Greymouth Evening Star. AND BRUNNERTON ADVOCATE. SATURDAY, MARCH 29th., 1930. NAVAL CONFERENCE

Greymouth Evening Star, 29 March 1930, Page 6

Greymouth Evening Star. AND BRUNNERTON ADVOCATE. SATURDAY, MARCH 29th., 1930. NAVAL CONFERENCE

yilE Naval Limitations Conference at London drags on, and most of the general public have probably lost interest in the proceedings. They are now waiting for actual results to be announced, or the official confession of failure. The Conference set itself a great task, and complete success under, the prevailing circumstances, was perhaps too much to expect. Mr. MacDonald was optimistic- at the beginning, and his utterances led 'to extravagant estimates in some circles, but of late the Prime Minister has had little to say. Yet, whatever happens, Mr. MacDonald and his colleagues are to be commended for a sincere attempt to minimise one of the heaviest burdens on civilisation. If they are unsuccessful, they will have the consolation of knowing that it was a failure in which there was no disgrace to themselves. If their political opponents attempt to make Party capital of the Conference’s breakdown, public opinion should condemn such tactics.

France, by common consent, has been mostly to blame for the main difficulties. She held a strong position in the negotiations, knowing that any one Power could make a deadlock by obstinate refusal to make any sacrifice or to take any risk. She cannot be censured for wishing to safeguard her territory, but from the Versailles Treaty proceedings onward, France has earned the title of the “spoilt child” of Europe. To placate her, Britain has been very generous, too much so in most of the Empire’s opinion, as was proved when Mr. Snowden made his stand at The Hague against further financial concessions by Britain. Applause

was general for his determination, ( which added greatly to the prestige of the Labour Party at Home. It is not quite clear what France fears, but if she makes any sacrifice in war vessels, she wishes to be compensated by guarantees of support should she consider it necessary to take action against other Continental Powers, which really means Italy. The latter country has played a conciliatory part at the Conference, but will not accept naval inferiority in the Mediterranean as compared with France. In theory, each nation has a strong case, but in view of the , Locarno and Kellogg Pacts, and the general recognition that unless there are naval limitations there must be naval competition, with its ultimate threats of war, France should take wider views. Any obduracy causing the breakdown of

the present negotiations will tell against France in the future. Apart from naval limitations, J there are the questions of land and j aerial armaments to be considered. Here, France could have given a lead to the world; instead she insists on the retention and development of large armies. Why should France require a big navy and bigger army, if her signature to the Kellogg Pact was penned in all sincerity ? Britain has already made large'reductions in her defence forces, and France should have followed this example. It is too soon to say that the Naval Conference has definitely failed, and perhaps next week will bring welcome news, but at the moment, the prospects of success seem to be slight. Should failure be the outcome, every nation will have to reconsider proposals to limit its defence forces, New Zealand included. Disarmament schemes have been based on the fact that the Kellogg Pact was something more than a pious hope. The Naval Conference xS a logical test of the Pact signatories’ sincerity. If the Conference fails, of what value is the Pact V