DISARMAMENT DEBATE

Greymouth Evening Star, 26 November 1927, Page 7

DISARMAMENT DEBATE

LABOUR INCONSISTENCY

“GO AHEAD QUICKLY”

[Australian and N.Z. Cable Association.) (By Cable—Press Assn.—Copyright.)

LONDON, November 24.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, submitting his disarmament motion, expressed the opinion that the Geneva Naval Conference w-as bungled from beginning to end. Britain failed to scout the field before joining the battle. The only chance of an Anglo-American agreement, and an American agreement with the rest of the world, was for Britain and America to come together and remove the chance of war. The Conference failed because war methods, instead of peace methods, were followed, experts being allowed to usurp politicians’ functions. Britain was pledged under every peace treaty to promote peace and disarmament, but no real Disarmament Conference had yet been held, only discussions how to reduce armaments in order to save money. He was not interested in disarmament as an economical move, but as a means of removing the world’s trust in arms. The world must be got into a frame of mind'of taking security for granted, and pursuing arbitration by ordinary civilised methods of settling disputes. Lord Cecil’s statement, of the manner in which he was hampered whenever he came to a proposal of practical disarmament was unanswerable. Parliament’s duty was to compel the Government to carry out the country’s palpable intention, and go ahead quickly towards disarmament, arbitration and security. If the Government faced the problem of security, there would be no difficulty from the viewpoint of the Dominions. ■As Russia was joining in explorations for security, they could proceed. Sir Austen Chamberlain’s duty was to bring the Empire as a united, powerful force, into the councils of Europe and contribute a scheme of peace. Sir Austen Chamberlain appeared to be setting up the Empire against the League. He was quite mistaken. It was true that under the British Government’s prompting, the Governments of Australia and Canada rejected the Protocol of 1924, but the Protocol was only the first draft. Mr. MacDonald believed the Empire could find a form which was not merely words.

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN’S REPLY.

Sir. A. Chamberlain, replying, said that Lord Cecil’s reasons for resigning were, firstly, Mr MacDonald’s own rejection of the treaty of mutual assistance; secondly, the present Government’s opposition to the Protocol; and thirdly, dissatisfaction with the Naval Conference. The Government found an attempt to amend the Protocol would necessitate an entire recasting. The Government was charged with not making diplomatic preparations before the Naval Conference. Hitherto the Opposition had attacked him for sticking to methods of old diplomacy, instead of openly facing the world without previous back-stair understandings. He accepted some of the blame for diplomatic preparation, but the conference- was held at the invitation of the United States, and the British Government refrained from seeking *a preliminary understanding lest it should appear to America to be seeking to evade acceptance of the invitation.

The debate was interrupted by the electric light in the whole of Westminstei - Palace suddenly going out. Sir Austen Chamberlain said he thought the lesson of the Naval Conference was that diplomatic preparation was always necessary before conferences. It would also be only after great preparation that there could be any hope of the. League Disarmament Conference succeeding. Those who wanted to hurry and press matters before the ground was prepared were likely to be confronted by the same disappointment as was the experience at the Naval Conference. Apropos of the League Assembly’s resolution outlawing wars of aggression, Sir Austen Chamberlain said he was not prepared to define aggression. He thought the League was mistaken in attempting such strict rules, for unknown future circumstances would probably lead to an occasion when the unhappy term of definition would enable an obvious victim of aggression to be described as the aggressor. “L do not think it will be impossible for the League in. individual cases to apportion the blame hut I-believe a rigid definition will, be a trap , for the innocent and a signpost for the guilty." Replying to Mr MacDonald’s definition of an aggressor as a party refusing arbitration, Sir Austen Chamberlain • pointed out that the Covenant already bound signatories not to go to war until they had exhausted every method of judicial arbitration or conciliation by the League Council. “But do not let us underrate the limitations which the Covenant itself puts on as right to go to war, or the obligation to exhaust peaceful methods \ before going to war.” He would be the last man to suggest that, the Government’s present attitude ougjit to be Britain’s attitude all the time. The Government had not agreed to sign an optional clause on arbitration because last year’s Imperial Conference agreed it would be premature. All -British parties agreed that, even if signed, there would have to be reservations such as everything concerning the Dominion's relations within the Empire or internal matters within the jurisdiction of the state itself.

WHAT BRITAIN HAS DONE. Sir A. Chamberlain added: “What contribution to a sense of generaj security would such a restricted signature give if wo were not prepared to make engagements in advance, which before fulfilment might require legislation of the seven Parliaments. This does not mean that we are not ready to use arbitration to the fullest measure. I hope Englishmen, at least, will not forget what Britain has done in the matter of disarmament or arbitration. Wei have arbitrated more and in more important disputes than any other country in the world. For instance, the Alabama question and the Russian destruction'of British fishing boats in the Dogger Bank, though on the latter arose the question of honour to our flag. We arbitrated on the Alaskan boundary though many Canadians were of the opinion that they therein sacrificed vital interests. We also arbitrated the Mosul boundary. Thpse were four gigantic questions in which we accepted arbitration, but we cannot undertake in advance to arbitrate all cases when we

feel we may not have power to secure obedience to advance to the award. We have practised arbitration in the past and hope to do-in the future. We had to take new and large risks in the treaty of. Locarno, which was an immense contribution' to the security of Europe.”

