The Duce Apprehensive

Evening Star, Issue 25676, 27 December 1945, Page 7

The Duce Apprehensive

Hitler-Mussolini Letters—No. 14

Russia Can't Be Conquered MUST BE PLACATED

Towards the end of March, 1943, Mussolini obviously was convinced that Nazi Germany never could defeat Soviet Russia and. was apprehensive over liis own precarious situation in North Africa. ,

Here was his summary of the situation as set forth to Hitler in the last of a series of letters between the two dictators: —

“ ROME, MARCH 25, 1943

“ FUHRER,— “ I deeply regret to have been compelled to postpone our meeting by a few days due to the launching of the Anglo'American offensive in Tunisia. I greatly desire to confer with you, and deein it absolutely necessary that we thoroughly examine the subjects I outlined in my last letter. “ Next week I hope and believe that the course of events will allow me to leave Italy and meet you even somewhere further than Salzburg. In the meantime, permit me, Fuhrer, to spend a few more words on a subject wJiicK presently I consider as one of decisive importance—namely, Russia. “ I have discussed this subject at length with, the Reichmarshal . (Herman Wilhelm... Goering) when we met at the Brenner;.Pass on June 1, 1941. I expressed the opinion that as .far as Russia ryas concerned there was no alternative "’but to choose between alliance/ and; -war. / . , “ After long and harrowing meditation—of which you spoke oftem—you chose war, - and announced your decision

to me a few hours before your troops crossed the frontier. History has shown you to have been right in your decision. Russia has deceived Europe and the whole world—even through its campaign against Finland —and truly has constituted a formidable menace in the Axis’ rear. “ In nearly two years of war, through the gravest sacrifices and heroisms unprecedented in history, you. succeeded ; in weakening Russia to the extent that, for a long time to come, she will no longer be a threat to the Axis Powers. “ Therefore, T may rightly say > that the Russian chapter can now be closed—if possible with a separate peace or else with the establishment of a. defensive line—a powerful eastern wall—which the Russians could not overcome. DEFENDED BY HER SIZE “ I have arrived at this conclusion chiefly ' because, in my opinion, Russia can never be annihilated. She is defended by ' her very size—a territory so vast that it can never be conquered or held. “.Summer offensives and winter withdrawals cannot continue indefinitely without resulting in a wearing out of forces, which, even if bilateral, will be advantageous in the end to the Anglo-Americans alone. To this I will add that relations between Stalin and the Allies are at present anything but good, and the moment is most favourable. “ I am convinced that Russia can never be annihilated, owing to her enormous distances, even if the Japanese were to enter the war (against Russia) —an eventuality far from probable. It is therefore necessary to conclude the Russian, chapter in one;way or another. Should this materialise, on that day we can unfurl our flags because victory will be definitely in sight. .■“Once Britain’s continental army —the most powerful and the one on which she relied most—is wiped out, the Axis could weigh with all its* resources on the western front and regain the strategic initiative which since the autumn, both by land and air, passed into the enemy’s hands. AFRICA CATASTROPHE ■ “ It must’- be admitted that the Anglo-American landing in North Africa was a happy move in that it

created a strategic situation entirely new, which might entail the realisation of plans that previously might have appeared almost fantastic. That such plans exist and that the enemy is preparing to carry them out I have-not the slightest doubt. “ Now the possibility is offered us to transform what originally was a wellconceived move and a lucky reality into a catastrophe which might have incalculable consequences in the future developments of the war, particularly as the United States are concerned. In order that the Anglo-American expedition in North Africa be turned into a catastrophe it is necessary that ._. (The balance of this letter is missing.) DESPAIR (EDITOR’S NOTE: One month later, Mussolini’s desperation had become more apparent.), “ ROME, APRIL 30, 1943. “ FUHRER, “ Unless it be possible to solve the air force problem in the Mediterranean —on which I have insisted again and again—and in such a way as to counterbalance the overwhelming air superiority of the enemy, not a warship, not a transport, not an airpjane will reach Tunisia. And this means the immediate loss of Tunisia and of all our forces there. “ All attempts to ship troops there are doomed to failure. To-day three destroyers were lost, two of them carrying German troops, and the other loaded with munitions, following attacks by large enemy formations with 70 to 120 fighter escort. “ Fuhrer, the problem is urgent—imperatively so. Our troops in Tunisia are fighting magnificently, as the enemy himself is compelled to admit, but if we cannot supply them they are doomed. MUSSOLINI.” LAST LETTER Here is the last letter in this historic series of communications. “ MAY 2, 1943. “DUCE, “ I have received your telegram diated May 1, 1943. “ Duce, on March 1 the second air force consisted of 1,012 first line aircraft. Another 574 planes were sent during the month of March. These shipments were further reinforced in April. In the last month alone 669 first line aircraft were sent over,, and this figure includes only the aircraft of normal delivery, not those of the units transferred into Italy or the'transport planes. “What can still be done to stregthen our air forces is now being considered. “ Field-Marshal (Albert) Kesselring will confer with you on this subject. “ With greetings in comradeship, “ A. HITLER.” The correspondence ends with a final report by Mussolini to King Victor Emanuel. “ ROME, MAY 3, 1943. “ MAJESTY, “ I take the liberty to send you here included: “ (a) A copy of the telegrams exchanged between the Fuhrer. and myself, concerning the air situation in the Mediterranean; “ (b) A copy of the note handed to me by General Ambrosio, concerning the situation of the military and civilian commands in Athens. “ With devotion, “ MUSSOLINI.” (World Copyright Reserved.) (End of Series.)