RIVAL STRATEGIES.

Greymouth Evening Star, 27 September 1917, Page 8

RIVAL STRATEGIES.

GERMAN AND ALLIED ' SYSTEMS.

WATERLOO AS DECISIVE BATTLE GROUND. Waterloo may witness the decision of the world's greatest conflict as it witnessed the downfall of Napoleon's imperial power one .hundred years ago- This is the opinion of an English military expend, Major Stuart-Stepheifs, who advances it in an article in the latest issue of the “English Review-” lie also takes up three points about the situation on the Western front in Eliiope that will strike the average follower of the war's developments as nowThese are:— The necessity that the Allies provide a reserve of 1,000,000 men capable of adminilsering a "knock-out" —for which reserve the English expert looks to America. The location of the German battle lino to which Uindenburg, according to Miajor StuartStephens, is gradually and methodically retiring. Tire radical difference between the Anglo-French and German systems of planning major military operations, which, owing to the progress of aviation, should result, he thinks, in material benefit to the English and French on the Western frontThis third point, is of especial interest to Americans, as it has to do with the control of the air, toward which such determined efforts are being made just now in this country. Major Stuart-Stephens met many of the German leaders before the war, and heard from their own lips their conception of strategy. Especially interesting was Ins acquaintance with Maeckel, author of a German textbook on strategy- It is on his knowledge of these bum and their cast of mind that Major StuartStephens bases the conclusions set forth in his article. lie contends that the war can he settled only on the battle front in Western and Southern Belgium, and that it can be settled there only it the Allies are able to increase enormously their numerical superiority._ He declares that such an increase in numbers is possible, and sets forth the necessity for it in these words : A MILLION RESERVE NEEDED“The bedrock of the overwhelmingly serious problem that ov'sents itself to us now, now, now, is the setting to work in deadly, brutal earnest tor the provision of new reserves. In a banking institution we may look unoii the actual gold reserve as ‘the Deserve,' and the widespread and ramified resources of jjic concern in the shape of credit as Hie bank's ‘Reserves-’ Now, in the event of a run on the bank, I imagine the reserves are mobilised, and the reserve is produced, ready to throw in to turn the .scale. It seems, to the people looking at it from a business point--of view, quite a reasonable cone lusiou that, if an adequate reserve is not supplied in time to turn the tide of battle, or to meet au unforeseen eventuality, the resources of the bank may not sace it from disaster- Do the same people see from their business point of view that Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig must have at his disposal a reserve of at least a million men before he can accomplish ,after many rounds, a knock-out blow Y I trow nor. Because our unmilitary British public will not apply to the "inning of a struggle for our Empire's existence the _ principles that are inseparable from ordinarv civil, life.

"j.u 1 lie ring 11 je boxer s_ resources ore his skill, his training, bis fitness —a. hundred and one factors which arc behind him; his reserve is that which he keeps Tip bis sleeve, some knock-out blow into wliicb be bas to put everv ounce at bis disposal, and which be is preparing to put in to settle the, combat once for all, oither when be sees an opening at a predetermined time- And without this million reserve Haig will not be strong enough at, a point where be would be looking to the accoinplisbmeiit of a delusion, or where Hindenburg would propose a decision- “ Now I dare to assert that cither of these contingencies will not present itself to either opponent for some months to comeTherefore, there is time even at this eleventh hour to get the ‘solitv plexus’ million- for there cannot be any reasonable probabiFitv of a knock-out blow in the area" in which this summers operations will be carried on. the ‘riu<>'’ is not suitable; it does not favour a knock-out- There is no clean area fit for the deployment of armies, one or the other ot which would be able to inflict a decisive blow-” “THE COCKPIT OE EUROPE.” Such an area will not be presented, continues iVlaior StuaitStephens, until Hindenburg reaches his formidable new line, in the 3,’egion of Waterloo, which is thus described:— “On those rolling plateaus, the immemorial cockpit ot Europ,e, within not many miles of God s Acre at Waterloo, where so many

of our brave forbears sleep, will be fought the big battle of the war; on which, if the issue of the result imposes such a course, the enemy will hold us up on their last line, that on which during the last eighteen months has been lavished every atom of Teutonic military engineering ingenuity. “This Torres Yedras of the war, of the mature of which I have heard from neutral sources, extends from the Antwerp entrenched camp to that at Namur- . • . One of its most striking features is an extra heavily ballasted railway, capable of bearing the weight of mobile platforms, from which ‘Fleissigc Bertha.’ (42-mm. howitzers)’ can be brought into action ‘with almost as much rapidity,’ an informant expressed to me, ‘as a horse artillery gun.’- The whole line is, in fact, stiffened by the presence of a perambulating giant battery which is ready to move up and down between the place of arms or the Scheldt and that on the confluence of the Sambre and the Tfeuse-"

The German system is responsible for the fact that the present British reserves are iinule<|uate for a knock-out blow, says Major Stnart-vStepbens the system tanpbt by Maeckel and the rest of bis school- The English officer explains this as follows;

UIXDKXHrivMi'S SYSTEM OF 11ETBEAT.

