SUPREME COURT TRIALS

Greymouth Evening Star, 28 July 1932, Page 7

SUPREME COURT TRIALS

HERMITACE SHOOTING CASE

ACCUSED ACQUITTED

[PER PRESS ASSOCIATION.]

TIMARU, July 27.

At the Supreme Court, this afternoon, the hearing was concluded of the charge against William John Thomas Whalley, married’, aged 33, for the alleged murder of William Edward Wogan, at The Hermitage, Mount Cook, on November 5, 1931. Accused was acquitted. Inspector Arthur Sydney Bird produced a statement by accused made on November 21, in which he said he did not handle the rifle, and have an accident with it when Wogan was shot. He was practically certain Wogan was sitting in a chair when the mishap occurred. On November 30, accused had made a voluntary addition to his statement concerning the presence of blood on his hands.

Detective-Sergeant John B. Young said he interviewed Whalley on March '3l. Witness called Whalley’s attention to alleged contradictory statements concerning where Wogan was sitting, and also questioned him concerning betting transactions. Whalley made a statement denying that he had ever made a statement other than that Wogan was sitting on a chair. Whalley could not account for an alleged statement that he had had money to put on a race for Wogan and had held it up. , . Sergeant Charles King,'of Hokitika, gave evidence that he had known Wogan for eight years, and had never known him to go shooting. When witness arrested Whalley, accused said: “I have been expecting this.” This concluded the case for the Crown. No evidence was called for the defence. In the course of his address to the jury, counsel for accused said the jury had to obliterate everything they heard or read outside the Court. There had been some peculiar features about the case—particularly extraordinary he called it—-and that was the conduct of the Coroner who held the inquiry, and the Magistrate who committed the accused for trial. Those two men made statements from the Bench which were decidedly prejudicial to the accused. What they said they said in public, and it had been published. That was highly mproper, and he thought the Crown Law Office held the same view, for a change of venue had been offered. They appreciated the offer, but decided to place the fate of the accused in the hands of a jury in Timaru.

In the course of his summing up, the Chief Justice said there was one matter he was constrained to refer to, and that was the matter which counsel referred to in his address'. When charging the grand jury the previous day, he himself, knowing something of the kind had happened, ventured to deal with it in a guarded and general way, without making particular reference to the case. Counsel for the accused had referred to the matter, and certainly not improperly, and he felt it encumbent upon him to say a word or two to clear the matter up. Every person accused of crime in a British community was entitled to a fair trial, and had a right to go before a trial jury unprejudiced and- unembarrassed by prior comment. It was the duty of a Coroner to ascertain the cause of death. So far as a Magistrate was concerned, he was merely sitting ministerially merely as a recorder of the evidence before him, excepting to the extent that he might have to decide provisionally, the admissibility of evidence. If, as he gathered from the statement by -counsel, anything had been done in this case contrary to what had been said, all he could say was that it was to be deplored. It had never happened in his experience in New Zealand before, and he hoped it would never happen again. After a retirement of over three hours, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. The . pronouncement w < as received with applause at the back of the Court. The Judge ordered the police to bring forward anyone seen applauding, but the police were not able to do so. The Judge said he desired to make a certain observation. Counsel for the defence had drawn his attention to the fact that, when he was commenting during the afternoon on the comment of the Coroner and the committing Magistrate, he did not have the accurate finding of the Coroner. He had the finding as it appeared in a local paper which had omitted two or three words which very greatly qualified the comment that should be made so far as the Coroner was concerned. The position of a Coroner was different to that of a Magistrate, and so far as l the Coroner was concerned, it had been better if one paragraph of his finding had not appeared.

PROBATION GRANTED.

TIMARU, July 28.

At the Supreme Court, Roland James Ackroyd, aged 20, who had pleaded guilty to a charge of a serious offence against a girl under 16, was admitted to probation for two years.

SAVED BY ILL-HEALTH.

