampson post installed, to supplement the windlass. The accidents to the Omana and the Abel Tasman, coming fairly close together, and the fact that the ships visiting the harbour were becoming bigger, influenced witness’s conclusion as to the need for a new system of holding the

cables on the ships. The bigger ships were taxing the natural limitations of the port. The wharf facilities today were quite adequate for the larger ships. He did not think the Harbour Board should interfere with the mooring apparatus, unless requested to assist. Three large mooring springs were secured by the Board, but were used only once. A fee was charged for the use of the springs. Witness said that if a vessel got-' away from the Grey wharf in flood time she had not the ghost of a chance of escaping disaster, therefore, he was in favour- of supplementary moorings. He did not see the shackle which broke on the Omana, because it was put on during the night. No steps were taken in connection with the mooring system, after the Omana broke away, because the cause of the breakaway was known. He could only use the mooring material available, but he was not content to allow ships to break away from the wharf. If he noticed a defective cable, he would condemn it right away, and let the owners take the responsibility. It was not desirable to be without the use of the anchors, if the windlasses could not hold the cables. If the windlasses could be made capable of holding everything, that would be satisfactory. Vessels coming to the Grey wharf should be provided with something beyond the band-brake of

the windlass to ensure that they would be held properly fast to the wharf. The provision of extra mooring facilities was a business proposition between the Board and the shipowners. If the windlasses could not be made stronger, something more elaborate could be considered. Witness considered that there was a 20ton pressure by the river against the Abel Tasman, and the cable that broke first must have been in a pretty rotten condition when it did not stand that pressure. The Harbour Board was not an insurance company, and could not take risks like that. It was taken for granted that the cables on ships were in good order. If he asked captains if their cables were in good order, they would think that he should go to Seaview! They knew their responsibilities, and so did witness.

The Court adjourned at 5.15 p.m. TO-DAY’S PROCEEDINGS. Resuming his evidence, this morning, Captain Cox was questioned by Mr Kitchingham, and stated that to his knowledge three vessels had

roken away at Greymouth, during

flood-time, th;e Taupo, Omana, and Abel Tasman. The present mooring system had always been adopted. The flood on July 18, was not such as to cause concern for the safety of shipping. There was a tendency to condemn the pi esent mooring system, when the trouble was really due to defects in ships’ chains, for which the harbour authorities were not responsible. Ho suggested that in future, when a second cable was put out, a 41in. steel-wire mooring line should be used, instead of the anchor chain, and that the port anchor be allowed to remain shackled to tire chain, to he ready for instant use if required. A special steel-wire line should be kept on the ship, for mooring purposes. He also suggested that an extra turn should be taken around the mooring posts. So far as witness was aware, none of the captains visiting the port had protested against the practice of unshackling the anchors from the chains.

In reply to Mr Kirkcaldie, witness gave technical evidence regarding the working and breaking strains of new manila ropes. So far as the moorings of the Abel Tasman were concerned, he said that all precautions were taken, and they should have stood up experienced in the Grey River. He was not in favour of the practice of slackening stern moorings, and allowing ships to ease out from the wharf, as it led to considerable shoaling of the berthage. Details regarding the procedure adopted for sounding the bar were given by witness. He said that the wreckage of the Kaponga did not curtail the navigable or working channel in the river.

To Mi’ Foden: The Abel Tasman was moored as well as she possiblj’ could be, and he would have no hesitation in using similar moorings in future. The ships’ lines should be in good condition, and he would moor a vessel with the equipment aboard, knowing that the equipment was supposed to have been inspected. The onus was upon the shipowners to r upp’y gear up to standard. Witness could not inspect every line and cable.

Captain Henry Moar, deputy-har-bourmaster, gave evidence as to the river current on July 18, and said that

ho instructed the Kaimai to put. out a second cable. The moorings of the Abel Tasman complied with the requirements, and he was told that the main steam was handy, with a pressure of 1601bs. Witness did not consider it was necessary to use a ship’s engines, with a current of eight knots, but was in favour of using the engines when a ten-knot current was expected in the river. Vessels very often laid quieter at the wharf, if the engines were not running, and consequently there was less friction on the moorings.

To Mr Kirkcaldie: There was danger to propellers, from logs, when the engines were running.

io Mr Foden: There was no objection to the propellor just turning over, as distinct from running at speed. A similar system of mooring was in vogue at Westport. The fact that ships had broken away at Greymouth was sheer misfortune. This closed the evidence called by Mr Foden on behalf of the Minister. The Harbour Engineer (Mr D. C. Milne) was called by Mr Kitchinghani, and produced the tide-gauge chart for July 18. There was no doubt that the cause of the Omana breaking away was the failure of a crystallised shackle. The wreckage of the Kaponga was 115 feet to the north of the centre of the navigable channel, and there was ample room for vessels, if they kept to the course indicated by the beacons. He admitted, however, that there was not much to come and go on, if a sea were running. To Mr Foden: If the propellers were just turning over, when a flood was expected, it would be an advantage, in that the engines could be used immediately, if necessary. He agreed with the suggestion that additional precautions should be taken. Mr Kirkcaldie put in the last equipment certificate for the ship, issued by the Australian Government, and Lloyds’ certificate. The proceedings -were adjourned until Monday mo'rning, when counsel will address the Court.