“ITmv is it that the several ‘pushes’ of ourselves and our gallant French Allies huve failed to realise the tangible result anticipated:' 1 TTn 1 1 esi tat i n j**l y 1 declare that such a lamentable state of affairs will continue 'so long as Hindenbrug’s governing tactical principles are apparently ignored and unprepared for. His system of fio-hfin<>■ detaining- actions by enveloping attacks in mass directed against one of the follow!noarmy’s flanks is no modern development of Teutonic military science. It is the same idea on which Frederick, the Great based his offensive-defensive ' strokes during- a strategic retirement—the manoeuvre to produce his famous .‘oblique line’—and this idea should guide us during the prelude of every coming action fought on a large scale. This German method of retirement, continues the English writer, with its strong and constant counter-attacks to slow up pursuit, will use up any reserve that the English provide under their present system, and the absence of the ‘solar plexus million will make any settlement impossible short of'the A nt werp-Namur line. And this brings him to a most interesting comparison of (he Anglo-French and German strategy. The chief difference, lie points out, lies in this: With the Hindenburg school it is not the situation accurately known that rulcjs the offensive, but a rapid and overwhelming offensive blow to create a pre-detormined tactical situation favourable to the Comander-iu-Chief s strategic plan. Here is his summary of the two schools: —

THE TWO METI-IOUS

■'The German system seeks for success in the envelopment of nu enemy whose actual position is often ascertained by a process of reasonin'’- as to the best move open to him. This plan is adopted in order to avoid the loss of time incident on exhaustive aerial reconnaissance- The chief drawback to this method is the possibility of the defeat in detail of converging units before they close on their prey. This danger is guarded against in the German system by a high degree of Gaining in initiative and co-operation, which leads commanders of units to close with the enemy as rapidly as possible and irrespective of losses, the object being to get at the enemy wherever he is encountered. in order to deprive him of freedom of movement, in the certainty that their comrades to the right and left are doing the same, and by their vigorous action are relieving hostile pressure. “One obvious drawback to this form of war is that, should the position of the enemy not conform to the hypothesis of the Comman-der-in-Ciiief, the latter has great diiiiculty in altering his plan by giving fresh directions to his general officers for the control of the operations, and once these are launched they are practically in the hands of column commandersOn the other hand, the German system—that evolved by my some time Berlin friend, Colonel MaecIcel is especially adapted to working in the fog of war, and is therefore finding its raisin d’etre in the condition of things that prevail on the whole AVestein front“lt demands, first of all, an entirely intelligent knowledge of the art of war on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, and Hindenburg is efficiently equipped in this'respect. And it calls for character and vigour rather than intelligence in its column leaders. It assumes that, in war, information will not always be forthcoming exactly when it is

wanted, or, at any rate, not in time to be acted upon, and that, therefore, it is necessary to have a hard and simple definite plan of action, laid down beforehand, and a' vigorous and irresistible initiative to destroy the independence of the hostile Commander-in-Chief-

“Now, the German system requires information to confirm the hypothesis as to the whereabouts and constitution of the main body of the hostile army. Our system requires accurate information when the enemy has committed himself and is no longer free to alter his dispositions.

“Secondly, Hint of Germany requires a standard of average efficiency bui not g'enins in the subordinate leaders—not a bea'venborn general here and there, but a corps of commanders who can be counted mpon to play up to each other.

“Thirdly, the German war method suits the conditions of uncertainty which, airplanes all to the contrary, have shrouded operations on the Western front. In this form of war the German General Staff maintains that a vigorous offensive in great measure replaces accurate information.

“Fourthly, 1 lie adherents of tlie German method contend that only the simple succeeds in war. The German war doctrine is simplicity pushed to its ultimate. (In favour of the French Flail' method, under which T have trained, it maybe said that, •riven sufficient information, the plan acted upon is never an involved one.)

“Fifthly, the German method bridges over tlit* y»'u IJ‘ between strategy and tactics, since Prussian envelopin') 1 strategy brings about a battle of Avbicb enveloping taetics are the characteristic feature.

“Sixthly, In tlic enemy's system the CJommander-in-Chief must, to a yreat extent, stand nv fall by his initial plan of operations. In the Franco-13 ritish system a Commamler-in-Cliief ran take advantage of an opportunity if be is able to recognise it- “ Lastly, the German Comman-der-in-Cbief bases his jdans at the onset on reasoning rather than on information. When his mind is made up he risks much to jptin time.”

WHERE THE ALLIES GAIN

Tliis difference in system, according to the Mnglish expert, should work tor the advantage of the Allies under present conditions of warfare, because of the extraordinary development of aeroplane reconnaissance, which enables a commander to use information tar more plentiful and accurate than could be gathered in former wars. Says Major Stuart-Stephens :

“Lot- iis imagine the two opponents on the Western front of equnl efficiency, and. approximately, of equal strength, one fightiny according to the Prussian war doctrine and the other according to the Anglo-1 rench system. IS T oW, which ought to derive the greatest advantage from the new cavalry of the air? The answer is indubitably, “the side that can make the best use of information.” .

“Should the airplane reconnaissance prove the Gorman Commander-in-Chiets reasonedout plan to be wroiifj', "the German method of war makes it exceedingly difficult for him to profit by that information by giving' a fresh direction to bis operations as a whole. This weak feature of the enemy's battle system may come as a surprise to many of my readers who have been led to believe that a Prussian commanding general embarks upon a massed operation, carrying in his pocket several alternative plans' to be resorted to if the tide of battle flows in his antagonist s favour.

“The German High Command laboriously manufactures a plan founded on logically reasoned-out conclusions. At what is calculated to be the psychological moment it is put into execution with lightning' celerity—time being, with the German system, the essence of success. “I think the introduction ot the air service factor in this war ought to make for the most favourable influence on our sideTo put it in a .nutshell, with an equality of aerial cavalry the advantage over the German ought to be indisputable; for the flying machine assists us in the formation ot a battle plan, whereas it only assists the German leader in the execution of an already - formed plan-” “A T ow the airplane favours oui strategic school if the necessary reserves are available to ensure on irresistible attack, says Maior Stuart-Stephens m conclusion. “For it is man-power, and that factor alone, that; will decide in our favour the issue d this titanic struggle, and that, no doubt, is why America has come in to