QUESTIONS FOR LABOUR LEADER

Sir Austen Chamberlain said he did not pretend there would be no further trouble in Europe, but they could meet difficulties in a more cheerful spirit and with greater confidence since Locarno. The Governments of the States of the Empire who had not signed the Protocol, had their own reasons therefore. “I have no reason to believe any’ of them have changed their minds.” Would Mr. MacDonald be prepared to place Britain, and all her resources, at the mercy of the League’s machinery, without our people having any control? If not, Mr. MacDonald would be more usefully employed defining how much of the Protocol he would adopt; what new obligations he would undertake, and how he would fulfil them, than in talking vaguely of raising hopes he could not fulfil, spreading uncertainty instead of confidence. The common argument against signing -was that unless all went in the proposals could not be carried out.

Sir A. Chamberlain continued: “Mr. MacDonald had suggested that everyone had favoured the Protocol except Britain. If so, nothing prevents them operating it against the world except Britain. The real reason for the agitation is that the British Navy would not be of service to the League for the purpose of sanctions. There was an immense difference between the covenant as it stands and the fresh obligations Mr. MacDonald recommended in order to pool the security of the world. We have pursued more restricted and a more modest role. Wherever, either at he League or otherwise, the Government could help to remove understandings, we have been glad to do so. Where we have been in dispute, for instance, in Mosul, we accepted the arbitration of the League, and when the award Was in our favour, we used it only to negotiate an agreed settlement. I challenge the House to say any Power has done more than Britain in the cause, either of security or disarmament. Some have talked more, some wanted to pass more resolutions, sign more papers, but -who has done more, let him throw the first stone.”

MR. L. GEORGE’S CRITICISM. Mr. Lloyd George said that he thought. Sir Austen Chamberlain had dealt most inadequately with disarmament. So long as there were huge armaments in the world, arbitration and conciliation would be impossible. The first step, therefore, was to reduce armaments. At the present moment, fifteen million men in Europe could be called up for slaughter, with equipments such as the world had never seen for horror and destruction. The League’s Disarmament Commission had made no progress the last two years, because conscription was outside its scope of inquiry. Other countries complained that Britain and America, who did most of the blathering about peace, were increasing naval expenditure. Risks must be taken for peace, as they were taken for war. He did. not see much risk. ;There was no enemy on the horizon. During Disraeli’s and Lord Salisbury’s time the defence of the Empire cost two per cent, of national income, now it was; costing 3.1 per cent., though the German fleet was at- the bottom of the ocean, and ours at present could engage and sink all the fleets of Europe. -The Government at the beginning of its regime formulated a naval programme which involved an expenditure of from 65 to 70 millions on new ships. We Were the pioneers of arbitration. Now the feeling at Geneva is that we are holding back and stopping the way. Mr. Lloyd George hoped Sir Austen Chamberlain at Geneva would use his influence for disarmament and arbitration. “Without which, I think, in the no distant future, there will be such an upheaval as the world has never seen.”

' GOVT. POLICY APPROVED. Mr. Buxton said the pillars of Labour’s policy were disarmament, arbitration and security. Sir Austen Chamberlain professed great friendship for the League, but was always attempting to check its activities. He was like the hen who was continually warning the ’ducklings not to take to the water. Mr. Bridgeman wound up the debate on behalf of the Government. He pointed out that the Labour Government was the first to lay dowji the 10,000-ton cruisers authorised by the Washington Conference. In his opinion, it was the best thing they ever did. It was useless to pretend there was a warlike spirit in Britain. The whole country was in favour of peace. Even the League of Nations sometimes looked towards the British Navy to control the peace of the world. The Labour motion was defeated by 318 votes to 105. Mr Duff-Cooper’s amendment: “That the House, recognising the Government’s efforts,had been constantly directed to the maintenance of peace and a reduction of armaments, and the advancement of the authority of the League, remains opposed to Britain assuming extended dangerous obligations embodied in the Protocol of 1924, and approves of the Government’s policy,” was carried by 288 votes to 66.

Mr. Duff-Cooper, in moving his amendment, said: “If the United States wants the biggest navy in the world, let them have it. We should protect our shores and commerce from every menace, but I do not include America as a possible attacker. That is the only way of beating the big navy party in America.”

AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY. NEW YORK, November 24. ' The New York Times’s Washington correspondent states that the “big iqivy” speech attributed to Captain White, in Paris, is considered inopportune, at least in official circles, coming as it did at a time when there was hope for reasonable readjustments of naval construction programmes. Official comment was declined. Mr. Wilbur has corrected impressions in Paris that the speech was delivered after approval in Washington, where nothing was known of .it till the newspaper accounts appeared. That the United States wants to be in the best position to defend herself is not disputed, but the Administration would regret any implication that it was developing a navy, aimed to outstrip Britain, or any other Power, in the competitive armament race. DANGER' FROM ITALY. LONDON, November 25. “Italy is a prison where life is intolerable,’’ declared Signor Kitti, exPrime Minister of Italy, chief speaker

at the No Afore War Movement Conference at Westminster Hall, where he made a remarkable attack on Fascism. He said : “Italy has abolished every safeguard of the individual,. and every liberty. Despite false statistics, the financial disorder gets worse daily, and production is diminishing while the dictatorship is equally bloody and brutal as the Red dictatorship, and unjustified by any ideal, even though a false one. Italy is indulging in violence against adversaries, houses are pillaged, sacked and devastated, and thousands are deported without trial. All independent newspapers are suppressed and. Parliament is suppressed, in fact no profession can be carried on without the Government’s consent. No freeman ,can live in Italy. Mussolini has never disguised the will to war. All Fascists speak only of war. When the dictator feels himself lost he makes war. As Italy’s dictator he foresees a war in which Italy must participate, [in 1935-40.” ’