“We Warned France”

Franklin Times, Volume XXIX, Issue 43, 19 April 1940, Page 7

“We Warned France”

OF THE ATTACK ON VERDUN (From Hugh Cleland Hoy's Book, “40 O.B.”) The secret oj how France managed to save Verdun has never been told. It is this, We had forewarned them. "We had told them not only that Verdun would he the objective but that the attack would he launched in the third week in February. One morning an American came to the Admiralty asking to see the Admiral. The Admiral was ill, but he told his story to the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence and myself. His story was this: — “I realise that it is almost unbelievable that an ordinary citizen, and an .American at that, should have got hold of such a secret,” he began. "I do not pretend to assert that my information is true. I feel, though, that It is my duty to give it to you, and

I do so just as it was given to me. He had, he said, just returned from Warsaw, where he had been on business. While there it had happened -that he made a friendly acquaintanceship with a high German official, and .just before he left the country had been asked to dine at his home. “I went and had dinner wtih the ■family, who were making it more or less an occasion because it happened to be the daughter’s birthday. The official enjoyed the little celebration thoroughly, and as the evening went on he got more and more talkative. When the ladies had retired he began to discuss the war, and as his tongue was pretty well loosened he forgot his evei’yday discretion.” The American diplomatically drew him on, and his host began to hint •darkly that a great attack was pending that would completely finish France.

“He told me,” the American continued, “that he had just returned from attending a Council of the German General Staff at Berlin. He said that the council were aware that their earlier mistakes could now only be put right by a terrific smash-up on the Western Front. I pricked up my eajs then, I can tell you!”

Apparently he managed to disguise his consuming curiosity from the now over-communicative official, who soon revealed what"” the American was interested to learn.

“Von Falkenhayn,” the host declared, “has decided to strike the mightiest blow of the war and cursh Fraifce through Verdun.

And in his confidential mood he actually told the date of the opening attack and the number of troops which Germany calculated she would have to sacrifice to achieve her plan.

“That’s all I Know,” the American said, as he ended his narrative. “It may be a hoax to get the French 1o move their troops to that part of I lie line, and on the other hand it may he the truth. 1 Can't say. hut at least you know as much as 1 do!” When he had gone Captain Smith turned to me and asked: — “What do you think of him? Do you believe him?” “I believe his story of what happened,” I said, “but whether the official was speaking the truth is another matter.”

However, I dashed up in the car to Admiral Hall’s house and showed him my report of the conversation, telling him. too, that the American was patently straightforward and genuine in my humble opinion. The Admiral’s face was very serious. He asked me to hurry back to the Ad-

mindly to give the report to Captain : (now Comte) de Saint-Seine, Ihe : French Naval Attache, and also, lo | send a copy to the War Office.

j “It may be Ihe answer to what we i have "wanted to know ever since we 'realised that a large-scale German attack was planned. That is—when I and where. My own feeling is that jibe information is genuine. Anyhow, iin two minutes Ihey shall know this ! in Paris.”

: By his private line to Paris, and in jin's own special code Captain de Saint - j Seine immediately transmitted the sensational warning. We awaited the I sequel, trembling' at the colossal risk ! that depended oh it. Truly. Ihe late jot nations hung in Ihe balance: the ! fulcrum *as our diagnosis 01. the j American’s reliability. Both Captain Aubrey Smith and myself were impressed by I lie candour 'and apparently genuine earnestness l of the informant. Would the French generals be convinced by his strange story? It seemed doubtful that Ihe 1 German official would be so foolish jas to unload this great secret on to 'a stranger—but the American's description of the circumstances .under which the betrayal was made was easily the reply to this natural doubt. On the other hand, assuming our visitor to be honest in narrative and intentions, then was Ihe German official’s behaviour just a big bluff? — a deliberate piece of cunning employed on the off-chance that his indiscretion would eventually reach the right quarter and lead to a massing o l ' the French troops at Verdun, thus exposing another part of the Front to Ihe German push?

The 20th came. No news. On the 21st the French Naval Attache hurried into Admiral Hall’s room, and finding me there he pressed my hand and congratulated me on my judgment of Mr , the American. That morning at 7.1 a a.m. the Germans had opened a bombardment of unparalleled intensity toward Verdun. But the French guns were ready. The French generals had elected to take the risk of believing the American’s story, and had prepared their defence.

I think this was the biggest thrill of my life.

