Greymouth Evening Star. AND BRUNNERTON ADVOCATE. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2nd., 1928. BRITAIN AND U.S.A.

Greymouth Evening Star, 2 October 1928, Page 4

Greymouth Evening Star. AND BRUNNERTON ADVOCATE. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2nd., 1928. BRITAIN AND U.S.A.

’J'HE refusal of the United States to accept for itself the limitations of naval vessels, as proposed in the Anglo-French scheme, was expected, as the publication by the Hearst Press of the reported details of the agreement had aroused considerable opposition in the United States. The Presidential election campaign, now in full swing, had its influence on the reception of the proposals, the fact that the proposed pact was AngloFrench in origin making it unpopular with a large section of the “foreign” vote in the States. Experts must decide if the AngloFrench scheme is practicable, but it is fair to both Britain ami France to admit that the attempt to limit naval forces was honest in intention, and had no ulterior motives, such as some American am! Italian circles are suggesting.

A lost of the cabled comments on flic scheme are adverse, but this, where the Homeland Press is concerned, may be due to the newspapers’ politics, which are antiGovernment, or pro-American. Friendship with the United States is supposed to be Ihe keystone of British foreign policy, bid, that does not mean it would be wise to iynore much nearer neighbours, especially as the United States is a somewhat difficult “friend.” Secure in its own territorial fastnesses. the States can, with greater safety than can Britain, treat European Bowers with indifference. French amity is of vast importance to Britain. The advent of aerial and submarine weapons has almost dost roved the security from invasion, Britain formerly enjoyed, through her island position and strong navy, and it would be criminal for British statesmen to ignore that fact. France, if aii enemy, could work" great niise.hiyf Io neighbouring Britain, and apart from any reasons of sentiment, A nglo-French co-operation is important to both nat ions.

Friendship between Britain and the United States should not mean

that Britain must do nothing except with the tacit permission of the States. After all, Britain is still as great a Power as her friend, and the latter is not too generous or reliable in her attitude. Britain seems to be expected to do most of the giving, and to play second fiddle to the States. Moreover, none can tell exactly what is the American policy. Her ideals, so far as speeches and documents, are concerned can scarcely be bettered, but her deeds are not always in keeping. Post-wax* history proves that the United States takes narrow views regarding responsibilities towai’ds the rest of the world, and instead of helping to solve some problems, she talks of avoiding “European entanglements.” That may be wise policy from her viewpoint, but it makes the task more difficult for Britain, who is much nearer the centre of disturbance. Whether the Anglo-French negotiations should have been given greater preliminaxy publicity is one of those matters of detail that are of little consequence compared with the merits or demerits of the proposed limitation scheme, and, so far little condemnation has come regarding this, except from the United States. It is easy to prate of “open diplomacy” where foreign policy is concerned, but commonsense proves that until a certain stage is reached, it would be folly to shout from the house-tops what statesmen are endeavouring to achieve. In far less impoi’tant affairs, secrecy is observed until the bargain or programme is completed, and so long as nothing definite in foreign policy is arranged until the respective Parliaments have ratified the proposals, no harm is done. Unbiased consideration of the information so far given of the Anglo-French naval limitation scheme does not give ground for belief that stupidity ox* malice inspired the proposals, which were meant to be a. step forward to that disarmament fox* which the whole world is yearning. The question was not one of Britain and United States, ox* Britain and France, but of the three Powers, with others, so desirous, agreeing to a scheme which promised benefit to worldpeace.