Russia Contravening Potsdam

Evening Star, Issue 25893, 10 September 1946, Page 7

Russia Contravening Potsdam

This may not be so easy to achieve, as it is believed that Russia’s need for consumer goods is go urgent that the Soviet is compelled to adopt, its present policy of extracting reparations by taking goods from German current production. This is contrary to American interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement, and contrary also to British interpretation , Both the British and the Americans contend that Potsdam permits only the removal of agreed heavy • industry plants, and that the agreement did not envisage the levying of reparat ions, from current , production. British opinion also supports Mr Byrnes's contention that the Polish Sossession of Silesia and other eastern erman possessions cannot be regarded as final. , ... The sharp Polish, rejoinder to this proposal, however, is regarded as. an indication of imminent Russian objections. , . ‘ The Times ’ reports that observers in Germany see signs that the Itus- * mans are beginning to realise that there are limitations to their isolationist economic policy, and that they may be compelled bv economic necessity to revise their attitude. They are urgently in need of steel, and may be prepared to permit the export of food and brown coal from their own zone, in order to obtain it from the British and Americans.

The British and American decision tp proceed with economic unification of

their two zones is seen as a move likely to force the Russian hand. The only criticism of Mr Byrnes s speech in Britain is on the score of precipitancy in entrusting the Germans with the powers of self-govern-ment. Sorpe doubts have been expressed as to whether the Germans are fit to govern themselves, and the saggestion is made that a longer aud more intensive period of political education is required before this risk can be accepted. [The United States favoured the early establishment of a provisional German Government for Germany, said. Mr James Byrnes, Addressing Allied and German leaders at Stuttgart. 11 It is the American Government’s view that the people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility of running their own affairs. More than a year has passed since hostilities ceased, and Germany’s millions should not be forced to live in doubt regarding their fate. It is the American Government’s view that the Allies without delay should make clear to the German people the essential terms of the peace settlement which they expect the Germans to accept and observe. Tt is our view that the German people should now be permitted and helped to make the necessary preparations for establishing a democratic Government which can accept and observe those terms. From now on the world’s thoughtful people will j'udge Allied action in Germany not by Allied promises, but by performances,”]