The story of Verdun is now histery, but during this period the light thrown upon it by Captain SaintSfine in his frequent friendly chats with me in Admiral Hall’s room provided engrossing comparisons with Ihe German officials injudicious revelation.

Before the attack opened Captain Saint-Seine went through the points which in his opinion gave credence to this forecaste. For many months France had been unhappily aware that the Germans were in an advantageous position. Russia was disorganised, Italy weakened by doubts, and Britain preoccupied by the problem of preparing the recruits under the Military Service Act, which was due to come into force on January 27. 1016. Obviously Germany was going to make the best of her advantage in this critical moment.

The Allies expected an attack early in 1016, but were uncertain as to the part of the Front which Germany would select for tier purpose. Verdun was frequently considered as a possibility, but the tendency of Allied consideration was to the region of Paris and Flanders. Moreover, General Joffre’s theory that fortresses were obsolete as modern war defences had resulted in the withdrawal of .troops and guns from Verdun. The Germans were in a position of valuable strength at this juncture.

Their easy'means of communication — j which lias been called tlieir "inner ' circle” —made it unnecessary for them to keep large numbers of troops in , reserve, a contrast to the imperative ( need of the Allies in this respect. In addition, their artillery was of greatly i superior strength, and their scientific | research had evolved for them poison- j ous gases in the output of which they , were overwhelmingly in advance ol the French chemical factories. j

There will always remain in my mind Ihe picture that the French Naval Attache drew for me of Verdun as it was before that dale. Alter General JolTre had induced in 19 I •”> ! Ihe French Government lo "declass” ; this post along with others of the ' line as a fortress, it had all its peace- ; time air. Douaumonl towered above j llicm all.' It was the key to all the j forts. In wintertime the .Meuse often rose and flooded the intervening ; meadows, leaving a scene of desolation—deserted trenches, barbed wire, muddy fiats —one of Ihe French arguments against the likelihood ol the enemy’s attack being directed thither. , From Ihe forts there was hardly a sound to be heard beyond the distant ( shriek of occasional shells, and the defenders did not expect to he disturbed.

After receiving our message through the French Naval Attache, General j .Toffre altered his plans, and Verdun I defences were increased. The Germans brought up eight divisions, and the Crown Prince had under his charge nearly 700 modern guns, not counting the field artillery. The German artillery begun its bombardment on February 2J. By the end of May the enemy realised that Verdun was impregnable. In June the Grown Prince was ordered by von Falkenhayn to take the fortres at any cost, but by the end of that month the Crown Prince admitted that the Germans were suffering greater losses than the French. A crisis was reached in the affairs of Germany when on August 21 Ihe , Grown Prince dismissed General von Knobelsdrof, his chief of staff, whom he had always suspected of being too friendly with the stubborn von Fal- I kenhayn, to whose attitude of “on and always on” Ihe Grown Prince was j now openly hostile. j Through our Intelligence Division at the Admiralty we were fully j aware that the von Falkenhayn slock was by that time very low in Ger- ‘ many, and we were able to keep the j French alive to the fact that if they . could only hold out it would not be j long before, the German morale was broken. j Further encouragement was added by the presentation to Verdun by M. j Poincare on 13th September of the j Cross of the Legion of Honour and • Allied decorations, in a ceremony j which stirred the deepest feelings of j the French. From that dale the tide j of battle seemed definitely to turn, but with varying vicissitudes which dragged it out for another year. j The final blows were struck during the third week of August, 11)17. when, after ten thousand prisoners had been taken by the French, nothing remained in German hands but Beau- ; month.

It is true that from such casual sources of information did we sometimes get information of incalculable value. In this instance the story brought to us from Warsaw by the American probably changed world history, so accurate was it, even in detail of date, venue, and foreacst of Germany’s losses. In the light of post-war claims to this victory, a new claim might be made for this information conveyed to the French High Command through the instrumentality of the Admiralty—which resulted in the advance defending of Verdun, thus probably preventing the over-running of a considerable portion of France by the German hordes, if not saving the whole French army from ruin. In a word, it was the British navy that saved the French army. Among my treasures is a letter to me from Comte de Sainte-Seine, in which he says: Dear Mr Hoy.—l very well remember the afternoon, in the early days of February, .1916, when you conveyed to me the news of the German attack on Verdun, which news. I at once transmitted to Paris. Your judgment of the American visitor was correct, and that gave us about three weeks in which to prepare for this terrific onslaught. Believe me, my dear Mr Hoy, your sincerely, SaintSeine.