SEA POWER

Greymouth Evening Star, 16 November 1934, Page 10

SEA POWER

THEORIES THAT NEED REVISION. “The Times” reviews a new book by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. “Sea Power in the Modern. World,” as follow. : — Sir Herbert Richmond’s book is not addressed to Britons alone, but to all the maritime Powers. The total naval expenditure of the seven Great. Powers. has risen fairly steadily from £34/100,000 in 1886 to £191,500,000 in 1934—despite the fact that the expenditure of two of them, Germany and Russia, is negligible in the latter year—without apparently any corresponding increase in the security of any one of them. “If the doctrines that appear to dominate naval policy throughout the world are accepted, there can be no doubt that the years ahead must bring substantial increases.” At the same time statements are heard on all sides that sea power is out of date —ineffective in offence, impotent in defence, and therefore unnecessary—since the coming of air power. The world, or the maritime Powers at least, are in the grip of conflicting and mutually destructive theories, both of which already involve them in vast expenditure without allaying the fears that give rise to it. Evidently the time is ripe for a new study of the nature and implications of sea power, such as that made by Captain Mahan some forty years ago. Admiral Richmond ranges over the whole field. He analyses the origins of sea power and its elements, and shows that, though strength at sea gives to its possessors the power to control all communications at sea, it is only when sea power is allied to land power that it can utilise, or needs to utilise, the -weapon of economic pressure. “Blockade,” in its widest sense, is the collective weapon of great coalitions called into being in opposition to any single Power that aspires to world dominion; it is not a weapon that can be wielded by an individual Power, however strong at sea. He examines the case for ships of great size, whether cruisers or battleships, and concludes that it is baseless. The instrument should be as large as is necessary to enable it to perform its function, and no larger. Growth has been due, among other causes, chiefly to unthinking competition, which involves all in increased cost and gives advantage to none.

THE SUBMARINE. He recites the reasons put forward by various Powers for refusing to con ; sidef the proposal to abolish submarines. and urges that none of them should carry weight. Not only is the submarine, ton for ton, the most exI pensive form of man-of-war, but its i possession by any Power involves all others in vast expenditure, and is one of the chief excuses for the great size of surface ships. The submarine is of little utility for defence, whether against shore bombardments or against attack on commerce, and of doubtful utility as a scout. In the circumstances in which she can contribute materially to defence —e’.g., invasions by sea—it is probable that aircraft could do it better. Turning to the allegation that air power has superseded sea power and rendered it out of-date, he has no difficulty in showing that few wars that have occurred in the last 30 or 40 years would have ! . : • different course had air- .. . i._ : . 1..’"? when they were

fought. If wars in the future arise out of causes similar’ to those that occasioned them in the past, the same conditions are likely to recur. Aircraft'will, of course, exercise a profound influence on war at sea in many ways; but they can neither transport armies overseas nor defend shipping from attack. He examines the case for great ships from the points of view of both collective and individual security, and argues that from neither is there any need for them. He would have the nations agree to limit the size of the battleship to something very much lower than the 35,000 tons fixed at Washington in 1922, or even than the 22,000 tons proposed by this country in 1930; for he points out that whatever figure is agreed upon will be available, sooner or later, to Germany. The limit of 10,000 tons imposed upon her by the Treaty of Versailles cannot be maintained indefinitely unless all other maritime Powers adopt it for themselves. He would have them agree to limit the size of cruisers to that necessary to enable them to carry out their primary function of controlling sea communications—i.e., about 6,000 tons —arguing that, in the absence of more powerful cruisers in the fleets of possible enemies, no Power would thereby be at a disadvantage. SECURITY AND NUMBERS. He then approaches the thorny question of relative numbers, and suggests that in battleships instead of starting with the strongest navies, as did the Washington Conference, and scaling down to a point at which the smaller navies felt insecure, the logical method, and the only one which offers any promise of an acceptable agreement, is to start with the smallest. In effect, that was the method which produced equilibrium for many years towards the end of the last century, until Germany’s policy of seeking security through the insecurity of others upset the balance. On that basis he suggests figures which, given adequate limitation of the size of ships and starting from eight allowed to Germany by the Peace Treaty, should give to each Power the security it demands, and effect economy all round. In cruisers, he holds that the requirements of each Power are absolute, depending not upon the cruiser forces of other Powers, but upon the number of positions in the world in which its shipping needs, and can be given, protection. Size being limited, he would let each Power decide its own needs.

After all, no absolute comparison of strength between Powers is possible: Japan is stronger than America for a war in Northern Asia, but weaker for a war in the Caribbean. England is stronger for a war in the Indian Ocean but weaker for one on the coasts of the Pacific. Any of the military" States of the Continent is stronger than Ameiica, England, or Japan for a war on the Continent. Is there not reason to suspect that many of our present troubles arise from refusal to recognise these facts? Are not the parallel growths of the fleets of the United .Rates and Japan the result in some measure perhaps a marked measure, ?iLn aC H try H S t 0 make itself stronger than the other m an area in which one possesses all the advantages' of position?

Admiral Richmond’s arguments are logical and convincing, and one may be permitted to hope that in time they will come to be accepted. But before that can happen many cherished theor ies and prejudices, both British and foreign, will have to be discarded.