ARMAMENTS INQUIRY.

Greymouth Evening Star, 2 July 1936, Page 13

ARMAMENTS INQUIRY.

BRIBERY ALLEGATIONS DENIED LONDON, May 22. Representatives of the Admiralty, the’ War Office, and the Air Ministry gave evidence before the Arms Commission yesterday, denying allegations that armament firms had attempted to bribe Government officials, both at home and abroad. Sir John Eldon Bankes presided, and the representatives of the three services were: —

Admiralty.—Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald G. H. Henderson, Controller of the Navy, and Sir Walter St. D. Jenkins, Director of Navy Contracts. War Office.—Mr. F. C. Bovcnschen, Director of Army Contracts; Lt.-Gen. Sir Hugh J. Elies, MasterGeneral of the Ordnance; and Sir Reginald Townsend, Director of Ordnance Factories. Air Ministry.—Air Marshal Sir Hugh C. T. Dowding, former Air Member for Research and Development and Mr. B. E. Hollaway, Director of Contracts.

They presented a memorandum dealing with the attitude of the Services towards the proposals to set up a National Armaments Board and for “the nationalisation of armaments and domestic matters pertaining to the Admiralty. War Office and Air Ministry.” Rebutting allegations of bribery made in previous evidence, the memorandum stated that so far as the Services’ Departments were concerned the allegations were without foundation, but that they might be considered from the point of view of whether the system was such as to afford adequate safeguards against bribery, and whether cases of bribery had occurred. The memorandum stated that the same broad principles regarding precautions against bribery applied to all three Departments, and it was claimed that they rendered effective bribery difficult, if not impossible. It was pointed out that bribes might be offered by armament firms to induce a Department to embark on a programme of purchase of armaments which it would otherwise not purchase to buy stores from one firm in preference to another, and to pay a highei price than was justified. After giving details of precautions taken, the memorandum stated that there was no shadow of evidence for suspecting that any case of corr,up tion or undue influence had ever aris on.

The system in force in the three Departments was such as to safeguard the State against bribery in connection with the placing and administration of contracts. To the question whether, despite the system, bribes had been offered to and accepted by members of the three Service Departments from armament firms, it was, of course, impossible to prove a negative. It could only be said that in none of the three Departments was there a record of any such case since the war. All three Departments were satisfied that in the placing and administration .of contracts their officials carried out their duties with honesty and integrity.

“JOBS ON RETIREMENT”

No scrap of evidence had been produced that officials of the Departments had been directly bribed by armament firms, and the Departments were aware of none. Regarding the more “subtle” form of bribery allegation, that discrimination had been made by officers of the Ministry in allocating orders in order to obtain jobs upon retirement as directors on the boards of armament firms, the memorandum stated that in support of these allegations certain names had been mentioned. “It is freely admitted, indeed it is common knowledge,” the memorandum continued, “that members of the Services have, after retirement, joined the boards of armament firms providing munitions for the Crown. “The fact that such appointments have been given is no evidence that they have been given for improper motives, and no shred of evidence exists that discrimination has been made. “It may, perhaps, be suggested that if this system of inducement to officials to shew improper discrimination were really in existence, senior officials of the Contracts Departments of the Services who make peace-time allocation of coptracts might be expected to be the special objects of such inducements. "In fact, no such official has been appointed so far as it known.”

