The Franklin Times PUBLISHED EVERY MONDAY, WEDNESDAY AND FRIDAY AFTERNOON. MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1943. ROOSEVELT ASSESSES 1942 EVENTS

Franklin Times, Volume XXXII, Issue 3, 11 January 1943, Page 2

The Franklin Times PUBLISHED EVERY MONDAY, WEDNESDAY AND FRIDAY AFTERNOON.

MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1943. ROOSEVELT ASSESSES 1942 EVENTS

Office and Works: ROULSTON STREET. PUKEKCNE. ’Phone No. 2. P.O. Box 14. “Nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice.”

WAS 1942 the last year of possible victory for Hitler? asks the Evening Post editorially. President Roosevelt says that it was; further, he states, the Nazis know it. While the state of Nazi knowledge may remain a matter of conjecture, no doubt whatever attaches to the fact that — barring the unlikely contingency of some suicidal disunion in the Allied ranks- —Hitler lias lost his chance of victory. The New Year hells rang down the curtain on his insatiable ambition, and they hold distinct promise for Allied victory, but that victory depends on unsparing united effort. It is a mistake to regard the impossibility of a Hitler victory, and Ihe certainty of an Allied victory, as one and the same thing. They are not. The failure of Hiller's initiative does not guarantee Ihe success of the United

Nations’ initialive. But it is a strategic fact that if the United Nations’ initiative were to fail to secure victory. the cause could be looked for in the United Nations’ own conduct of Ihe war. Hiller's power to defeat us has gone. No one can defeat us except ourselves. Hitter can he insured against destruction only by some short coming—some wry unlikely wavcring—of the United Nations. Hiller's task in III" first year of tin 1 war (1939-50; was to overthrow France before Britain was ready to fight. He succeeded. His self-ap-pointed task in the second year of Hie war (1910-41) was to overthrow Russia before America was ready to fight. Tins lime he failed. He bad from June. 1941, till 7. 194 ! (the day .of Japan's <J| tack on Peart Harbour) to polish off Russia and the Red Army. He expected to do it. Numerous people outside Lerrnany predicted his success. it was ‘Tipped” Ilia I Ihe Red Army would he destroyed by Ihe end of September (194 1) or :il least by the end of October; Hie JJed Army could not possiblv last tlirouvh November, Mil! People now laugh at this. but for Hiller if was life or death. Far from being destroyed in the latter part of J9i I. Ihe Red Army in the latter pari of 19-12 lias figured as the dost rover: and if is sa lis far I ory In note dial Pp'sidenl Roosevelt in his Message f> Uongress is very definite in his trilmto to tin* Red Army. He entertains no doubt as to what constituted Ho* hivgesl pic 1 lire on the world-wide canvas of Hue war in 19 12. .Many thiims happened in 19 12—including \frinan and Pacific victories but the. President (lesiTilres events nil the ! 511 i front as "the la ryes I ami most importon I of the development-; of Hu 1 \ypuf> st ra logic pic I lire of ib i •>." This i just and si rid I \ true s! aii a m m!. Wo' 1 " file Allies as a wliol" wov able lo grasp the initiative from Hitter in 1912. the Russian lever, arfinv directly in the vital field of conimenbi! strategy, was tin 1 most powerful development of the year. Willi equal justice the President may claim, and docs claim, that Mm North African expedition ' Novrmlmr- ! leceniber) diverted from Russi , -Mine of life Herman strength. He slate.11 1 a I during 19 12 "to lake'some of the weight off Russia" Mr UlnirdiilFs phrase) was Ihe United Nations' primary aim: “our first task was to lessen the concent ra'cd pressure on the Russian front by compelling Lermany lo transfer part of her man-power to another theatre.'' The North Andean expedition, the President adds. did more than divert Herman strength impose Allied initiative on Hiller. f! also closed an Axis avenue to Sindh America via Dakar and the narrowest part of the South Atlantic Ocean. Moreover .it brought- into the war increasing French forces on Ihe Allied side —though paradoxically enough the first: effect, of flic expedition was a clash with the same forces. So for as available reports show, the President wisely kept off the delicate ground of French leaders' rivalry m North Africa and elsewhere. No assessment nf the events of the year 1942 is complete without a reference In Parian's later career and the --vents belonging to it, but no incident in the war is so difficult lo assess in Arms of the rather complex French present and of the unpredictable future. North Africa is an account that was opened in 1942, but its influence will be feltmost profoundly in 19 53. It was the first- big Christmas box ever received by Hitler that he did not expect.

After what Mr Curtin had said — not to mention the Babel of commentators —special interest attached to what President Roosevelt would have to say, in his Message to pongress, about the Pacific. The report to hand condenses his remarks into an assurance that “our aim in the Pacific now is to force the Japanese to fight. Last year we stopped them; this year we intend to advance. Every day Japan's strength in shipping and aircraft ; s going down, while American strength is going up. American submarines are striking down Japanese shipping as far as the entrance to Yokohama harbour itself. The final outcome wilt be evident to the Japanese people when we strike at their own home island and bomb them constantly from Ihe air.” The bombing of Japan, if effected by land-based bombers, connotes action from China, or (in the event of Russian belligerency) from Asiatic Russia. Recognising this fact, the President tells Congress that “in these attacks against Ihe Japanese we shall be joined by Ihe heroic people of China.” Of course, the Chinese cannot pull (heir weight without armament: therefore Mr Roosevelt promises that “battle equipment will he got to China.” He puts a better face on present transport, expedients (or else a worse face on old ones) by stating that “even today we are flying as much lease-lend material into China as ever went bv the Burma road.”

Taken all round, the President’s as-

sessment is a promise of victory it there is no slackening; and his Message is a Message lo a Congress con-

cerning which —since the 1942 elections —-there have been rumours of dissension. The Message Ihcrefore is a piece of artillery tiring a high political projectile. 11s success in Congress is just as important as Rial Eisenhower’s aeroplanes should lly and Halsey's guns hil home.