THE FLEET INVINCIBLE.

Greymouth Evening Star, 22 February 1917, Page 2

THE FLEET INVINCIBLE.

AFTER TWO YEARS. 6

A RETROSPECT AND A PROPHECY.

Confucius reminds us to '"'study the pa&t if you would divino the future," and we may judge the naval prospects of the coming year from the events which have occurred at fretv since the .outbreak of, hostilities in August, 1914.' When the war opened (writes Archibald Hurd in the New York. Herald) the Central Powers believed •themselves fully prepared at sea. Germany possessed a navy larger than the combined-forces of France and Russia, gaining all the advantages which -are always as.;oeia'ted with unity of design, trainings and command. If the British people, whose interests in the Continental quarrel was moral rather than material, had determined to stand aside, leaving Serbia to be

crushed, Belgium to -be overrun, and France and Russia to be defeated, the Central Powers would have obtained the a:; aired command of the •world's seas, GERMAN PREPARATIONS.

The German naval preparation?*, pursued unremittently over a peri&l of nearly 20 years, were undertaken at a cost of about £300,000,000 in order to frighten the British people to adopt an attitude of neutrality. In the preamble to the German .naval act of 1900 it was candidly declared that "Germany must have a battle fleet Mr strong that even for the adversary with the greatest sea power , a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world." In other words, dependent a«i no nation before .haw been dependent on sea communications, the British people were to be prevented by the threat of a great German fleet from taking part in any war in which Germany became involved. "When at last the war party in Germany gained the ascendency for which they had been struggling, the German fleet had reached a. strength which rendered it a menace to the sea interests of the British Empire. Nevertheless, the British people throughout the world, the Dominions anticipating, the decision of the Mother Country, determined to join in the war, prompted thereto by sympathy with Serbia and afterward by horror a* the "wrong" done to Belgium. German Baval policy failed; the British Fleet was instantly mobilised when the Avar opened on the Continent, and thus gained the initiative at sea • which, during nearly two and a-half years of war, it has never lost. A SIGNIFICANT DECISION. The significance of the verdict of the British Dominions on the issue.in Europe, which was reached before the British Cabinet in London had decided to fight, has not been fully realised. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, like British India, had no direct .interest in the ■ European struggle, and yet the people..of the Dominions, like the ruling princes of India, determined to bear their share in the war. The action of'these fardistant parts of the British Empire is the most complete answer to the taunt that Britain entered the war because she-, waa jealous of German progress. Germany, if German influence had been politically and morally beneficial, had nothing to fear from these widely distributed peoples, far removed from the .scene of the war. Do not underestimate the significance of that initial, though silent, victory. At the moment when war occurred Germany possessed the second largest fleet in' the world and she gained all the advantages flowing from a strategical situation which' enabled her to prevent co-operation between, the British and Russian fleets, while at the same time she possessed North .Sea ports, within three or-four huudred miles of the exposed eastern littoral of Great Britain. She Avas ablo to mobilise 40 capital ships—battle- , ships and| battle-cruisers—besides eight older coast defence battleships; she also possessed nine armored and* 43 other cruisers, besides nearly 200 destroyers and torpedo boats, and about• 30 ; submarines.' Germany had a, great fleet, Avell manned, Aveli equipped, and Avell trained"; She could count on the support of Ihe considerable naval forces of Austria-Hungary in southern water's, '■ Her ally possess. ed seven modern and eigh t older besides 20 -.cruisers, and more than 100 torpedo craft. If it was a source of Aveakness that the two t allied fleets were so far' apart, it also was. a. source of strength: that Germany was able to count on her partner maintaining a. naval threat in, southern waters; and' tfiua checking any tendency or? the part of the Entente Powers to carry out a complete policy of concentration by sea. "

PAST AND, FUTURE. What course has 'the naval war taken? A review of the past .may en- ' able us to form some conception of what the future lias in store. Hie Austro-Hungarian navy hay been compelled to'adopt a.'policy of almost uh_ interrupted inactivity. It has inflict', ed, and liria itself suffered, ineidentiu losses, but it has made no-attempt, to upset the balance of power in the Mediterranean, contenting itself with not very tjucceasful, submarine attacks on the Allies' maritime lines of communication. The German fleet nas shown more initiative. It has made some effort to 'convince the world that; it is not, in a, military tsense,"''eoh-\ tained." In the first phase of,the naval war a section of the British fleet under Vice-Admiral 'Sir David Beatty invaded the Bight of Heligoland and inflicted on the Germans con. siderable 10-sues. That'action led the to take precautions against ' its repetition, -with' the .result 'itha.t, though British submarines have been, continually on duty in ; what May bw, regarded as Germany's owu waters. they have had few opportunities of attack, owing to the absence of targefei- At,last the Germans decided on adopting the . offensive , with their battle-cruisers." These large swift vessels, protected by a screen of de- ':