NEW WEAPONS AND PLANES

Sir Philip Gibbs, a, member of the i Commissioner, raising the question of i keeping the latest types of weapons < secret, asked, “Don’t you think from < the Services’ point of view that the < Government ought to have closer control over the sale of weapons of war i by private enterprise?” i Lt.-Gen. Sir Hugh Elies: AN e have i a strong licensing system. Sir Philip said it did not seem to , prevent the sale abroad of our latest , types of weapons. ! Sir Hugh: I hope there is no sale of that sort. ’ 1 Sir Philip: Are not many of oui most modern types of weapons and most recent discoveries in armoui- . piercing shells, for instance, available to foreign countries? Vice-Adml. Sir Reginald G. H. Henderson: There was the Hadfield shell. Although it represented an auvancc it would soon have been found out. and we came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to take otu a patent for it. „ Sir Thomas Allen (a membei of the Commission): Secret or otherv.l«c--is it an advantage or a disad\ antage to the Defence Services that, there should be export of armaments. Lt.-Gen. Sir Hugh EUcs said it not a disadvantage, but definitely he 11 ful to the extent that firms wcic using their brains to improve things. Replying to Sir John Eldon banker Vice-Adml. Sir Reginald Henderson said that he would say that an cxpoit system was essential. q:,. Replying to Sir Philip G^bbs,, S.i Hugh said that if a country backwaid in manufacturing facilities wanted an air force, it would buy its machines somewhere else if it could Hot get them in this country. Sir Philip: But they would not get our best types?—No, they will have somebody clse’e best types. We are making them a present oi our brains.—Wc are not making them a present, but a sale of our brains. Sir Philip. The sale might be very costly if they used our brains against US. Sir Hugh Dowding: We have a system by which every new aeroplane and engine goes on what is called the “secret list.” That is not published anywhere outside the Air Ministry, but

I manufacturers know they arc not pei-| niitted to disclose any details of aeio-| 1 planes or engines, or even their existence in the early "stages, and any request for export oi* sale abroad would be unhesitatingly refused at that stage. There comes a stage in the life of the'aeroplane where it is impossible to keep its existence scci ct anj lon^ci. A new type could not bo kept secret when it went out on to the aerodrome. No aeroplane can be sold at any time without the permission of the Ministry. Sir Hugh added that at a later stage manufacturers were allowed to discuss sales with bona fide purchasers, but the general principle followed was that the Service should have something ever a year’s lead. PRIVATE MANUFACTURE Sir Maurice Hankey said that at an earlier session he had made out a prima-facie case rather tcntativelj as to the value of the private manufacture of arms to the civilian industry. He had since had an interesting confirmation. Last week he spent 24 hours at sea on board the Queen Mary. While they were visiting the engines, a very high expert of the Admiralty mentioned that the firm which built the Queen Mary had also built H.M.S. Hood, and that the experience gained in the case of the Hood had made the construction of the Queen Mary possible. . The designer of the Queen Mary engines confirmed this, stating .that he gained invaluable experience tor the Queen Mary’s engines from the engines of the Hood. The same applied to Auxiliary machinery and scientific apparatus of all kinds. Admiralty experts had been closely watching all the technical developments in the Queen Mary and had attended her trials. Nothing must be done to weaken the co-opeiation and mutual advantage which resulted from the present cordial contacts. “I venture to submit that the case has not been made out sufficiently to justify a prohibition, whether national or international, or any drastic icoiganisation of an industry which, as shown in my earlier evidence, is essential to Imperial defence,” Sir Maurice concluded. Sir John Eldon Bankes said that a part of Sir Maurice’s memorandum appeared to be criticism of evidence already given. Regarding that part of the memorandum, Sir Maurice was very much in the position of counsel. Sir Maurice replied that he had no brief for the arms industry. He had set out to explain why he thought the prohibition of private manufactuie would be disastrous to Imperial defence. On examining some of the evidence that had been given, he had found a great many points contrary to what he believed to be facts. The chairman said that because Sir Maurice was not questioned on Certain points of criticism, that did not mean • that the Commission was necessarily iii agreement with him. Sir Maurice contended that it was prejudicial to the national interest to fling mud at the industry. It was bad for the morale of the industry, bad for national prestige, and bad for Imperial defence. He hoped that the Commission would express its opinion of the extravagance of the propaganda against the industry. He had never held a share in a private armaments firm hi his life, but he contended that it was wrong to say that when a man invested in an armaments company he wanted war. It was very doubtful if the shares would rise; between June 2 and July 30, 1914, Vickers’s shares fell one-sixteenth and Armstrong s rose one-thirty-second. When Sir Maurice had concluded tne presentation of his memorandum, the chairman mentioned that the Commission was not asked to consider whethei any of the alleged evils existed. They had to consider and report whether there were any steps which could be usefully taken to remove or minimise such evils. It seemed that they were asked to assume that they existed and to try to devise remedies. He believed that that was deliberately done. , NEW MENACES Sir Maurice dealt with the causes of the European wars of the last century and said that, whatever might have been the importance of armaments as a factor, in none of the wars was it easy to find the smallest tiace of the influence of private manufacture and trade in arms as an origin. There were many new factors today that tended to disturb peaceful progress, in addition to many of the origins and predisposing causes of past wars, he went on. “There are vast internal upheavals in many countries,” he said, “widespread financial confusion; the springing up of systems of government of a kind almost unknown; successions of startling and tragic internal events creating international misgivings; the weakening of treaty obligations; the use of wireless propaganda across teiritorlal boundaries; the growth of militarism, and large-scale rearmament. “Perhaps, worst of all, is the menace from the air. These new factors combined with the old causes, aie the real obstacles against which the League of Nations and peace-loving countries have to contend In the vast complex of disturbing tactois piivate arms manufacture, even if a case against it wag made good, would be a°negligible factor. As a serious cause of unrest it is a figment of the imagination of its opponents. Its aboli tion would not touch Uie real causes of international unrest.” . Dealing With the case against the industry and, ill particular the <l- - incompatibility of public duty and private interests, Sir Maui ice de elared “This unworthy suggestion ■ that individuals cannot separate their ■ private interests from their public ; duty as citizens cuts deep into civilised society. , 1 "Doctors, chemists and nuiscs dc- ' pend for their profit on ill-health oi ’ disease. It would be outrageous to suggest that for that reason they try - to encourage epidemic disease or aie 1 lukewarm in the promotion of public “Companies concerned in cemeteries r or undertakers would make greater 1 nrofits when the-death rate is high, i No one suggests that they try. to ins crease the death-rate. Barristers diaw I their fees for advocacy in the courts but they do not for that reason advise t people to undertake unnecessary e litigation.”

