Greymouth Evening Star. AND BRUNNERTON ADVOCATE. SATURDAY, JULY 22nd, 1916. COLONEL MAUDE ON THE OUTLOOK.

Greymouth Evening Star, 22 July 1916, Page 4

Greymouth Evening Star. AND BRUNNERTON ADVOCATE. SATURDAY, JULY 22nd, 1916. COLONEL MAUDE ON THE OUTLOOK.

Ik view of the commencement of a general -offensive by the Allies, we are prone to , ask ourselves ; What is going to, happen ? Will the end be sudden, or will the enemy resist lor a protracted period? Colonel F. N. Maude, who is an authority-of high standing, being the author of several valuable works on military strategy and tactics, has given the following ample illustration of what '.ho expects to happen : “Take, the map of Europe, in, .any school atlas, and■ stretch an ordinary indiarubber band round the German and Austrian boundary lines as they existed before the l war; pin it down with drawing pins, and then stretch it to. include successively all he territory overrun by the enemy forces. Then imagine insects.' capable of eating rubber, if such creatures j xist, steadily gnawing it—in. France,, all across Russia, in the Balkans, and so forth—always keeping pace one with the other, so that the band shallsnap as nearly as possible simultaneously on every front, and picture how the. broken pieces will roll up on their several centres—-the drawing pins. Something very like this must happen to the German' armies; before very many months are over, and the more simultaneously the ruptures, occur at the different points-of attack, the mare catastrophic, will lie the final destruction.’’ Colonel Maude tolls up. that the groundwork of this plan was laid at the ■ French General Headquarters hontl/v after the failure .of tho G*”mans to break our !inoat Tpres. Behove the war began it was obviously impossible to. do more, thn.ni outline general ptincirtles for mutual guidance and support in case of anti to-trouble arising,' We could' only hastily draw .up measures’of nsfhn. hronufte' ' we had gained experience in. war,, not

only of the 1 nkiuv now weapons and. devices which. all. nations were then trying- for the first time, blit also of, the armies: 'themselves' we could do little else. The latter had undergone" profound modifications since they were tested under actual fire, and if was-, not until' the end of last December that, each army had discovered what its, men could bo counted upon to endure. By that time .Russians, French, Belgians, and British knew that as individual fighters they possessed a. marked superiority over any men which the Central Powers could put up against them, the one great difficulty being tho Allied want of munitions and eo.uipment and of mobilised numbers.. ‘lt was for this reason that we, sent an ■ expedition to the Dardanelles to help -the Russians .by giving ■J*ievn .time, to collect, consolidate, and equip tin ir stupendous resources of men. Let no one say that tho precious lives lost on Gallipoli were- thrown, •awwv. Those soldiers' Colonial Dominions and of the United Kingdom who gave thn.r lives at Gallipoli, -says Colonel Maude, were nob wasted, inasmuch as they stood in the gap, so to speak, through which the ehemv would have poured to the premature des’truc^

lion, of Russia, -and by their heroism and deaths have made it possible for the Allies to conquer the menace of Germany to the peace of tho whole world. When the pick of tho German armies failed altogether to ..break and roil up the Allied lines cither in, France or in Poland, it was decided that it was reasonable to assume that they would be equally unsuccessful in any future efforts, and that where their best had been kept at bay their’ second best would be of even less avail. The Allies therefore determined it would he' perfectly safe to, make the French Army (the 'most numerous and bestequipped) their chief bulwark against the enemy, and under cover of its protection, they proceeded to organise and develop all their resources of men and material until at length the Allied armies should stand ready for action inirresistible numbers to meet and over-' throw any possible assault. By the end of August, 1915, however,, the Germans in this sector had “shot their bolt,” as Lord Kitchener told usi, and having completely failed to _ bring about any revolutionary- demonstrati us in Russia, wire compelled to attempt their Balkan adventure in the m , hi...i uy iureatening British interests iu particular they might succeed in detaching France, Russia, and Jta.lv from the Alliance and so leave Great Britain to face the continuation of the wav single-handed. No sooner were the Central Powers, well committed to this new attempt than both French and British struck sharply in Champagne and at Loos.; the Russians began to press hard in Bessarabia, and in consequence- the whole scheme of re-distribution of all the German armies, had to be profoundly modified to nW'Cit the threats of the situation thus; created. There was literally no other move left .on the military chess‘hoard but to attack us on the. West before our armies were completed and before the end of “the roadless period” in Russia allowed the Russian armies to begin their big offensive, and obviously Verdun was the only place for thorn to strike at. On this point, however, they concentrated everything that could possibly be spared from other areas, and in doing so have played into our hands. In Uo other way could they have proved to ua that the quality of their troops had sunk so low that in reason their man. , hers no longer matter. After predicting an early commencement of the Allied offensive both on the Eastern and Western fronts, Colonel Maude.said; ‘‘When we do. advance, it will be because: the.'demoralisation of the enemy has bem so completely established by observation at the front that the whole series of combined movements will goforward with an irresistible rush. It is quite possible, though—it always is on any battlefield—that sudden local Allied successes may break the enemy’s line with such completeness that the hour and direction of our advance may be hastened. Once the break-up of an a run- through gradual demoralisation begins, no one can say • how rapidly events may crowd one on the oilier. In the nature of tilings; there is no reason why a beaten Gorman. Army should not be driven back on the Rhino within six weeks: the distance thither has often been; covered in similar circumstances in the same time, and the passage of the great river itself presents no more formidable difficulties to us than did that of the Danube to the Russians in 1877, or the crossing of the Vistula to the Germans . last spring. How far. we may have to fight our way beyond the Rhine into- the middle of Germany. will depend principally on the progress made by the Russians and Italians towards, meeting the Allies. My .own idea has always been that the German,si will attempt a final stand between Muiden-Paderbom and Hainan their extreme left resting’ on tho T nnringian. Forest, where a great French army moving down the right bank of the Rhine from Basle will work round their flank while the rest of the Allied forces from the West will press forward on a broad front by all possible roads, and river crossings. Once the Allies have reached Berlin and joined Impels, will follow a period of negotiations, during which, .nr: the Germans did before Paris in 1870 for the French, we shall give the enemy facdiiies to elect a new Government with which we can treat. Exactly how ‘ long this final stage may take no one can toll with certainty, but from tho experience .of many, former campaigns , six months to a, year 'should see the end of tho reckoning with ‘that hitter ,and hasty .nation,’ who like the ' Chaldeans of old, marched through dwelling-places, that are not theirs.” " 1