SOUTH AFRICAN DESPATCHES

Greymouth Evening Star, Volume XXXI, 22 April 1901, Page 4

SOUTH AFRICAN DESPATCHES

The British Gazette of February Bth publishes in full Lord Roberts’s despatches, from ilia date of his arrival in South Africa down to the date of his departure. In a brief form they give an excellent account of the chief points of the campaign. We shall therefore from time to time give extracts. The first despatch is from Capetown on February Gth, 1300, in which he says: Now that I have been nearly a month in South Africa, and will shortly Re leaving Cape Town for the operations which I propose to carry out for the relief of Kimberley and in the Orange Free State, it seems desirable that I should submit for the information of Her Majesty’s Government a concise account of the state of affairs in this country as I found them on my arrival on the 10th January. The force which was despatched from England between the 20tlx October and the early part of December had been greatly scattered. The Army Corps organization had been broken up, and even the formation of the Divisions and Brigades materially differed from what had been originally contemplated. On assuming the chief command, the first slop which Sir Redvers Bailor undertook was to despatch Lord Methuen with the Brigade of Guards, the 3rd, or Highland Brigade, and a third Brigade, improvised from 3j battalions on the Lines of Communication- which were immediately available, for the relief of Kimberley. As your Lordship is aware, this force succeeded in crossing the Modder River ; but the subsequent attack on the Boer position at Magorsfontoin having been repulsed, Lord Methuen fell hack on the river, where he has formed an entrenchment facing that thrown up by the enemy.

Lord Roberts then goes into the details of the disorganization of the original schemes for a general advance owing to the critical state of affairs in Natal, and continues ; In view of the distance of my headquarters from Natal, and of the fact that on the date of my arrival Sir Redvers Duller had made his dispositions for the second attempt to relieve Ladysmith, I thought it best to leave him a perfectly free hand, and not to interfere with his operations. . . Since I have been here I have taken no steps to render active assistance to General Sir Redvers Duller, as ho had a force at his disposal which seemed sufficient for the relief of Ladysmith, and. after being reinforced by the Oth Division, he had informed mo that nis task would not be rendered easier by a farther addition to the number of his troops. Moreover, I had no troops to spare. The frontier of the Cape Colony was weakly held, and the attitude of a portion of the Colonists bordering the Orange Free State was in some cases doubtful, and in others disloyal. The conclusion I arrived at was that no sensible improvement in the military situation could bo hoped for until we were prepared to carry the war into the enemy’s country, and all my efforts have accordingly been exerted in that direction. This plan was, however, attended with considerable difficulties. The two main roads leading from Cape Colony to tho Orange Free Stito were held in force by tho Boers at tho points where those roads crossed the Orange River, and it seemed certain that the bridges over that river would be destroyed if the enemy could be forced to retire to the northern bank. Moreover, I could not overlook the fact that, even if either of these routes could bo utilized, the movement of an army solely by means of a lino of railway is most tedious, if not practically impossible. The advantage is all on tho side of the enemy, who can destroy tho line and occupy defensible positions when and where, they please. In a hilly enclosed country, or where any large river has to be crossed they can block the line altogether, as was proved in the case of Lieut-General Lord Methuen on the Modder River, of Lieut General French on the Orange River, and of General Sir Redvers Duller on tho Tugola. A railway is of tho greatest assistance, it is indeed essential to an army for tho conveyance of stores and supplies from tho base, and it is a most valuable adjunct if it runs in the direction of tho objective, but even then a certain proportion of the troops must bo equipped with wheel or pack transport to enable supplies to be collected with many tactical difficulties which have to be surmounted, owing to tho greatly increased range and’power of modern projectiles.

.No organized transport corps existed when I arrived in South Africa. Some thousands of mules have been collected and a number of ox and mule wagons had been purchased, but what is k v own as the regimental system has been opted, which consists in providing each v. it with sufficient transport for its ammunition, baggage, and two or three days’ supplies. Such a system may answer well enough for peace manamvera, wcero the troops march short distances daily for a week or ten days, and where depots arc established in advance from which the regimental supplies can be replenished. But this system is quite unsuitable for extensive operations in a district where no food and scarcely any forage can be procured, where advance depots cannot he formed, and whore all the necessaries required by. the army in the field have to be carried for a considerable distance. It is, moreover, a very extravagent system, for during a campaign every corps is not required to be continually on the move. A certain number have to garrison important points and guard lines of communication, and for tticsc transport is not needed, On tbs regimental system the transport attached to such corps would remain with them, and would therefore not be available for general purposes, or in the event of its being taken away from them, no one would bo specially responsible for its supervision.

Major-General Lord Kitchener’s experience in this important matter coincided with my own, and wo decided that the first tiling to bo done was to form a properly organized Transport Department.

On the 20th January I received intelligence of Sir Itedvcrs Buller’s withdrawal from Spion Kop to Potgietcr’s Drift. The second attempt to relieve Ladysmith having failed, it has become imperatively necessary to give early effect to the policy indicated above. With this object lam collecting as large a force as possible to the north of the Orange Elver Railway Station, with the view of joining the troop? under Lord Methuen’s command, and proceeding in the first instance, to relieve Kimberley. The Column, including Cavalry and Mounted Infantry, will number 35,000 men, with about 100 guns. On the relief of Kimberley being accomplished I proposed to leave a modern garrison at that place, and with the remainder of the force to move eastward for the purpose of threatening Bloemfontein and seizing some point of the railway between the place and Springfontein. This operation will, I trust, cause the Boers to reduce the force which they have concentrated round Ladysmith, and enable our garrison there to bo relieved before tire end of February.