PALMERSTON N., July 28.

At the Supreme Court, Charles Frederick Ammon, 47, who was found guilty of causing actual bodily harm to William Whyte, storekeeper, Terrace End, was ordered by Mr Justice Ostler, in view of the prisoner’s health, to come up for sentence when called upon. POLICE INSPECTOR LIBELLED AUCKLAND, July 28.

As a sequel to the unemployed demonstration in the ground of Parliament House, in September 16, George Budd and Ernest Frederick Thomson, were tried at the Supreme Court, today, on a charge of publishing defamatory libel of Police Inspector Lander.

The alleged libel was contained in a pamphlet, entitled “War,” distributed at a meeting held in Auckland in October, and it referred to Lander as a “liar and perjurer,” when he said he was not armed while on duty during the disturbance.

After detectives had given evidence, counsel produced a photograph taken during the disturbance. Both detectives said that they considered In spector Lander, who could be seen in

the photograph was not armed. The man indicated by counsel was not Lander.

Counsel then said it was clear a mistake liad. been made by accused. They had seen the photograph and had believed the man carrying a baton was Lander. (Proceeding.) MOTORIST CHARGED. WELLINGTON, July 27. In the Masterton crossing fatality case, Gladys Evelyn Adams, a domestic, who was a passenger on the bus, eaid the first she saw of the train was when the bus got on the railway line.

Elwyn John Adams, woodcutter, Masterton, another passenger, said he heard a whistle when the bus was half way across College Street. He saw two light about 500 yards away. He believed them now to have been street lights. The first he saw of the train was when the bus was ■ just on the line. 1

The final two witnesses were Frank Baldock Gray, carrying contractor, who described observations made at the crossing, and Mollie Wishart, another passenger in the bus. Addressing the jury, counsel for the accused submitted that the fatality was not the result of negligence, but a pure unavoidable accident. The Court adjourned.

THE DUTY OF JURIES.

WELLINGTON, July 28.

The great responsibility devolving upon juries who have to try cases in which there has been loss of life, through the alleged negligence of a motorist, was referred to by his Honor Justice Reed, in directing the. jury at the conclusion of the trial of James Thomas Rutherford. “The duty is cast upon juries to see if it is possible to reduce this shocking loss of life, by insisting upon a high degree of care,” said his Honor.

He also commented on the nonobservance by many motorists of compulsory railway stop notices at level crossings. His Honor said that, without hesitation, and with some experience of such cases, that fully 90 per cent of them were due to negligence and probably ten per cent, to inevitable accidents. ' Speed was often blamed, but his experience was that speed was not often a factor. A careful driver took no risks. A careless driver often would take a risk. His Honor said it was the juries of the Dominion that had to set the degree of negligence they would excuse. The duty was cast upon juries “to see if it were possible to reduce the shocking los sof life by insisting upon a high degree of care in the management of motor vehicles.” If juries were strict it did not necessarily follow that the person. concerned should be punished severely. It was of great importance, however, that a person should not escape being convicted, where the jury was thoroughly satisfied there had been negligence, and the loss of life had been due to negligent handling of the car. The higher the degree of care demanded, the more there would be to the careless driver.

In regard to the compulsory-stop sign, his Honor said the rule was stringent and was supopsed to be obeyed. He was aware it was not obeyed, that persons did not actually -stop, but at all events it was a reasonable ground for exercising due care when approaching a railway crossing. The fact, however, that a person did not obey that rule was not conclusive evidence of negligence, but it was some evidence of negligence. After reading some observation on negligence by the late Sir John Salmond, his Honor said that had Rutherford stopped his vehicle he could have heard the train whistle and could have heard the noise of the train approaching. He thought the jury would agree that a reasonable man before going on to a level crossing would look carefully to see whether a train was approaching, and that if he did not do so he was negligent. That was the broad point.

The jury retired at 11.20 and had not returned at 2 p.m.