stroycrs while emerging from Ger-

many's submarine-infested waters, on

successive occasions dashed in the

darkness across; to the English coast, and, contrary to ' international laws,

bombarded a number of. seaside resorts devoid of all form of defence-

Since August, 1915, -ttiat poiky has been abandoned.' Why 1 The expLana_ n . ticn is to be found in Sif. Dasjjdl: Beatty's successful action off: the Oogv ; jrer Bank, when the Bluehetv was. •; sunk and two other battle-cruisers • narrowly escaped . destruction. That; form of raid was found too Mostly. Changes Avei ; e..'.afterwards made in the German'naval /staff" and -in. the command of the high fleas fleet, and, after lono- preparation,.,a .new,;.,policy was adopted. .On May 31%Aast; ; th.Q , whole of the German naval;.fc>n» advanced into the North-Sea intention'of 'defeating jilie ■ battle-cruiser force under ' Sir'lipfiyid Beatty before Admiral Sir John'; J|lß. cce could arrive on .the scene of aot|on with his slower battleships;- Th>b scheme also failed- Admiral (;sj»*ls ■ outmanoeuvred the Germans, e*en%_. drawing them on 'to Su*. : .J.b;hnJellicoe's force, with the result'\that Admiral von Scheer took advantage of , the failing-light to escape back UM* home ports, having 1 lost,no inconssdeir-, v able number of his ships and. s,uffera!i; : great injury to those which remained • affoat. The Germans ''asserted-'that;.; they had Avon a victory. .. Time,..tests', every iraf, claim. Naval .battles^are',fought with only one object—in'order'-' to gain-the to'use the military aiid economic- pui-pose-s..Since;' the battle of Jutland, German "" nttYJgt activity has been confined- to destroyer raids in the darkness, -Hdiich have achieved no military results', and tu the submarine campaign agaii\St the merchant: shipping of. the.Allie.s^ ,, i\itd J ., unfortunately, also of neutrals.'. ~*.' FAILURE OF PIBACY:

The submarine campaign is doomed to failure. No.offensive weapon has ever yet-been'developed wMcli has not eventually been met by an adequate defensive.... The Germans are at pre-. .sent obtaining the benefit " ol'\vvhat--inay be described, as a new fornlM' naval warfare, for the. submarine as a- ;i practical seagoing weapon' has ''been)V developed since hostilities opened. There is no reason to doubt-tliafe in the course of the coining year the submarine will be defeated. Wlien that result has .--been produced whatf will happen 1 Will the high sea» fleet again emerge from- behind its niine/fieldsj supported by heavy coast artillery'/ Count Reventlow. and other j German writers' in close touch with the higher command have',.' time imu again averted that the German, naval forces will never engage at sea. unless 1 there hi an assurance tliat f they will'be opposed by . approximately ecruai strength.' The British Beet ig,'stronger ■ absolutely and relatively than it eyer was. Making allowance for its suffer, ior gun-powerj'.it is more than twice an. titrong in .modern battleships and battkveruisers than Germany, and' it' is adequately supplied with light cruisers and destroyers. The Gerattempt to trick the British admirals, as in the spring of last year, but they will fail aa they failed , before. Unless Germany,, therefore, determines in desperation to stake M&i ■ all on si battle atsea j' hoping) defeat be certain, to take to the-oot-tom of the sea. at.least an equivalent number, of Britiah units, there is!$ ai o reason to anticipate that duringJkhe coming year any serious •..effertifwill be made to break the iron "dominion which the:British.'fleet, is ;impos"ing.?.on_-. "the German Empire. Austria-Hungary is also unable to use her naval forces. . VICTORY ASSURED. ' ■

With every month that passes the; Allies' command of the sea. will he reinforced- by .new 'units and by tlfe strength which comes from sea-keep- ■ ing. What those factors'in combination involve it i& hardly necessary to explain. During' the" months' ahead sea power will be translated into lancf power. •• In the early. pha.se. .of V th?, war it brought to rum Germany's! mill- • tary policy—a short, sharp campaign' against France, to be followed by tnw .of Russia;- It will bring to ruin the later military scheme.which has* involved in the war Bulgaria and Turkey. All those Powers which are now associated with Gemiahy will 'con- , tinue to be. besieged by sea, and all history attests that the', seq. contrbls the land. As the greatest writer on naval liietbry,- Admiral Maha'n, remarked in reviewing, the course of events after the battle of Trafalgar, in 1805.: 'Amid all' the poinp and cireumstance of the war which for.lo yean; to come desolated the. Continent, amid all the tramping to and fro" over Europe of the French armies and their 1 auxiliary legions, there went on tinceasingly that..noiseless pleasure upon, the vitals of France, that compulsion.' V. whose silence, when once noted, becomes to. the- observer- tJie-inost-strik-. -M ing and awful mark of the working, of sea power;" Throughout 1917 sea power will continue' to be' arrayed against, Germany and . her partners, and in due course it will bring thenr to defeat and ruin. '-: ' . . "