“NASTY INSINUATION” Sir Maurice referred to the “atmosphere of nasty insinuation” about the imputation that Cabinet Ministers and other influential people owned shares in firms manufacturing armaments and that they would be inclined to discourage disarmament. “It is difficult to imagine how such outrageous, insinuations can be seriously made, he

I declared. Dealing with what he termed . “the hard-worked Mulliner episode, ( he said that the full facts Had not, been stated and he placed the tuff story before the Commission in a meniorandum prepared by the Admiralty, * It would, be seen, said Sir Maurice, that Mr. Mulliner was concerned in two distinct episodes. The first, from TJO6 to 1909, related to a period when he was giving information to the Admiralty and to the Government mainly as to the increase in Germany □ capacity to manufacture guns and accelerate her naval programme. The second episode concerned tire political controversy which broke out later in 1909 and culminated in the General Election of 1910. , “The information in 190 b was tine, and, in short, ino the vast complex of origins of the war and disquieting tendencies between 1906 and 1914, this one episode that has been produced as evidence of activity by British armaments firms in fomenting war scares is negligible. This one over-worked example—a very poor one at its best—is not evidence against British films. Discussing the Shearer episode at the Genova Disarmament Conference, be said that the Admiralty had stated ’ that, whatever might be thought of I Mr. Shearer’s activity, he had not in any way affected the result of' the

1927 Conference. Attempts at sabotage at a conference might fl0 ’“ ’ anv quarter which felt dissatisfied at j the course of events. I (Mr William Shearer, an American, S was employed by three American shipbuilding companies to act. ver” at the Geneva Gciiteicncc ana As said, at the time, to t ried lo break up the conference. bc< ; British documents” used by him were afterwards shown to have lj e en a written years before by an Irish doct° r F —