SOUTH AFRICAN DESPATCHES.

Greymouth Evening Star, Volume XXXI, 24 April 1901, Page 4

SOUTH AFRICAN DESPATCHES.

(Continued from last issue.) The next despatch is dated March 15, and was penned immediately after the entry into Bloerafontcin. It describes in detail the whole of the march from Paardcbcrg to Blocmfontcin. It is followed by one of March 31, reviewing the services of the troops to whose bravery and endurance his success was so largely due. lie begins with an appropriate reference to 1 Jie gallant Canadians who stormed Croivje's laager on the anniversary of Majuba :

I would here like to mention the distinguished part played by the Royal Canadian Regiment in its advance on the enemy's trenches on 271 h February, and referred to in my Despatch No. 3 of 28th February, 1900. No account of the recent operations would, however, be complete, were I to omit to draw special attention to the good services performed by the splendid and highly efficient body of troops from other parts of Her Majesty's Empire, which have, while serving under my orders, borne in a distinguished share the advance into the Orange Free State. The various contingents from Australia, from New Zealand, and from Ceylon, the several corps which have been formed locally in the Cape Colony, and the City of London Imperial Volunteers have vied one with the other in .the performance of their duty. They have shared with the Regular Troops of Iter Majesty's Army the hardships and dangers of the cam- ] paign in a manner which has gained for them the respect and admiration of all who have been associated with them. I trust that your Lordship will concur with me in considering that by their valour and endurance the soldiers and sailors serving in (he force which is under my immediate command "have worthily upheld the best traditions of Her Majesty's Army and Navy. Considerations of space make it impossible to give the names of all the officers and men who Lord Roberts here selects for special praise.

Tlio next despatch is from Kroonstad and is dated May 2>> Lord Roberts reviews the situation in tlie Free State after the occupation of Bloenifontein, and explains liis determination not to let his general military policy he diverted by the unfortunate incidents at Sannah's Post and Dewctsdorp. Between this despatch and the next, dated Pretoria, August 11, there is a long interval. Lord Roberts begins by describing the position m it presented itself to him at Kroonstad at the end of May and giving the reasons which in his view made it imperative to dash across the Vaal and run the inevitable risk of having his communications attacked and even interrupted. My object then was to push forward with the utmost rapidity, while providing as far as my resources would admit for she safety of the main line of communication by occupying stiagetical points to the east of the railway at Winburg, Senekal, Lindley, andHeilbron. I calculated that, as soon as Mafcking had been relieved, a largo proportion of the troops under the command of Lord Methnen and Sir Archibald Hunter would be available to co-opcratc on my left flank and I hoped Sir Redvers Bulicr would be able to assist by an advance westward to Vrede, or north-westward in the Standerton district. But whether these

anticipations could be realised or not, I felt that the enormous advantage to be gained, by striking at the enemy's capital before he had time to recover* from the defeats he had already sustained, would more than counterbalance the risk of having our line of communication interferred with—a risk which had to be taken into consideration.

The narrative of the forced march on Johannesburg is then given, and Lord Roberts points out how once again, immediately after the occupation of Johannesburg, he was faced with the alternative of leaving his communications unprotected or of giving the enemy time to recover and strengthen themselves if he did not march at once on Pretoria. As usual, he took the bolder course. The despatcli goes on to describe the advance on Pretoria and the fighting at .Diamond Hill. It then reverts to the "unfortunate incident " of the surrender of the Derbyshire Militia at the Rhenostcr railway bridge. Once again lie rc--1 states the causes of such mishap and his | attitude towards them.

30. The possibility of such mishaps had been clearly forseen by me when I determined to advance on Pretoria, for I knew 1 was not sufficiently strong in numbers to make the railway line absolutely secure and at the same time have a force at my disposal powerful enough to cope with the main army of the Transvaal supported by forts and guns of position. Now, however, that I was in possession of .the Capital and the majority of our prisoners had been recovered. I took immediate steps to strengthen the posts along the railway. The liberated prisoners were armed and equipped and despatched to Vereeniging and other stations south of the Vaal, and as soon as more troops could be spared, they were distributed along the line between Pretoria and Kroonstad. i deputed Lieut-General Lord Mclhuen to superintend these arrangements and on the 11th June he attacked and defeated the commando under Christian l)e Wet at the Phcnoster River. The Imperial Yeomanry Field Hospital, which hadfal'en into the hands of (lie Boers when the Derbyshire Militia surrendered a few days previously, was recovered, together with the Officers and men who had been wounded on that occasion. Other desultory attacks were subsequently made on the railway line and the trains employed for reconstruction purposes, but the enemy were on each occasion repulsed without serious loss on our side and in the course of a few days railway and telegraphic communication were restored.

The relief of Mafeking by Colonel Mahon, the advance of General Hunter in tho Western Transvaal, the operations of General Warren in the north-western districts of Cape Colony, tho advance of General Buller into tho Transvaal are briefly summarisid. Tho next despatch is dated October 10, and deals with the situation during the months that followed tho occupation of. Pretoria, and the reasons which nude an immediate further advance impossible. Tho difficulty of dealing with tho Boers when oneo they had broken up into guerilla bands is thus set forth : The vast area of the country in which the operations arc being conducted has also to be remembered. The troops bavo had to march long distances, and, though existing railways have been utilised to the fullest extent, the limited capacity of single lines—especially of that between Pretoria and Bloemfontoin —coupled with tho scarcity of rolling-stock, has rendored it difficult to movo and concentrate rapidly according to the European standard of what should bo possible in war. 5. To deal with the organized forces of the enemy was a comparatively easy matter : but in South Africa the problem has been complicated, and the settlement of the country retarded, by the dctoiinination of some of tho Boer leaders to pursue a guerilla warfare after their troops had boen defeated iu the field. Owing to the non-compliance of tho Boers with the recognized custom of war which compels combatants to wear a distinctive uniform, they have found it easy to pose as peaceful agriculturalists one day and to take part in active hostilities on the next. Their leaders havo also usually found means by threats or by persuasions to induce them to disregard their oath of neutrality, although this was voluntarily taken by men who at the time professed themselves anxious to submit to tho British Government. To their honour be it said, a few of the burghers have sufL-rcd imprisonment or loss of property sooner than thus break their faith, but their number was not sufficient to enable them to exercise any influence on tho general situation.

Recent events have convinced ran that the permanent tranquility o£ tho Orange River Colony and Transvaal is dependent on the complete disarmament of the inhabitants ; and though the, extent of country to be visited, and the casi with which guns, riflos and ammunition can bo hidden, will render the task a difficult one, its aceompluhment is only a matter of time and patience.

The narrative continues with tho important series of operations conducted in July by Generals Hunter, Rundle, Page - , and Clements which ended in the surrender of over 4,000 Boers in the Brandwater Basin, a success which \va°, however, partially marred by tho escapo of De Wet and Olivier. The operations in tho Western Transvaal in July and August and the operations of Sir Redvers Buller away in the Southern Transvaal aro then given. After this follows thedetailed story of the inarch to Komati Poort ending with the final destruction of the last regular force kept togother by the Boers.