GENERALS IN THE WAR

Greymouth Evening Star, 16 November 1934, Page 9

GENERALS IN THE WAR

REPLY TO MR. LLOYD GEORGE Major-General Lethbridge Alexander who, in tho following article (in the London “Sunday Times”) defends British Generals in the war against the criticisms of Mr Lloyd George and others, was a Captain in 1915, served in France from then till towards the end of 1917, and was a Major-General and Quartermaster-General of the British Forces in Italy in 1918. He writes: — In his review of Mr Lloyd George’s “War Memoirs,” your reviewer states: “Mr Lloyd George, again, was right and the generals were wrong about the strategy of the Western Front.” Similar statements, frequently made by commentators and reviewers of histories of the war. arc* accepted as fact by a large portion of the public. They are dangerous and misleading. Such ideas, if unchecked, may lead in the future to the loss of our Empire and the destruction of England in particular.

Allow me to state briefly the strategical position from 1914. to 1918. In 1914, and again in 1918, large German forces were hurled at our line with the object of gaining Paris and tho Channel ports. The loss of either, unless some impressive miracle had occurred, would have led to the defeat of the Allies. The loss of the Channel ports would have led to the establishment of German Air bases ou the northern coast of France. Loudon, our factories and arsenals would have been bombed continuously. Submarine bases would likewise have been established, our southern and eastern ports closed, food supplies cut off. The civilian population of this country would then have had cause to realise what are the horrors of war. Possibly also, too late, they would have realised what should always be the correct strategy for this country.

All the above nearly happened in 1914 and again in the spring of 1918. In both years the situation was saved b.y the stern fighting qualities of the rank and file of the Army, the devotion of the regimental officers, and the calm and level-headed manner in which the situation was handled by our military leaders in the field—in short, by our much-abused generals. Let me plead with my fellow countrymen, and with members of the Press in particular, to consider for a moment what would have happened if the bulk of our forces had been committed to an offensive on a large scale in either Italy or the Balkans at any period of the war. (1) The transport of such a force to either theatre would have been difficult, the only railway communications being the line through Modena and via Turin, and that, along the Riviera. Neither was reliable. Rolling-stock was short; train running beyond Milan towards the front seldom averaged more than 10 miles an hour. Transport by sea and maintenance by sea were impracticable —we had not the ships to perform the task and also feed the population of the British Isles. (2) The climate of the Salonika front in particular caused large losses from sickness.' Regimental officers who served there have informed me that they frequently had 50 ,per cent, of their strength ineffective from this cause. Losses from a similar cause did not occur in France.

DIFFICULT TERRAINS. (3) No one who has seen and fought on the Carso or in the Alpine region south of the Trentino has failed to be impressed by the difficulties of both terrains.' Every factor favours a prolonged defence. The further attacking troops advance the more difficult their task, and the problem of supporting; them. The Balkan theatre is very similar. (4) Assuming that we had placed the bulk of our forces in either Italy or the Balkans, can any sane individual presume that the German would not have taken immediate advantage of the situation? Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Von Mackensen, and other German military leaders were well versed in knowledge of their profession. They would have attacked promptly from Picardy to the sea. The result would have been the subjugation of France, the destruction of the British Empire, and large loss of life among our civilian population.

(5) In 1917, after the Italian retreat from Caporetto, we did send a force of five divisions to Italy. In the early days of 1918, under the threat of a German attack in Northern France, two of these divisions had to be recalled. It was possible to re-transport two or three divisions fairly quickly; it would not have been possible to retransport 20 or 30 divisions in time to be of any use. (6) In March, 1918, the Germans attacked in Northern France and got within shelling distance of Amiens. This interrupted Vital railway communications passing through that city. Tbe result was that our three divisions in Italy did not receive for months a single pound of flour, bread or meat, or supplies of any kind. Nor did they receive a single round of ammunition or reinforcement to make good losses in men and officers. The three divisions subsisted during this period on reserves accumulated during the winter and by scouring the coast of Italy and Sicily for forage for the horses and mules. A larger force would have starved. Tbe situation was relieved by the successful attack of Lord Rawlinson’s Army, which drove the Germans back from before Amien«. and freed the railway communications. It was then the summer of 1918.

ATTRITION’S TART. I am on certain ground when 1 write of the above points, for I was, under the Commander-in-Chief of our Force in Italy, responsible for the detrainment of that Force and its maintenance during the period in question. The Austrian front in Italy was eventually broken by the tactical genius of the British Commander, Lord Cavan, aided by the fine fighting qualities of our troops and of our subordinate commanders. But that was in October, 1918, when the Germans, being fully occupied in warding off the Allied attacks in France, could not support their Austrian allies, and when the revolt in Hungary had dislocated the supply of the Austrian Army and caused the Higher Command of that army to lose its nerve. In short, attrition had played its part.

Wild military adventures such as those advocated by Mr. Lloyd George, adventures in terrains un.uited for the employment of British troops, unsuited for their maintenance and supply, may eventually lead to the loss of our Empire and the destruction oi all we hold dear. When m: •!> fallacies are supported by reviewers or any secliou of the Press the public is misled. In war the first duty of our forces, naval and military, is to guard the heart

of the Empire and the arteries leading to and feeding that heart. Our army placed in Flanders, performed tl at task; our navy, well handl ® d ’/.. ved telligent and farseeing men. niescned those arteries. . .. The inevitable destruction of those who follow false prophets has been written bv a greater hand than mine, can only'urge my fellow countrymen to bring commonsense.to bear on thts. (Hicstkms. When Mr Baldwin states St»o frontier «t Ito Brltisb nujne is O n the Rhine, every u ? o. ■Her Knows what he means. He nicaim ibal; no hostile power must be anov .-I to establish air or submarine., base, west of the Rhine. That precisely was the object of our nnl,J'- 1 ' ‘J * throughout the war. w ? °" " nreservation to the tact tna , through thick and thin, they stuck to tU r r hav°e n served as a regimental offleer und In other eapa cl « s ™ ous countries under -Br t.sl> udders I have known statesmen, nohUctans and business men ot this and other countries. The more S?ve «een of the latter, the more I have been impressed by the steiino- dualities of the former, then disinterestedness. intelligence, devotion to the interests of their countij and those serving under them < -ill by their silent loyalty to those members of the Government under whom it has been their duty, and s nietimes their misfortune, to serve. They have been proved to be men vho can take the long view and v.ho are, at all times, prepared to sacrifice their own interests.