THE ARBITRATION ACT

Feilding Star, Volume I, Issue 294, 18 June 1907, Page 3

THE ARBITRATION ACT

AN IMPORTANT SUPREME COURT DECISION. WRIT OF ATTACHMENT REFUSED. ['NOUVIOCBBV ftsaua Had] Dunedin, June 17. Mr Justice Williams gave judgment this morning in the patter of th« order of the Arbitration Court at Tiraaru, where one H .Millar was ordered to pay to the Inspector of Awards at Timaru £3 as fine for breaking the terms of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act by taking part in a strike. Following are extracts from his Honor's judgment : — ' "Respondent, under section 15 oi Amendment Act, was fined £5 by the Arbitration Court for taking part( in a strike. Subsection (E) of section 101 provides for enforcement of payi»eat t enacts that for the purpose of enforcing payment of fine and costs payable under any order of thi Court a certificate in the prescribed i( i .n, specifying the amount payabk and the respective parties or persont by and to whom the same is payable, may be filed in any Court having civil jurisdiction, to the extent of such amount, and shall, thereupon, according to its lenor, be enforceable in all respects, as final judgment of such Court in its civil jurisdiction. The certificate required has been filed in the present case in the Supreme Court. The question is, whether, bj virtue of subsection (E) of section 101, writ of attachment can issue against respondent, so that he can be committed to prison for making default in payment of the fine. "If he can be so committed it n only because, by making default in payment, he comes within the first exception in section 3 of the Imprisonment for Debt Abolition Act. 1904, and is punishable accordingly. Unless he comes within the excepted cases in that section no person car be imprisoned for non-payment of a sum or money. Section 3 was adopted from section 4 of the English Debtors' Act, 1869. The effect of section 4 has been discussed in various cases. Subsection Eof section 101 does not pretend to give power to punish for non-payment of fine; it merely prescribes what may be done for the purpose of enforcing payment. As is shown by English cases, punishment by imprisonment for default in payment is not a process 1 for enforcing payment. Hubsection E prescribes that the certincate, according to its tenor, is to be enforceable in all respects as the final judgment of the Court m ite civil jurisdiction. A fine is not enforceable by a Court in its civil jurisdiction. Order for payment, therefore, js to be treated, not as a line, bnt as a final judgment m a civil action; it is to be enforced according to its tenor. The tenor of it simply is that £5 is payable to applicant by respondent. The Arbitration Court had ordered this sum to be paid by respondent to applicant. "Whore a Court of competent jurisdiction has ordered awtopay a sum of money to another, that is a debUdue from one to the other. i find nothing in sub-section E to siigcest that the Legislature intended that in the event of default payment of the fine inflicted by the Arbitration Court under section 101, the person in default should be punished by imprisonment. When the Legislature intended that default m payment of a fine inflicted by the Arbitration Court for an offence should be punished by imprisonment, it has expressed itself very clearly. Sections 81, 107, 112, 113 and 118 of the principal Act create offences punishable by fine. Section 103 gives the Arbitration Court exclusive jurisdiction to deal with these offences. Proceedings are to be taken befor^ that Court as summary proceedings are taken under the Justices of the Peace Act, 1882. When the Court makes order for payment of a fine, it is filed in the nearest Magistrate's Court, and is thereupon to be enforced as a final judgment, conviction, or order made by a Stipendiary Magistrate "under the summary provisions of the Justices of the Peace Act, 1882. That brings into play sections 91 to 97 (inclusive) of the latter Act, and makes default in payment punishable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding the terms mentioned in the scale pet out in section 96. According to that scale, where the amount exceeds £1, but does not exceed £5, one month is the maximum. If the contention of applicant is correct, that non-payment of fine inflicted under section 101 of the Act of 1905, can be punished by imprisonment under sub-section E, _ the maximum term for the most trivial fine would be one year, a period beyond which, by the third section of the Act of 1874, no person can be imprisoned for non-payment of money. Further than this, if a man has served his term of imprisonment under section 96. he is no longer liable to fine. " The Legislature certainly considered the offences under the sections mentioned in section 103 more serious than those under section 101, and the startling result would follow that more serious liabilities would be incurred for a lesser offence than for a more serious one. The Legislature had clearly before it two classes of fines — those inflicted under section 101, and those inflicted under the sections mentioned in section 103. As to the latter, it made express provision for punishment by imprisonment in default of payment. As to the former, it made no such provision, but enacted that payment should be enforced practically as if they were civil debts. It would have been simple enough to have placed both classes in the same category., and the fact that the Legislature refrained from doing so is the strongest possible reason for holding, that it had no intention that imprisonment should follow on default of payment of fine inflicted under section 101. When, also, the Legislature passed the Amendment. Act it had before it sections 101 and 103 of the principal Act. If it had intended that default in payment of fine under section 15 of. the Amendment Act was to be punished by imprisonment, proceedings would have been directed under section 103, and not r-nder section 101. The law must be clear, and not a matter of doubtful inference, if the liberty of the subject is to be interfered with. In a former ©as©, Mr Justice Cooper took the contrary view to that '.vhich I now take. He, however, was under great disadvantage in having had only one side of the case presented to him.' I feel justified .therefore, in differing from his conclusion, although if he had heard the case argued as I have heard it, and his judgment had followed on such argument, I should have greatly lesitated before doing so. I have the satisfaction of knowing that if my decision is wrong the Court of Appeal can set it right very shortly.. If .on the other hand, there is a hole in tho Act requiring a patch, Parliament is at hand to patch it. Motion refused/ -